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Social emotional learning (SEL) is an increasingly important area of study, which aims to 
help students develop skills critical for healthy social functioning as well as academic and 
professional success. There is general agreement that SEL, like other subjects, should result 
in knowledge transfer. However, there has been little research aimed at identifying instruction 
methodologies that might enable such transfer. In my dissertation, I propose that SEL 
knowledge transfer may be facilitated by way of direct teaching of a model of the human 
emotion system (HES). I provide a functional definition of the emotion system, demonstrate 
how the principles of the HES represent the deep structures that underlie key SEL skills, 
discuss why the direct teaching of the HES is necessary despite the spontaneous formation of 
implicit models of emotion, and propose a set of components that may comprise an 
instructional HES model. I then describe a pilot study demonstrating that HES model learning 
can transfer to new problems and produce improvements in aspects of social emotional 
competence (SEC), specifically other awareness and empathy. Compared to the control 
group, the pilot’s model learning group rated “socially inappropriate” emotional responses as 
significantly less blameworthy, indicating greater cognitive empathy and the transfer of 
emotion model knowledge to a novel set of problems. A larger, follow-up study sought to 
replicate the results of the pilot while conducting the intervention online and exploring 
 several additional hypotheses. The study successfully replicated the pilot’s results with 
respect to other-awareness, while also demonstrating that HES model learning had a positive 
effect on self-awareness: participants in the model learning condition rated their own 
hypothetical undesirable emotional reactions as significantly less blameworthy than those in 
the control condition, demonstrating increased acceptance of emotions in the self. The results 
also suggest HES model learning produces a stronger short-term effect on other-awareness 
than self-awareness, and shed new light on the design considerations for preparation for 
future learning (PFL) activities in the SEL context, namely, the need for precise targeting of 
relevant deep structures and the potential for learning interference caused by the activation of 
existing emotion theories. Exploratory post-hoc analyses further point to the possibility of 
gender playing a role in the success of HES model learning, with males potentially being 
more resistant to such learning than females. I discuss the study results as well as the broader 
significance of the HES model learning approach to SEL. 
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There is an old eastern saying which alludes to the traits one would wish for in dealing with a 
complex, unpredictable and often unforgiving world: the serenity to accept the things one 
cannot change, the courage to change the things one can, and the wisdom to know the 
difference. If a single area of study could be said to have the goal of developing these three 
abilities, and that of wisdom in particular, it is social emotional learning (SEL).  
The term social and emotional learning was coined by the Fetzer Group in the mid 
1990s to refer to a conceptual framework for fostering children’s social, emotional, and 
academic competencies (Weissberg, Durlak, Domitrovich, & Gullotta, 2015). The impetus 
for creating such a framework came from the recognition that the mission of schools and 
education more broadly went beyond fostering students’ academic achievement, and included 
the development of skills that would enable students to become well-adjusted, healthy and 
responsible citizens (Osher, Kidron, Brackett, Dymnicki, Jones, Weissberg, 2016; but see 
Tyack, 1992 for alternative viewpoints). As importantly, it was coming to be understood that 
social and emotional skills played a significant role in academic success (Boekaerts, 2011; 
Weissberg et al., 2015; Zins, Weissberg, Wang, & Walberg,  2004). Indeed, as scores of SEL 
programs were implemented in schools across the country, it was found that improvements in 
these skills were associated with better school performance (Durlak, Weissberg, Dymnicki, 
Taylor, & Schellinger, 2011), while conferring additional benefits such as reductions in 
behavioral problems, greater psychological well-being, and healthier relationships, among 
others (e.g. Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000; Fine, Izard, Mostow, Trentacosta, & 
Ackerman, 2003; Rivers, Mayer, Brackett, Caruso, Reyes, & Salovey, 2012). These 
developments were accompanied by a crystallization of the SEL framework as defined by the 
Collaborative for Academic, Social and Emotional Learning (CASEL)--the organization that 
grew out of the original Fetzer Group initiative--including the high-level skill set that SEL 
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aimed to cultivate: self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, relationship 
management, and responsible decision-making (CASEL, 2008).  
As the SEL field continued to mature, researchers have also proposed guidelines for 
the development of effective SEL programs. At a macro level, findings suggest that SEL 
programs are more effective when they are not restricted to a single classroom, but are 
ecologically comprehensive, and include the entire school, as well as components aimed at 
the community beyond the school (Tolan, Guerra, & Kendall, 1995; Weissberg et al., 2015). 
At the instructional level, the guidelines indicate that SEL programs should set explicit 
learning goals, employ sequenced training, provide sufficient time for skill development, and 
use active forms of learning (Durlak et al., 2011).  
At the same time, there is general agreement that SEL, like other subjects, should 
result in knowledge transfer (Durlak et al., 2011; Durlak, Domitrovich, Weissberg, & 
Gullotta, 2015; Yeager, 2017a; Zeidner, Roberts & Matthews, 2002), yet there has been little 
research aimed at identifying instruction methodologies that might facilitate such transfer. 
Below, I argue that social emotional knowledge transfer may be enabled by way of direct 
teaching of a model of the human emotion system. In Part I, I lay out the theoretical rationale 
for my argument. In Part II, I describe a pilot study that tested the effects of teaching a “core” 
model of the emotion system. In Part III, I describe the follow-up dissertation study, which 
builds on the pilot. In Part IV, I provide a general discussion of the results of the preceding 
studies, and review the broader significance and implications of the HES model learning 
approach to SEL. 
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PART I: THEORETICAL RATIONALE 
 
I begin this section by outlining the current state of SEL practice, with a focus on existing 
instructional and design guidelines. I then highlight the central role transfer is thought to play 
in the educational process, and how it applies to SEL specifically. I proceed to discuss the 
importance of deep learning to achieving successful transfer, and describe the way deep 
learning often relies on abstracting the deep structure of a concept or problem. I then identify 
the core SEL skills and demonstrate that the principles of the emotion system represent the 
deep structures that underpin the knowledge necessary to master those skills. I go on to show 
why the emotion system should be taught despite the spontaneous formation of implicit 
models of emotion, provide examples of past research involving the teaching of the emotion 
system, offer a set of possible components for an instructional model of the system, and 
address the developmental considerations of teaching the HES. 
 
Current State of SEL Practice 
In recent years, a number of social emotional learning frameworks have been developed 
(Jones, Barnes, Bailey, & Doolittle, 2017; Nagaoka, Farrington, Ehrlich, & Heath, 2015). Of 
these, CASEL’s framework is seen as the most widespread and well-established (Osher et al., 
2016). This framework identifies five high level abilities as central to social emotional 
competence: self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, relationship management, 
and responsible decision-making (CASEL, 2008; Durlak et al., 2015; Zins et al., 2004). The 
development of these skills could be said to represent the chief goal of modern social 
emotional learning programs (Weissberg et al., 2015). Additionally, researchers have 
suggested key criteria for successful SEL program design, including being developmentally 
appropriate, culturally relevant, systemic, comprehensive, evidence-based, and forward 
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thinking (Osher et al., 2016). The literature also provides a set of recommended SEL 
instructional practices that includes sequenced training, active forms of learning, focus on 
sufficient time and practice for skill development, and explicit learning goals (Durlak et al., 
2011). Together, these practices are referred to by the acronym SAFE. The above guidelines 
are currently used by SEL researchers to evaluate the quality of program implementation 
(Durlak et al., 2010, 2011) and to make recommendations to schools and policymakers in 
selecting effective SEL programs (CASEL, 2015). Over the past three decades, hundreds of 
SEL programs have been implemented in schools throughout the US and beyond (Durlak et 
al., 2011; Osher et al., 2016; Weissberg et al., 2015). Many of them had been designed or 
evaluated on the basis of the above guidelines. Yet in the course of these efforts, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the question of SEL knowledge transfer.  
 
Transfer and SEL 
Literature on cognition and education has consistently singled out transfer as one of the most 
important concepts when gauging depth and quality of learning (Barnett & Ceci, 2002; 
Salomon & Perkins, 1989; Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, & Chin, 2011). Transfer refers to the 
ability to use prior knowledge to solve novel problems (Cormier & Hagman, 1987; Perkins & 
Salomon, 1992). More broadly, transfer implies the ability to deal with new concepts and 
phenomena on the basis of prior experience (Chi & VanLehn, 2012). The ability to deal with 
or “treat” these novel phenomena may refer to various actions such as “categorizing, 
deciding, diagnosing, explaining, identifying, learning, problem solving, and analogical 
reasoning in or across different contexts, concepts, problems, patients, phenomena, or 
situations” (Chi & VanLehn, 2012). In other words, transfer is what needs to occur for 
knowledge acquired in the classroom (or anywhere else) to be employed outside the learning 
context and with new content. Without transfer the entire educational enterprise fails: 
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knowledge that can only be utilized in the classroom, on familiar tasks, is of relatively little 
use. While some expectations of transfer, such as from learning to write computer code or 
speak Latin, have proven to be overly optimistic (Pea and Kurland, 1984), there is a great 
deal of evidence validating the construct as well as providing insight into the teaching 
methodologies that support it (e.g. Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; Bransford & Schwartz, 1999; 
Brown & Kane, 1988; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Salomon & Perkins, 1989; Schwartz & 
Martin, 2004; Singley & Anderson, 1989).  
The SEL literature is unambiguous on the need for social emotional skills to transfer 
across different situations (Durlak et al., 2011; Durlak et al., 2015; Zins et al., 2004), and 
researchers and practitioners have expressly advocated for SEL programs to be designed with 
deep learning and transfer in mind (Kam, Greenberg & Kusche, 2004; Osher et al., 2016; 
Zeidner, Roberts & Matthews, 2002). However, the majority of SEL programs have been 
evaluated in the same context in which they were implemented, usually in school or in after 
school programs, and few studies have expressly focused on the transfer of acquired social 
emotional skills as an outcome measure or a design criterion (Durlak et al., 2011; Durlak, 
Weissberg, & Pachan, 2010; Sklad, Diekstra, Ritter, Ben, & Gravesteijn, 2012). Furthermore, 
research has shown that SEL programs focused on improving the school climate often do not 
lead to improved behavior outside that climate (Yeager, 2017a). Consequently, at present 
there is relatively little concrete evidence of SEL knowledge transfer beyond the school or 
classroom, or even across different situations within the school or classroom, despite there 
being ample evidence that many SEL programs produce positive results (Durlak et al., 2015; 
Osher et al., 2016). Of course, this does not constitute proof that transfer of social skills 
acquired from SEL programs does not and has not occured. Indeed, it is quite probable that 
some transfer does occur some of the time, particularly for successful programs. However, 
research has shown time and again that when learning, transfer is far from guaranteed 
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(Barnett & Cecci, 2002; Lave, 1988; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974; Thorndike & Woodworth, 
1901; Schliemann & Nunes, 1990) and that for students to be reliably capable of transfer, 
instruction should be structured in a deliberate way (Chase, Shemwell, Schwartz, 2010; Chen 
& Klahr, 1999; Perkins & Salomon, 2012; Salomon & Perkins, 1989). The current SEL 
instructional guidelines contain some aspects of such a structure, such as providing sufficient 
time for skill mastery and employing active forms of learning, but I argue that they do not go 
far enough to ensure its achievement. For instance, it has been repeatedly shown that skills 
can be “mastered” yet be accompanied by minimal ability to transfer them to new contexts 
and problems (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999; Detterman, 1993; Lobato, 2012; Schwartz & 
Martin, 2004; Thorndike & Woodworth, 1901). Indeed, is has been shown that SEL programs 
that focus on specific skill-development (rather than e.g. altering students’ mindsets) tend to 
be ineffective for adolescents (Yeager, 2017a), implying a failure of knowledge transfer. The 
current SEL program development guidelines may well be deficient in regard to ensuring 
learning transfer partly because there is little available research on how transfer might be 
achieved in the SEL context. The goal of my dissertation is to begin to address this gap in 
knowledge. Below, I make the argument that a potentially effective way to facilitate 
knowledge transfer in the context of SEL may be to teach a model of the human emotion 
system. At the heart of this argument lie the twin concepts of deep learning and deep 
structure. 
 
Deep Learning and Transfer 
A central tenet of transfer literature is the importance of deep understanding of learned 
concepts (Brown, 1989; Gentner & Schumacher, 1986; Schwartz, Chase et al., 2011). That is, 
learning that goes beyond the surface, to grasp the deep structure that underlies a concept or 
problem (Chi & VanLehn, 2012). It’s important to note that the term “deep structure” has 
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been used to mean somewhat different things in different research contexts. For instance, in 
the problem-solving literature, the term is likely to refer to a problem-solving procedure, such 
as a probability principle (Ross, 1987), or another mathematical rule such as the equation for 
calculating distance traveled (Reed, Dempster, & Ettinger, 1985), as opposed to the problem 
cover story, which would contain surface features like descriptions of moving cars or trains 
(Chi & VanLehn, 2012). Critically, simply learning a formula is not the same as grasping a 
deep structure. Rather, one should understand the nature of the structure that the formula 
represents, and the interrelations of the structure’s elements. For example, in their work, 
Schwartz and colleagues (1998, 2011) showed that helping students understand the nature of 
the ratio structure that underlies the concept (and formula) of density, i.e. mass / volume, led 
to better transfer. A deep structure may also refer to an abstract rule or principle such as 
“density is invariant under transformation” (Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, & Chin, 2011). Deep 
structure has also been defined as a schema, as in the analogical reasoning tasks used by Gick 
and Holyoak (1980, 1983), in which participants had to arrive at a common problem-solving 
approach, or schema (e.g. overcoming a large obstacle by means of multiple converging lines 
of attack), that could be reused on subsequent problems. Deep structure has been used in the 
context of stories, where the setting and the characters’ names and appearance would be 
considered the surface features, while the causal plot would represent the story’s deep 
structure (Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993). In the learning literature, deep structure 
usually corresponds to learners’ mental models of the concepts or systems they are studying 
(Johnson-Laird, 1995).  In order to understand a system, a learner needs to construct a mental 
model of that system (Ferrari & Chi, 1998; Johnson-Laird, 1995). Their deep understanding 
is reflected in the accuracy of their mental models. Students’ understanding of the circulatory 
system, for instance, has been evaluated based on the correctness of a representation of their 
mental model of the system (Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994). By capturing the 
 8 
interrelations of the elements of a system, causal mental models allow for reasoning and 
inference-making that facilitates problem-solving (Barnett & Cecci, 2002; Chan & Black, 
2005, 2006; Chi, de Leeuw, Chiu, & LaVancher, 1994; Mayer, 1987). Conversely, when the 
necessary model or underlying principle is lacking, i.e. is not known or not recognized, 
people will often rely on surface features of the situation and represent the problem 
incorrectly (Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Fialkov, Jackson & Rabinowitz, 2014).  In a 
seminal study highlighting this idea, Chi and colleagues (1981) showed that when evaluating 
physics problems, novices tended to group problems based on superficial characteristics 
while experts grouped them by the underlying physics principles they represented. More 
recently, Fialkov et al. (2014) demonstrated a similar phenomenon in the psychological 
realm, showing that psychology students with exposure to an ethics curriculum were better 
able to group hypothetical clinical scenarios on the basis of the deep structure of the ethical 
issue involved. 
In short, deep structure is a fairly broad, multi-purpose term, but its versatility makes 
it well suited to my purposes, as I will explain below. The overarching idea is that grasping a 
deep structure, that is, abstracting a schema, model, principle, or set of principles, is thought 
to enable transfer by allowing learners to map that schema, model, or principle onto new 
problems or situations while getting past their superficial attributes (Brown & Kane, 1988; 
Chi & VanLehn, 2012; Gick and Holyoak, 1983), and using these to reason and make 
inferences about the problem or situation (Chan & Black, 2006; Johnson-Laird, 1995; Mayer, 
1987).  
Another key factor in successful transfer is motivation (Perkins & Salomon, 2012; 
Nokes & Belenky, 2011). That is, whether a learner is motivated to apply what is learned in a 
novel context. Acquiring a deep understanding of a concept may have the added benefit of 
enhancing the motivation to use the concept (Perkins and Salomon, 2012) by making it 
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meaningful to the learner (Chi & VanLehn, 2012).  
Researchers have offered a number of recommendations regarding teaching 
approaches that support the sort of deep learning that enhances transfer, including explicit 
identification of underlying principles (Chen & Klahr, 1999), the use of diagrams (Mayer, 
1989), preparation for future learning (PFL) activities (Schwartz, Chase & Bransford, 2012), 
and varied practice (Marton, 2006; Salomon & Perkins, 1989), among others. In order to 
understand how these recommendations, and the notion of deep learning more generally, 
might apply to SEL, it is necessary to examine more closely the primary skills SEL targets. 
 
The Foundations of SEL 
According to CASEL’s (2008) SEL framework, the five key competencies targeted by SEL 
are self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, relationship management, and 
responsible decision-making. Of these, relationship management and responsible decision-
making are higher order skills that could not be effectively accomplished without first 
attaining some level of self-management ability, self-awareness and social awareness (Durlak 
et al., 2015; Smith, Killgore & Lane, 2017). For instance, relationship management depends 
on social awareness insofar as one needs to be able to correctly interpret others’ emotions and 
behavior in order to respond to them appropriately (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Similarly, 
responsible decision-making depends on both awareness and self-regulation. If one lacks self 
or other awareness, poor decisions may be made due to a failure to correctly understand the 
meaning and causes of a given situation (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Graham, 1996, 1997; Stegge 
& Meerum Terwogt 2007), or an inability to appreciate the negative consequence of an action 
for oneself or others. By the same token, irresponsible decisions may result from an inability 
to regulate one’s emotional reactions (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 2006). 
Indeed, one of the chief goals of self-regulation is the avoidance of the harmful consequences 
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of such decisions (Tamir, Chiu & Gross, 2007; Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007). Thus self-
awareness, other awareness and self-regulation could be seen as foundational abilities upon 
which other social emotional competencies are built (Weissberg et al., 2015). It is also 
generally agreed upon that emotional awareness of self and others (Fonagy and Target, 1998; 
Lane and Schwartz, 1987; Mennin & Fresco, 2014; Pocock, 2010; Smith, Killgore & Lane, 
2017), as well as emotional self-regulation (Gross, 2002; Gross & Munoz, 1995; Snyder, 
Simpson & Hughes, 2007), are conducive to psychological health and effective social 
functioning. And many if not most existing SEL and affect management programs 
incorporate the development of awareness and regulation in some form (e.g. Berking and 
Schwarz, 2014; Greenberg, Kusche, & Mihalic, 1998; Kemeny, Foltz, Ekman, Jennings, 
Rosenberg, Gilliath, et al., 2011; Maurer & Brackett, 2004; Mennin & Fresco, 2014; see 
Durlak et al., 2011 for a meta-analysis of school-based programs). Given the foundational 
role that these abilities play in social emotional learning and competence, it is on them that I 
intend to focus.  
I had previously discussed the concept of deep learning, and that it often involves the 
apprehension of a deep structure that underlies the content being learned. Such learning has 
been shown to support knowledge transfer by enabling learners to map the deep structure 
onto new problems. Might there be a deep structure or set of deep structures to SEL content? 
Below, I argue that such deep structures exists, and that they can be represented by the 
principles and processes of the human emotion system. I begin by providing a functional 
definition of the emotion system and then demonstrate how self and social awareness, as well 
as self-regulation, are enabled by an understanding of the system.  
 
The Emotion System 
The idea of an emotion system has previously been described both in the neurological 
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(Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Cicchetti, Ackerman, & Izard, 1995) and conceptual 
(Berking & Schwarz, 2014; Boekaerts, 2006; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Levenson, 1999; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Sloman 1987; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007) sense. While 
researchers continue to debate the precise nature of the system’s neurological makeup and 
mechanisms (e.g. Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Barrett, Wilson & Barsalou, 2014; Smith, 
Killgore, & Lane, 2017), I am more concerned with the high level functions that it is thought 
to be responsible for, as well as the generally understood principles, components and 
processes that govern those functions.  
Cicchetti and colleagues (1995) proposed that the “central function of the emotions 
system is to motivate and organize behavior” and that the “system is composed of separable 
components involving... neural processes, expressive behavior, and subjective experiences or 
feeling states.” Stegge and Meerum Terwogt (2007) have offered a succinct definition of the 
system as “a kind of radar and response facility that enables us to quickly appraise and 
respond to situations that are relevant to our well-being.” A somewhat expanded definition 
might run as follows: the emotion system helps identify potentially self-relevant stimuli, 
evaluates those stimuli in relation to one’s goals and needs--an evaluation that depends on 
one’s values and beliefs--and then activates an appropriate (and largely automatic) neural, 
motor and physiological response that drives and guides the organism’s behavioral reaction to 
the situation and produces the phenomenological experience we call emotion (Barrett, Wilson 
& Barsalou, 2014; Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004; Frijda, 1988; Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Kahneman, 2003; Levenson, 1999; Lindquist et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Stegge & 
Meerum Terwogt, 2007). Critical to this definition is the assumption that the products of the 
emotion system, i.e. emotions, are essentially adaptive, in that they help the organism rapidly 
determine how to respond to self-relevant events (Frijda, 1988; Levenson, 1999; Roseman & 
Smith, 2001). At the same time, because of the necessity for speed, the system’s output is 
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inevitably stereotypical--the term ‘emotion program’ is sometimes used (Gross & Barrett, 
2011)--and may not represent the optimal response in relation to e.g. long term goals, thus 
requiring some situational fine-tuning (Levenson, 1999; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007). 
To account for this dual need and function--speed as well as flexibility--Levenson (1999) 
proposed the two-system emotion model, in which a core emotion “engine” generates rapid, 
stereotypical responses that can be adjusted by a context-aware, more deliberative control 
system. This echoes the two-system cognitive model advanced by researchers like Kahneman 
(2003) and Stanovich and West (2000). In this model, System 1 (the core emotion system) 
operates rapidly, automatically, and intuitively, producing swift emotional impressions, 
which offers the advantage of speed but tends to lack flexibility and nuance, whereas System 
2 (the control system) allows for purposeful deliberation and functions as a monitor of the 
output of System 1, adjusting that output when necessary (Kahneman, 2003).  The two-
system model is useful for illustrating how knowledge of the emotion system enables the 
skills of awareness and regulation, and how, consequently, the processes and principles of the 
emotion system represent the deep structures underpinning SEL content, as discussed below.  
 
SEL Skills and Emotion System Knowledge 
The idea of developing an understanding of emotions and the emotion system as a means of 
fostering social emotional competence (SEC) has previously been put forth by a number of 
researchers. Boekaerts (2011) has argued that self-regulation is influenced by knowledge and 
beliefs about the emotion system. Similarly, Wranik, Barrett, and Salovey (2007), building on 
Salovey and Mayer’s (1990) emotional intelligence theory, suggested that emotion 
knowledge is instrumental for effective self-regulation, and in particular that an 
understanding of the appraisal process that is central to emotion generation could facilitate 
more effective regulatory strategy selection. Similarly, Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT; 
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Meichenbaum, 1977), which has strongly influenced modern approaches to SEL, is based on 
elucidating the connections between “thoughts, cognitive schema, beliefs, attitudes, and 
attributions that influence one’s feelings” and behavior (Osher et al., 2016). In their lucid and 
persuasive account, Stegge and Meerum Terwogt (2007) argue that explicit knowledge of the 
emotion system contributes critically to the process of reflection, that understanding the 
causes of emotion and having strategies for emotional responding are crucial for effective 
regulation, and that children should be helped to acquire a two-level “emotion theory,” which 
emphasizes both the autonomous nature of the emotion process as well as the capacity and 
need for regulation. However, the literature has not offered a clear, comprehensive account of 
the relationship between emotion system knowledge and key SEL skills; nor has it 
highlighted the potential advantages of teaching the HES from the standpoint of deep 
learning and learning transfer--topics which I begin to address in this and the following 
sections. 
 
Self-Awareness. Self-awareness is defined by Weissberg and colleagues (2015) as the 
understanding of one’s emotions, personal goals and values; furthermore, a high level of self-
awareness is seen as requiring the ability to understand the interconnections between 
thoughts, feelings and actions. It should be added that practical self-awareness would go 
beyond mere understanding to include the capacity to recognize and monitor the interaction 
of these elements in something like real time (Wranik, Barrett & Salovey, 2007). Meanwhile, 
as discussed above, the emotion system is the “engine” that combines stimuli, personal goals, 
values, and thoughts, and transforms them into emotional responses that drive behavior. In 
other words, developing self-awareness would entail the development of a metacognitive 
(Flavell, 2004) understanding of the emotion system. That is, meta-level cognitive processing 
aimed at evaluating one’s emotions and related mental states and phenomena (Lambie & 
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Marcel, 2002). Using the two-system model of emotion and cognition (Kahneman, 2003; 
Levenson, 1999), one might describe this process as System 2 (the control system) 
purposefully evaluating the operations and output of System 1 (the core system). Such 
metacognitive evaluation of one’s emotional processes relies on what has been called second 
order awareness (Lambie & Marcel, 2002), to distinguish it from the first order phenomenal 
experience of having an emotion. In the case of second order awareness, we are consciously 
considering how we feel, why we feel that way, and how we can respond (Stegge & Meerum 
Terwogt, 2007). The quality of this assessment will depend on one’s general understanding of 
how emotions operate, i.e. of the functioning of the emotion system (Barrett 2006; Barrett, 
Gross, Christensen, Benvenuto, 2001). At a most basic level, for example, one would need to 
be able to categorize the emotion one is experiencing, for instance as anger or fear or joy or 
something else, which would call on conceptual emotion knowledge most of us acquire 
through experience, but which can also be deliberately cultivated through instruction and 
practice (Barrett, 2006; Barrett, Wilson & Barsalou, 2014; Smith, Killgore & Lane, 2017; 
Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Wranik, Barrett & Salovey, 2007; Zelazo and Lyons, 
2012). One would also benefit from being able to recognize the cause of the emotion, a task 
made easier by the knowledge that emotions are generated in response to evaluations of 
events with respect to one’s goals and needs (Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 2001). Similarly, 
knowing that emotional experiences often involve blends of emotions (Lane & Schwartz, 
1987), could help one recognize and disentangle several simultaneous and possibly 
conflicting emotional responses (such as relief and disappointment), and so on. Returning to 
the two-system model (Kahneman, 2003; Levenson, 1999), System 2 could now be said to be 
intelligently monitoring System 1, that is, using knowledge of System 1 (and its own 
relationship to that system) in order to make better sense of System 1’s output (Figure 1.1).  
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Figure 1.1. Self-awareness as a function of the 2-level affective-cognitive system: the output of System 
1 (the core system) is monitored and evaluated by System 2 (the control system), a process aided by an 
understanding of the HES. 
 
Social awareness. Whereas self-awareness is concerned with monitoring one’s own 
emotional processes, social awareness involves recognizing and understanding the emotions 
of others, including taking others’ perspective and feeling empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Weissberg et al., 2015). In the psychological literature self and other awareness are 
collectively grouped under the rubric of Theory of Mind, which deals with the “mentalizing” 
activity of interpreting and making inferences and attributions about the mental states of 
oneself and others (Flavell, 2004; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Frith & Frith, 1999). It makes 
intuitive sense for self and other awareness to be functionally related, and indeed numerous 
neuroimaging studies have provided evidence that there is a substantial overlap in the 
neurological processes involved, with some of the same brain regions, such as the medial 
prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and the parietal cortex, implicated both in 
attending to one’s own emotions and those of others (e.g. Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Ochsner, 
Knierim, Ludlow, Hanelin, et al., 2004; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; Vogeley, Bussfeld, 
Newen, Herrmann, et al., 2001). Research in the area of grounded cognition and emotion 
embodiment suggests that when we attempt to interpret others’ emotions and behavior, we 
model their mental states by simulating them via our own emotion system (Barsalou, 2008; 
Buckner, 2011; Damasio, 1994, 2003; Decety, & Grèzes, 2006; Flavell, 2004; Gallese, 
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Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004; Goldman, 2006) enabling us to infer their affective states 
(Gallese et al., 2004; Niedenthal, 2007; Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, & 
Rizzolatti, 2003).  As Barsalou (2008) put it, “[we] represent other people’s minds using 
simulations of our own minds.” In particular, affect simulation is facilitated by a process 
whereby the observation of others’ postures and facial expressions results in neural activity in 
the corresponding motor cortices, which may or may not result in overt physical movement, 
but which will activate associated emotion constructs (e.g. perceiving a smile may engender 
the activation of the neural representations of joy or happiness; Gallese et al., 2004; Decety, 
& Grèzes, 2006; Niedenthal, 2007). Furthermore, the construction and semantic 
comprehension of the context and situation that gave rise to the other’s emotions relies on 
some of the same top-down mechanisms that interpret the meaning of self-relevant situations 
and events (Ochsner et al., 2004; Ochsner, Ray, Hughes, McRae, Cooper, Weber, Gabrieli, & 
Gross, 2009; Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015). The product of the top-down meaning-making can 
then be plugged in, so to speak, into bottom-up emotion generation circuits like the amygdala 
to create a simulated experience of the other’s condition (Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner et 
al., 2009).  
This kind of mental simulation is also thought to be the mechanism which allows us 
to comprehend the emotional and mental states of characters in films and books (Anderson & 
Hanson, 2010; Decety, & Grèzes, 2006; Fletcher, Happé, Frith, Baker, Dolan, Frackowiak, et 
al., 1995; Niedenthal, 2007; Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015). Thus it is not puzzling to us when a 
character in a story feels angry upon being insulted: the simulation of the character’s 
experience that occurs as part of engaging with the story allows us to understand his anger. 
The capacity for such simulation depends on the common structure of the emotion system -- 
that is, on the implicit expectation of consistency in the general interrelations between 
emotions, their causes and consequences, within the observer and the subject (Decety & 
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Chaminade, 2003; Gallese et al., 2004; Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986; Harris, 2000; Wondra 
& Ellsworth, 2015). It is this assumption that makes it possible for the same neural 
mechanisms that govern the experience and interpretation of one’s own emotions to be 
utilized to experience those of another. (Note that I am referring to the general principles of 
the emotion system, e.g. that a stimulus will be evaluated with respect to an individual’s goals 
and needs, rather than the specific goals, values, beliefs, experiences, temperament and other 
factors that may produce individual differences in emotional responding.) Furthermore, the 
aforementioned simulation process is generally thought to be carried out automatically as we 
engage with another person (whether real or fictional) (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Wondra & 
Ellsworth, 2015), suggesting that this occurs largely by means of the core affective system. 
As Wondra and Ellsworth (2015) write, “Empathy is not a special process. Instead it is a part 
of normal emotion processes.” 
Because of the reliance on one’s own emotional processing capacity to understand the 
emotions of others, researchers have argued that enhancing this capacity, that is, improving 
one’s emotional self-awareness, would support social awareness (Decety & Jackson, 2004; 
Flavell, 2004; Lane and Schwartz, 1987). To paraphrase Rousseau, knowing your own heart 
allows you to better understand your fellow man (or woman). This perspective has obvious 
implications when considering the role of emotion system knowledge in enabling social 
awareness. Simulating others’ emotional states in our own mind allows us to make sense of 
their emotions in much the same way that we make sense of our own (Wondra & Ellsworth, 
2015): by interpreting the situation, identifying the attendant feelings, uncovering their 
causes, and other factors, such as beliefs and values, that may have played a role in the 
person’s emotional reaction--a process that would clearly benefit from an understanding of 
the emotion system, just as it does in the case of self-awareness. Here again, System 2 can 
leverage its knowledge of how System 1 works to make a better evaluation of System 1’s 
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output, only this time the output being evaluated is one that results from a simulation of 




Figure 1.2. Social awareness as a function of the 2-level affective-cognitive system: another’s  
emotional state is simulated via System 1 (the core system) and the result of the simulation is evaluated  
by System 2 (the control system), a process aided by an understanding of the HES much as it is in the  
case of self-awareness. 
 
Emotion regulation. Knowledge of the emotion system would also be expected to be linked 
with emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is generally defined as the purposeful 
management of one’s emotions to facilitate the achievement of one’s goals (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007). Regulation can take a variety forms, including situation selection, 
attention deployment, cognitive change, and emotion suppression (Gross, 2015). For the 
present discussion, regulation through cognitive change, e.g. by means of reappraisal 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2007), is of particular interest for several reasons. First, it is a form of 
regulation that occurs “in the moment,” i.e. as someone is experiencing an emotion, which is 
the time when the challenge and need to regulate might be greatest. Second, there is evidence 
that it is generally a healthier form of regulation compared to emotion suppression (e.g. 
Richards & Gross, 2000), and third, it has been extensively studied (Gross, 2015).   
While emotion regulation via cognitive change is often thought to be distinct from 
emotion generation (Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Gross & Thompson, 2007), a growing 
body of evidence suggests that the two may in fact be carried out by overlapping neural 
circuitry (Barrett, Wilson & Barsalou, 2014; Ochsner, Ray, Gabrieli, & Gross, 2004; Ochsner 
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& Gross, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2009) and may represent two functions whose distinction is 
more theoretical and conceptual than anatomical (Gross & Barrett, 2011; Barrett et al., 2014; 
Ochsner et al., 2009). In particular, Barrett and colleagues (Barrett 2006; Barrett et al., 2014) 
argue that emotions are continuously updated “situated conceptualizations” that are both 
generated and altered, or regulated, by the same underlying, distributed neural components 
and mechanisms. Essentially, emotional experience is triggered in response to the perceived 
meaning, or conceptualization, of a situation or stimulus. When that meaning changes, 
whether as a result of deliberate effort or spontaneously, the emotion and its attendant 
psychological and physiological experience change with it. In short, while regulation may 
subjectively feel different due to its effortful and deliberate nature, its effects are produced by 
the same underlying meaning-making processes that automatically generate emotional 
experience, i.e. by means of the emotion system. At the same time, successful regulation 
strategy selection depends on a grasp of the emotional structure of a given episode (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994), which is aided by an understanding of the emotion system (Stegge & Meerum 
Terwogt, 2007). Similarly, determining whether regulation succeeded (and whether or not 
additional efforts or an alternate strategy may be called for) depends on the evaluation of the 
effect of the regulation effort (Bonanno & Burton , 2013), i.e. a metacognitive, second order-
type assessment of the emotion system’s state following the regulation attempt. In the two-
system (Kahneman, 2003; Levenson, 1999) parlance, when regulation occurs, System 2 is 
both evaluating and modulating the output of System 1 (by providing new inputs in the form 
of altered conceptualizations (Barrett, Wilson & Barsalou, 2014)), and subsequently 
evaluating and acting on the result of the modulation, in an ongoing regulatory feedback loop 
whose success depends in part on how well System 2 understands the functioning of System 
1 (Figure 1.3).  
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Figure 1.3. Self-regulation as a function of the 2-level affective-cognitive system: the output of System 
1 (the core system) is monitored and evaluated by System 2 (the control system); System 2 then 
modulates System 1’s output by providing new inputs in the form of altered conceptualizations, with 
both evaluation and modulation being informed by an understanding of the HES. 
 
 
In sum, the set of neural structures and processes comprising the human emotion 
system can be said to be responsible for generating emotions and their attendant subjective 
experience, as well as allowing for mentalizing about one’s own and others’ emotions, and 
regulating emotions. The emotion system is thus the universal chassis, so to speak, upon 
which social emotional functioning is built. By the same token, knowledge of how the 
emotion system functions is critical for enabling core SEL skills like self-awareness, social 
awareness and self-regulation. In the next section, I expand on this idea to show that the HES 
may be an optimal target and basis for transfer-focused SEL instruction. 
 
The Emotion System as Deep Structure 
The universal nature of the emotion system makes it a logical focus for transfer-enabling SEL 
instruction. I propose that the HES, its components, principles and processes, can be seen as 
the set of deep structures that underpin social emotional learning content. These deep 
structures can come in several forms: that of a causal mental model of emotions to be used in 
reasoning about an emotional situation, of key principles and emotion schemas that factor 
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into the model and can influence attributions and secondary appraisals, and combinations of 
the above. The use of these deep structures should help learners make the most of the 
information generated by the emotion system to solve social and emotional problems.   
Though emotions have long been regarded as mysterious and inscrutable (Frijda, 
1988), the type of information processing involved in managing social-emotional challenges 
is similar to the process of general problem-solving (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Stegge & 
Meerum Terwogt, 2007). In order to determine how best to respond to a given situation, “one 
has to analyze the situation to establish the nature of the problem” (Stegge & Meerum 
Terwogt, 2007). The accuracy of this situational appraisal, which enables adaptive response 
selection, will be strongly influenced by emotion knowledge (Barrett, 2006; Boekaerts, 2011; 
Crick & Dodge, 1994; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007). 
Specifically, knowledge of how emotions arise (i.e. their causes), and an ability to apply that 
knowledge to make inferences and draw conclusions in a given (often novel) situation. 
Unlike broad behavioral rules, such as “be respectful,” or stereotypical attributions such as 
“teachers are caring (or strict),” which may be useful social heuristics but don’t lend 
themselves to flexible deployment for socio-emotional problem-solving, the workings of the 
emotion system represent the fundamental principles upon which our socio-emotional 
functioning is based. Consequently, understanding of the emotion system should allow for a 
more accurate and nuanced analysis--which would most likely occur at the level of second 
order awareness (Lambie & Marcel, 2002)--of the nature and causes of one’s own and others’ 
emotions, and subsequently for choosing more appropriate responses.  
For instance, knowing that emotions are generated on the basis of appraisals which 
evaluate events in relation to one’s goals and needs (Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 2001)--an 
aspect of the causal mental model of the HES--can help trace the emotion’s origins and 
provide insight into how to manage it (Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Wranik, Barrett, & 
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Salovey, 2007). For instance, incipient anger in reaction to a request from a partner or spouse 
might be determined to be caused by the pressure to make a deadline, rather than the nature 
of the request itself, which can help damp the anger and select a constructive response (such 
as communicating the demands of the deadline). Similarly, when observing someone else 
having an emotional reaction, one would be able to make use of the model of emotions based 
on goal-congruent appraisals, try to identify the goals in question, and manage the situation 
accordingly. In this latter case, HES model knowledge would be supporting social awareness. 
In both cases, use of the model would be laying the groundwork for more fruitful regulation 
and behavior response selection.  
To take another example, learning about the automaticity of appraisal (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2007; Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 2001)--a principle of the HES--and the limited 
control one has over the emotion generation process, would be expected to positively 
influence how accepting one is of emotions in oneself and others (Flavell & Green, 1999; 
Frijda, 1988). Being accepting of emotions involves non-judgment of the emotional 
experience, and is in itself a form of regulation associated with psychological well-being 
(Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; Zelazo & Lyons, 2012), which gives a person an 
opportunity to better understand the emotion and respond adaptively to it. Understanding that 
initial emotion generation is largely outside one’s control may reduce the sense of blame one 
would attach to an ‘inappropriate’ emotion (Knobe, 2006), and increase acceptance of one’s 
own emotions as well as tolerance for the emotions of others, providing potential regulatory 
benefits (Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007).  In this manner, learning and applying a specific 
HES principle could alter one’s conceptualization of an emotional situation, thus altering 
one’s emotional reaction and contributing to a more adaptive behavioral response. That is, it 
can help lead to greater socio-emotional competence.  
These are just a few examples of how knowledge of the HES model and principles 
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could impact SEC. I posit that a more complete instructional model of the HES, which would 
incorporate a  number of other components and principles, and which I describe below, could 
be expected to provide a variety of specific benefits in the context of socio-emotional 
problem-solving. An understanding of the system would facilitate getting past superficial 
aspects of a situation such as the external characteristics of the environment or of the people 
one is interacting with--e.g. social role, appearance, and so on--and simplistic, stereotyped 
attributions, and to reason and make inferences on the basis of underlying socio-emotional 
principles. Overall, it should boost learners’ emotional complexity (Kang & Shaver, 2004) 
and enable them to respond to emotion-eliciting events in a maximally flexible fashion across 
contexts and situations (Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Wranik, Barrett & Salovey, 2007; 
Yeager, 2017a), fostering what’s known as regulatory flexibility (Bonanno & Burton, 2013).  
The above perspective is consistent with evidence showing that conceptual emotion 
knowledge can influence emotional experience (Barrett, 2006; Barrett, Wilson & Barsalou, 
2014; Lane and Schwartz, 1987; Smith, Killgore & Lane, 2017; Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 
2007), and that an understanding of one’s emotion system can help regulate that system, 
supporting self-management and psychological wellbeing (Barrett et al., 2014; Berking & 
Schwarz, 2014; Boekaerts, 2011; Lane and Schwartz, 1987; Philippot, Baeyens, Douilliez, & 
Francart, 2004; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Wranik, Barrett & Salovey, 2007; Yeager, 
2017a, 2017b). Furthermore, use of such conceptual knowledge can be automatized with 
practice, allowing for it to be incorporated into a person’s repertoire of everyday regulation 
methods (Barrett, Wilson & Barsalou, 2014; Berking & Schwarz, 2014; Gross & Thompson, 
2007).   
Teaching the emotion system also offers a motivational advantage. First, this 
advantage has to do with the fact that the instruction is not prescriptive or rule-based. 
Prescriptive approaches undermine learners’ sense of autonomy, reducing their motivation to 
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follow the prescriptions (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Koestner, Ryan, Bernieri, & Holt, 1984). For 
example, Yeager (2017a) has documented the finding that many existing SEL programs that 
take a more prescriptive approach to learning (e.g. teaching particular ways to solve socio-
emotional problems) tend not to be effective for adolescents. In Yeager’s words, “when SEL 
programs feel to adolescents like a mother telling them how to make their personal choices, 
null effects should not surprise us” (2017a).  Conversely, teaching the HES model is not 
based on telling learners the right way to behave (nor on training them to use a particular 
regulation or behavior strategy), but on elucidating the system that governs their emotional 
functioning, and facilitating inference-making and problem-solving based on the system’s 
logic and principles. Thus it should not infringe on one’s autonomy. Additionally, it should 
foster motivation for transferring the knowledge to other contexts by making it meaningful to 
the learner (Perkins and Solomon, 2012). For similar reasons, this approach may also be 
expected to lead to greater teacher buy-in, which is integral to the successful implementation 
of SEL programs and which may not always be forthcoming (Reyes, Brackett, Rivers, 
Elbertson, & Salovey, 2012). Understanding of the emotion system would be expected to 
provide a further motivational boost by way of increased self-efficacy (Bandura, 2002). 
Knowledge of how emotions arise as well as of other aspects of the emotion system increases 
confidence in managing one’s emotions, i.e. one’s sense of regulatory self-efficacy (Berking 
and Schwarz, 2014). Increased self-efficacy and a greater expectation of success are believed 
to enhance motivation (Bandura, 2002; Wigfield & Eccles, 2000). Indeed, a belief in the 
ability to manage one’s emotions has been shown to support regulation efforts (Sapolsky, 
2007).  
To sum up, I propose that the principles, processes and components of the emotion 
system represent the deep structures that underpin key elements of social emotional learning. 
And that an understanding of the emotion system--i.e. having a well-developed causal mental 
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model of the system and understanding its principles--would be expected to enable improved 
reasoning and inference-making about one’s own and others’ emotions and behavior across 
varied contexts, as well as to boost the motivation to engage in such reasoning, thereby 
enhancing self and social awareness, and regulatory flexibility, and consequently all other 
social emotional competencies.  
 
Implicit Emotion Models and the Need for Direct HES Instruction 
Given that people are able to mentalize on the basis of a naturally developed, intuitive grasp 
of the emotion system (Decety & Chaminade, 2003; Flavell, 1999, 2004; Goldman, 1989; 
Gordon, 1986; Harris, 1991, 2000), one might reasonably ask why it would need to be taught. 
The answer lies in the fact that while we spontaneously construct models of the world, 
including of our own and others’ emotional functioning, and adjust these models over time 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994; Flavell, 2004; Gelman & Wellman, 1998), such models, or theories, 
are often at least partially inaccurate even after considerable experience (Decety & Jackson, 
2004; Flavell & Green, 1999; Fonagy & Target, 1998; Molden & Dweck, 2006). An incorrect 
emotion system model is, by definition, an impediment to a high level of self-awareness. 
Such models can lead to incorrect interpretations of (Dweck, 2008) and problematic reactions 
to emotional experiences (Bushman & Huesmann, 2010; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, Coie, 
& Lynam, 2006; Romero, Master, Paunesku, Dweck, & Gross, 2014, Yeager, Trzesniewski, 
Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011).  Low self-awareness and a poor understanding of one’s 
emotions will also impair a person’s ability to make sense of others’ emotional experiences, 
as discussed above.  Furthermore, spontaneously developed theories of emotions, often called 
“lay” or “naive” theories (Molden & Dweck, 2006), are generally implicit (Dweck, 2006; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Flavell, 2004; Romero et al., 2014). An implicit theory may 
influence a person to behave in a certain way, such as responding with more or less 
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aggression to a provocation (Yeager, Trzesniewski, Tirri, Nokelainen, & Dweck, 2011) or 
being more or less likely to take on a challenge (Dweck, 2006), but it won’t enable a learner 
to reason deliberately and flexibly about a novel situation because it has not been abstracted 
as an explicit, content-independent schema or model to be used in problem-solving (Bassok 
& Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983). As previously discussed, such deep structure 
abstraction is at the heart of knowledge transfer, enabling one to get past a problem’s surface 
features to its underlying principles (Chi & VanLehn, 2012).  
In sum, people are frequently operating on the basis of implicit and inaccurate, or only 
partially accurate, emotion models, which may contribute to incorrect social attributions 
(Dweck, 2008; Graham, 1996, 1997) and maladaptive behaviors (Crick & Dodge, 1994; 
Dodge, Coie, & Lynam, 2006; Fonagy & Target, 1998; Romero et al., 2014; Yeager et al., 
2011), and clearly isn’t optimal if one’s goal is high social emotional competence. Meantime, 
though existing SEL programs often rely on models of emotional functioning to develop their 
curricula, the curricula themselves tend to communicate those models only implicitly and 
indirectly (Durlak et al., 2011; Jennings & Greenberg, 2009; Zeidner, Roberts & Matthews, 
2002; Zins et al., 2004). This pedagogic tendency may be tied to SEL’s roots in behavior 
prevention (Durlak et al., 2011; Osher et al., 2016), which has been known to suffer from a 
somewhat paternalistic approach to learners, resulting in methodologies that often favored 
rule-based instruction over conceptual understanding and deep learning (Durlak, 1997; 
Dusenbury & Falco, 1995). Another reason may be that many SEL programs for middle and 
high school students are adapted from materials intended for younger learners, with only 
relatively superficial alterations (Yeager, 2017a). While activities that are not expressly 
designed to teach the emotion system model may still provide experiences that enhance 
aspects of people’s social emotional competence and provide other benefits, in most cases 
they will not lead to the spontaneous generation of a complete and accurate mental model of 
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the system and its principles. For this to occur, instruction has to be deliberately structured to 
lead to the understanding of the interrelations and common principles that govern the system 
(Chase, Shemwell, Schwartz, 2010;  Chen and Klahr, 1999; Klahr and Chen, 2011; Perkins & 
Salomon, 2012; Salomon & Perkins, 1989). In other words, the system has to be deliberately 
taught with the intention of enabling learners to grasp the underlying model in order for this 
to reliably occur.  
It is important to emphasize that the emotion system model I refer to should be 
founded on actual neurological and physiological processes involved in generating, 
experiencing and regulating emotion, such as the rapid ‘bottom-up’ neural processing of 
perceptual stimuli (Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2009); the more cognitively 
intensive, cortical, ‘top-down’ processes that evaluate stimuli in relation to a person’s goals 
(Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2009); the cascade 
of physiological--autonomic nervous system, endocrine--responses that accompany an 
emotion (Lindquist, Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2014; Rainville, Bechara, 
Naqvi, Damasio, 2006; Sotres-Bayon, Cain & LeDoux, 2006), and so on. This is another 
reason why one would not expect learners to derive the emotion model spontaneously, 
without direct instruction: much of the knowledge pertaining to the emotion system has been 
obtained by means of extensive psychological research as well as neuroscience techniques 
such as fMRI, and often would be quite difficult to arrive at independently (particularly for a 
younger person), even if it is easily understood once learned. In order to keep the material 
digestible, the model would not need to delve very deeply into processes’ underlying 
mechanisms. Yet a clear indication of the biological, research-based foundations of the 
model’s principles and components is seen as an important aspect of instruction because of 
the greater credibility and persuasiveness, and consequently greater capacity to affect extant 
beliefs (Aronson, Fried, & Good, 2002; Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997), it would lend to the 
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model. According to behavior change theories such as the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2010), belief change is critical to behavior change, which is the ultimate purpose of 
SEL (Brackett, Elbertson, & Rivers, 2015). In effect, having access to the same essential 
findings as academic researchers and psychologists would allow everyone to become their 
own therapist, just as universal literacy enabled everyone to become their own teacher 
(though just as literacy did not make teachers obsolete, so HES learning would not be likely 
to obviate therapists). 
 
Automatization of HES Knowledge 
For HES model knowledge to be useful, learners need to be able to employ it on the fly, in a 
real world context, just as they would normally make use of their spontaneously generated 
emotion models, rather than to merely recite it back in a classroom or lab (Durlak et al., 2011; 
Berking and Schwarz, 2014).  That is, the knowledge must move from a declarative to 
something like a procedural state (Anderson, 2009). Hence, the declarative knowledge of the 
model would need to be translated into procedural actions, a process that has been referred to 
as declarative to procedural transfer (Nokes & Belenky, 2011). It is well established that 
practice is the means by which procedural skills are acquired (Salas & Cannon-Bower, 2001), 
and existing SEL guidelines make clear that practice would be an essential element of any 
effective SEL program (Durlak et al., 2011). Consequently, teaching the HES model must 
incorporate practice exercises aimed at translating knowledge of the model into procedural 
skills that can be used in real time. A critical feature in this automatization would be the 
development of a habit of reflection (Bosoevski & Zelazo, 2008; Teasdale, 1999), which 
would support second order self and other awareness (Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007). 
This type of awareness is what enables and prompts deliberate regulatory activity (Levenson, 
1999; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007). Extant research on SEL as well as transfer and skill 
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development suggests a number of important characteristics for the practice activities 
intended to produces the automatization of HES knowledge. These include grounding 
practice in realistic examples of human behavior, e.g. using narrative (Brackett, Rivers, 
Reyes & Salovey, 2012; Greenberg, Kusché, & Mihalic, 1998), ensuring that practice is 
sufficiently varied (Marton, 2006; Salomon & Perkins, 1989), as well as inference-driven 
(Mayer, 1989) and constructive (Chi, 2009), and making use of conceptual models such as 
diagrams (Mayer, 1987, 1989).  
At the same time, one of the challenges of reasoning effectively about emotional 
situations is that the attendant emotions are prone to impact cognitive function (Crick & 
Dodge, 1994; Frijda, 1988; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Zelazo & Lyons, 2012). Such 
so-called “hot” cognition (Prencipe, Kesek, Cohen, Lamm, Lewis & Zelazo, 2011) may be 
biased by the prevailing emotional state (Lambie & Marcel, 2002; Teasdale, 1999), which 
can effectively “hijack” the cognitive system (Frijda, 1988; Zelazo & Lyons, 2012). Thus 
making effective use of emotion knowledge to improve socio-emotional problem-solving 
requires some baseline level of self-regulation that can provide the space for the strategic 
deployment of such knowledge. Notably, the practice involved in the automatization of HES 
model knowledge should in itself be expected to boost this kind of regulation. As alluded to 
above, HES model learning would involve fostering a reflective stance (Teasdale, 1999), 
which calls for self and situational observation. “Observing” an emotionally charged situation 
is a type of psychological distancing (Gross, 1998), which has been shown to make an 
emotion less potent (Wilson-Mendenhall, Barrett & Barsalou, 2011) and can become more 
effective with practice (Denny & Ochsner, 2014). Similarly, attending to one’s internal 
emotional state can attenuate an ongoing emotion by redirecting attention away from the 
eliciting stimulus (Silvia, 2002). At the same time, the HES model and principles would 
provide a framework of abstract conceptual terms to be used to “deconstruct” emotional 
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experience. Deconstructing emotion (Barrett, Wilson-Mendenhall & Barsalou, 2014), and 
representing a stimulus in terms of abstract conceptual descriptions (Bosoevski & Zelazo, 
2008), are both methods thought to produce down-regulation effects. In sum, HES model 
learning possesses some inherent characteristics that should support learners’ regulation and 
facilitate emotion knowledge use. In this way, aspects of HES model learning can be seen as 
not unlike mindfulness training, which is thought to reduce bottom-up interference with top-
down regulatory processes, diminish reactivity and provide more opportunity for adaptive 
emotional responding (Zelazo & Lyons, 2012). Indeed, some recent mindfulness-based SEL 
programs have begun to incorporate information about the emotion system (e.g. Broderick & 
Metz, 2014; Kemeny, Foltz, Ekman et al., 2011). 
Over time, the acquisition and automatization of HES model knowledge would be 
expected to lead to changes in the structure of emotion representation. Barrett and colleagues 
describe how interventions like cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) may produce their effects 
by helping people modify their conceptual system of emotions, altering “how conceptual 
knowledge is used to construct the situated conceptualizations that are emotion” (Barrett, 
Wilson-Mendenhall, & Barsalou, 2014). This echoes Lane and Schwartz (1987) who 
described how acquiring emotional knowledge would be expected to alter the structural 
organization of one’s internal conceptions of emotion, which “determines how the internal 
world of emotion is experienced.” HES model learning and automatization, besides 
facilitating reasoning about emotion, would be expected to accomplish precisely that: altering 
the structure of learners’ internal concepts of emotions, thereby altering how emotions are 
experienced and ultimately regulated. The benefits to regulation would potentially extend 
beyond cognitive change skills to situation and response selection, as greater understanding 
of emotional functioning would enable better prediction of situational and behavioral 
outcomes (see Figure 1.4 for a theory of change diagram). 
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Figure 1.4: How HES model learning is expected to impact social emotional processing. Model learning would 
augment emotion knowledge, which is utilized during primary appraisal, secondary appraisal and response 
selection, as well as situation selection. 
 
 
Past Evidence of the Benefits of Teaching the Emotion System 
Several recent interventions aimed at improving the emotion regulation of different target 
populations have produced some evidence of the potential benefits of teaching a model of the 
emotion system. Berking, Schwarz and colleagues (Berking, Wupperman, Reichardt, Pejic, 
Dippel, & Znoj, 2008; Berking & Schwarz, 2014; Berking & Whitley, 2013), developed an 
emotion processing model which was taught to participants in a clinical setting as part of the 
Affect Regulation Therapy (ART) program which combines with more traditional cognitive 
behavioral therapy (CBT) treatment. Participants in the program showed improvements in 
emotion regulation compared to a control group exposed to CBT treatment only. However, 
the emotion model was just one of several elements of the program, and the model did not 
appear to be explicitly tied to underlying neurological processes that would help explain the 
causal interrelations of the elements of the system. Similarly, Mennin and Fresco (2014) have 
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described a CBT-based program called Emotion Regulation Therapy (ERT), which involves 
providing clinical patients information about how emotions work, along with various other 
forms of emotion training and skill-building. As with ART, ERT is a comprehensive, 
multifaceted program, and shows considerable promise as a clinical intervention (Mennin & 
Fresco, 2014). However, it appears to devote only a relatively small portion of its training 
time to learning about emotions’ underlying mechanisms, so that it is unclear how much of its 
effects may be related to emotion system knowledge (Mennin & Fresco, 2014). Kemeny, 
Ekman and colleagues (2011) recently tested an intervention aimed at teachers, in which 
meditation and perceptual emotional awareness training was combined with information 
about certain aspects of the emotion system, resulting in regulation improvements among 
subjects in the treatment group. However, the emphasis of the intervention appeared to be 
primarily on meditation and perceptual awareness (e.g. recognition of emotion expressions) 
rather than the mastery of the emotion system model per se.  
Yeager, Dweck and Trzesniewski (2013) showed that high-school students’ 
aggressive behavior could be reduced (i.e. their emotional self-regulation improved) by 
influencing their beliefs with regard to personality traits. In some respects, this last study 
offers some of the strongest and clearest evidence for the promise of teaching the principles 
of the emotion system. The study relied on Dweck’s (2008) previous work on implicit beliefs, 
and involved a manipulation of personality beliefs whereby students were shifted away from 
an “entity” view of personality toward an “incremental” one. That is, the intervention 
attempted to increase students’ sense of their capacity to change so that they were less likely 
to think of personality traits as fixed. Crucially, as with other recent mindset-based 
interventions (e.g. Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck, 2007) this process depended on 
teaching students about brain plasticity, and the brain’s inherent capacity for growth and 
change, particularly as it relates to personality, behavior and emotions. Yet what this amounts 
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to is changing students’ conceptual knowledge about an aspect of their affective-cognitive 
system. In other words, Yeager, Dweck and colleagues’ mindset interventions are a specific 
example of the general principle of teaching salient aspects of cognitive and emotional 
functioning in order to produce substantive changes in attitude and behavior. As Yeager at al. 
(2013) put it, “patterns of aggressive retaliation are better understood not as inborn traits or 
intractable habits, but rather as resulting in important ways from the social-cognitive 
frameworks that adolescents have developed.” By the same token, “teaching the incremental 
theory of personality would provide students with a new framework for understanding the 
social world” (Yeager et al., 2013). Taking the transfer and deep learning perspective, the 
power of this approach lies in explicitly providing an accurate mental model of an aspect of 
emotional functioning, in this case the high level concept of the nature of personality. 
Students then rely on this model to reason about their own and others’ behavior, leading to 
altered interpretations of and responses to social situations such as bullying and victimization 
(Yeager et al., 2013). Significantly, Yeager et al. (2013) note that “there were no differences 
across nations or across ethnic or racial groups in the impact of an entity theory on the desire 
for vengeance, suggesting that implicit theories of personality may influence the motivation 
to respond aggressively in many contexts.” The implication is that providing an alternate (i.e. 
incremental) model of personality development would similarly influence learners’ response 
patterns across various contexts, which is the very definition of transfer. Yeager (2017a) 
makes this connection explicit when he writes “[the] mindsets model is promising for 
producing internalized, lasting change, because it’s a mental model that stays with people 
over time... [which] they can apply when they eventually leave [the school] climate.” 
Furthermore, in considering the underlying causes of the effect of the intervention as 
compared to the control group, in which students learned coping skills, Yeager et al. (2013) 
partly attribute it to the motivation students in the experimental condition had to make use of 
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their new knowledge, which was thought to arise out of the change in their understanding of 
the nature of personality. This view aligns with the argument made by Perkins and Solomon 
(2012) that students would be more motivated to transfer their learning if it was made 
meaningful as a result of a deep, causally linked understanding of the material (Chi and 
VanLehn, 2012). Similarly, it fits in with theories of motivation that suggest non-prescriptive 
approaches that provide learners with a sense of autonomy and competence will produce the 
highest levels of intrinsic motivation (Deci and Ryan, 1985). And indeed, Yeager and 
colleagues (2013) highlighted the fact that their intervention did not offer students ready-
made solutions to problems, but assisted them in learning new ways to consider and interpret 
a given situation (i.e. facilitated a form of secondary appraisal or reframing, leading to 
positive self-regulatory outcomes). In a related finding, Jamieson, Mendes, Blackstock, and 
Schmader (2010) showed that informing people of the beneficial aspects of emotional arousal 
led to better performance on a standardized test as a result of reframing the meaning of 
arousal (e.g. physiological preparedness rather than merely anxiety), further demonstrating 
the potential power of learning about the functioning of the emotion system.  
It is important to note that interventions such as those carried out by Yeager et al. 
(2013) and Jamieson et al., (2010) focused on a single, albeit clearly important, aspect of the 
emotion system (the nature of personality traits and of emotional arousal, respectively). 
While these interventions demonstrate the power of teaching certain aspects and principles of 
the affective-cognitive system, they do not represent full-fledged, emotion system model-
based SEL programs. Rather, they highlight the need for such comprehensive programs by 
demonstrating the inadequacy of the alternative, piecemeal approach. If, as research suggests, 
there are multiple key, interrelated HES processes, components and principles (e.g. see 
Cicchetti et al., 1995; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Frijda, 1988; Levenson, 1999; Ochsner & Gross, 
2007) that may each produce a meaningful impact on SEC, it would be impracticable to 
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create individual interventions around each. Nor would it make sense to teach such 
interconnected principles independently. Indeed, doing so could be misleading, as learning 
only isolated pieces of the system can create misconceptions about the entire system. For 
example, whereas Yeager and colleagues (2013) focused on the upside of learning about the 
ability to change one’s personality, other researchers have suggested that an understanding of 
some aspects of the emotion system over which we have little or no control can be beneficial 
as well (Flavell & Green, 1999; Frijda, 1988; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007). More 
broadly, appraisals and emotional responses (and by extension stress and behavior responses) 
are a product of a unique person-situation interaction (Gross, 2015; Roseman & Smith, 2001), 
that will vary in a multitude of ways across individuals and situations. An intervention that 
focuses on a single construct or idea, even one as seemingly powerful as the implicit theory 
of personality (Yeager, 2017a, 2017b; Yeager & Dweck, 2012; Yeager et al., 2013), is 
unlikely to be helpful or applicable in every case or even a majority of cases in which social 
emotional problem-solving will be required (but see Yeager & Walton, 2011 for a perspective 
in favor of such narrowly targeted interventions). Therefore, I argue that the elements and 
principles of the HES should be incorporated into a single, comprehensive model and taught 
together (though the instruction would likely occur sequentially such that the full model 
would be learned over a period of time), in the same way that the principles and processes of 
other systems, whether radar, the nitrogen cycle, or the workings of a camera (Mayer 1989), 
are taught together because they comprise a coherent whole. This view is in keeping with 
findings that suggest SEL interventions should be comprehensive in nature rather than 
isolated and disconnected (Greenberg, Weissberg, O'Brien, Zins, Fredericks, Resnik, & Elias, 
2003; Durlak et al., 2011; Osher et al., 2016; Weissberg et al., 2015). While the research 
supporting systemic and comprehensive approaches to SEL tends to emphasize ecological 
completeness (i.e. incorporation at the class, school, community and district levels), it also 
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points to the need for content unity and cohesion (Osher et al., 2016; Weissberg et al., 2015; 
Zins et al., 2004).  I posit that the causal interconnections and principles of the emotion 
system represent such cohesive, foundational content. Below, I outline a set of components 
that could comprise an inclusive instructional HES model.  
 
Defining the HES Model 
One of the obvious challenges of trying to present a teachable model of the HES is that the 
system is both complex and not yet fully understood (Levenson, 1999). However, my 
contention is that there is sufficient understanding of the system to be able to teach certain 
key aspects of it with relative confidence (Frijda, 2007; Smith, Killgore & Lane, 2017). For 
example, Berking and Schwarz (2014) developed a similar model to facilitate affect 
regulation training in a clinical adult population. However, the model was just one piece of a 
larger intervention, and its overall contribution to the observed effects was not assessed. 
Furthermore, Berking and Schwarz’s (2014) model was not grounded in the emotion 
system’s underlying neurological processes (insofar as these processes were not emphasized 
as part of the instruction), thus losing one of the more powerful bases of causal reasoning 
about the model. As with any instructional model, the ART emotion model was necessarily 
simplified for teaching purposes, and it is only one of a variety of possible HES models that 
could be developed.  To my knowledge, no systematic attempt has been made to determine 
which specific elements of the HES, when learned, are capable of producing improvements in 
SEC, thus warranting inclusion in a model used for instruction. As demonstrated by the 
interventions carried out by Yeager et al. (2013) and Jamieson et al. (2010), teaching a single 
key principle of the emotion system can have meaningful effects on learners’ social 
emotional functioning. And it is likely that some model elements are more useful in the 
context of SEL while others less so. In fact, some very important elements may be 
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overlooked by a given model, while including others of little value (Roseman & Smith, 
2001). Therefore, one of the goals in developing an instructional model of the HES would be 
to identify those model components that can be shown, or might be expected, to produce 
improvements in SEC. Below, I propose a preliminary set of such components and principles.  
Several elements of the emotion system which are frequently cited in the literature 
appear to warrant inclusion and emphasis in an instructional model of the HES:  
1) the stimulus that triggers the emotion generation process, which may be internal or 
external (Frijda, 1986; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Scherer, 2000);  
2) the situational appraisal process that gives rise to an emotion by evaluating a 
stimulus in relation to one’s goals and needs (Frijda, 1988; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Scherer, 
Schorr, Johnstone, 2001);  
3) the resulting emotional response, its valence and intensity, its linguistic label, e.g. 
fear or anger, and external signs such as facial expression, tone of voice, and posture (Barrett, 
2006; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Gross & Thompson, 2007; Niedenthal, 2007);   
4) the action tendencies that accompany emotional reactions, including physiological 
changes such as heart rate and perspiration (Frijda, 1988; Lane and Schwartz, 1987; Rainville 
et al., 2006; Roseman & Smith, 2001).  
I propose that the components listed above can be seen as a kind of core of the HES. 
Stegge and Meerum Terwogt (2007) and Levenson (1999) have also identified the emotion 
generation “engine” as the core of the emotion system. A similar suggestion was made by 
Wranik et al. (2007), who highlighted appraisal as a key concept in learning about the 
emotion system. Preliminary evidence based on a pilot study I ran, and which I describe 
below, suggests that an appraisal-focused, core HES model contains enough meaningful 
information to produce positive, short-term changes in SEC.  The notion of a core model is 
also useful in that it can function as a foundation upon which a fuller model can be built, in 
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keeping with the recommendation that knowledge and skills which are more complex should 
be mastered sequentially, after being broken down into smaller steps (Durlak et al., 2011), 
and that the key ideas to be learned in any subject ought to be regularly revisited in multiple 
contexts to solidify understanding (Bruner, 1960).  
The full HES model would incorporate additional components and principles such as:  
5) the bottom-up, perception-driven aspects of the emotion generation process and 
how they contribute to the evaluation of a stimulus, including the concept of emotional 
conditioning (Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, Duncan, Rauch, and Wright, 2007; Britton, Shin, 
Barrett, Rauch, and Wright, 2008; LeDoux, 2000; Ochsner & Barrett, 2001; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2007; Ochsner et al., 2009; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003; Quirk & Gehlert, 
2003);  
6) the influence of one’s preexisting emotional state on the appraisal and emotion 
generation process (Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Lerner and Keltner, 2000; Loewenstein, 1996; 
Quigley & Tedeschi, 1996; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Wright & Bower, 1992);  
7) the origins and development of individual goals and desires in relation to cultural 
influences and universal psychological needs (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Ryan, 1995; 
Smith, Killgore & Lane, 2017) 
8) the ongoing, constructive nature of emotion generation, in which emotional 
responses are part of a feedback loop that give rise to subsequent emotions (Lindquist et al., 
2012; Barrett et al., 2014; Gross, 2015; Gross & Thompson, 2007);  
9) the regulatory processes (such as reflection and reappraisal) that allow for emotion 
modulation by manipulating situated conceptualizations (Barrett et al., 2014; Barrett & Gross, 
2011; Bosoevski & Zelazo, 2008; Gross & Thompson, 2007; McRae et al., 2011; Ochsner & 
Gross, 2007); in conjunction with  
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10) the two-level model (i.e. the core and control systems) of emotional functioning 
(Kahneman, 2003; Levenson, 1999); 
11) the changeable nature of regulation ability, emotions and personality (Barrett et 
al., 2014; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, and Dweck, 2007; Denny & Ochsner, 2014; Dweck, 
2006, 2008; Graham, 1997; Wranik, Barrett, & Salovey, 2007); and 
12) the concept of complex and blended emotions (Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Stegge & 
Meerum Terwogt, 2007).  
The above set of proposed components, processes and principles is necessarily not 
definitive. It is entirely possible that learning about other facets of the HES may also support 
SEC development. For instance, learning about emotions’ attributional dimensions such as 
locus of control (Weiner, 1985; Roseman & Smith, 2001), could be useful in better 
understanding one’s emotional functioning. This aspect of emotion processing was part of the 
SEC intervention developed by Kemeny, Foltz, Ekman and colleagues (2011), and Wondra & 
Ellsworth (2017) have suggested that it could be useful for interventions seeking to enhance 
perspective-taking and empathy. Similarly, the reciprocal connection between external 
manifestations of emotions and internal feeling states, e.g. that while happiness makes you 
smile, smiling may also produce a feeling of happiness (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Niedenthal, 
2007), is another principle of the HES that may be useful to include in the model. 
Additionally, it may be useful to articulate the evolutionary purpose of emotions and their 
critical role in our survival (Frijda, 1988; Levenson, 1999) in order to increase learners’ 
interest and motivation to engage with the subject. At the same time, it is possible that some 
of the components and principles proposed above are not found to contribute significantly to 
improvements in SEC. Thus determining the proper makeup of the emotion system model is 
one of the essential tasks facing those who may wish to implement this SEL method, and 
represents a potentially fruitful research opportunity.  
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I now turn to the developmental considerations of teaching the HES, and subsequently 
describe a pilot study designed to test the hypothesis that learning a core emotion system 
model can produce improvements in aspects of SEC.  
 
Developmental Considerations 
Instructional materials and methodologies must be developmentally appropriate, and this is 
perhaps especially true of SEL (Brackett et al., 2015; Osher et al., 2016; Yeager et al., 2013), 
which is meant to foster skills that are closely linked to neurological and psychological 
development (Durlak et al., 2015; Saarni, 1999). Abilities like metacognition and perspective 
taking, which support self-awareness and social awareness respectively, develop with age 
(Flavell, 2004; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Perner & Lang, 1999; Smith, Killgore & Lane, 
2017), as does self-regulation, which is tied to executive functioning and the development of 
the prefrontal cortex (Prencipe et al., 2011; Teicher, Andersen, Polcari, Anderson, Navalta, & 
Kim, 2003; Zelazo & Lyons, 2012). Furthermore, the specific instructional approach I 
advocate for here depends on the notion of abstracting underlying principles of the emotion 
system, which at first glance may seem too sophisticated a cognitive task for younger 
learners. However, Brown and Kane (1988) showed that children as young as preschool-age 
are able to learn, i.e. abstract, general principles from multiple examples. And a number of 
ostensibly successful SEL programs have been developed for the pre-K population (Bierman 
& Motamedi, 2015). Indeed, pre-K is an age group which has garnered perhaps the greatest 
amount of SEL interest and support (Weissberg et al., 2015). There is also evidence that 
certain theory of mind capacities, such as understanding false beliefs, develop earlier than 
previously believed (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), suggesting that children may able to 
benefit from socio-emotional instruction at a very young age. Therefore, a simplified, age-
appropriate version of the HES model could conceivably be utilized with fairly young 
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learners, a view that appears to be supported by some researchers (e.g. Stegge and Meerum 
Terwogt, 2014; Yeager, 2017a). Indeed, teaching young learners emotion vocabulary and 
other basic emotion concepts, which are elements of a number of established SEL programs 
implemented with the K-8 population, such as the RULER approach (Brackett et al., 2012), 
could be seen as an important preparatory step to introducing them to the more elaborate and 
sophisticated version of the emotion system model, which assumes learners’ familiarity with 
fundamental ideas like emotion categories.  
Further research is needed to understand at what developmental stage and in what 
form the teaching of the HES model should ideally commence. Meanwhile, research evidence 
already exists demonstrating that the approach can work with older learners, such as students 
in high school, college, and beyond.  For instance, Yeager and colleagues (2013; Yeager, 
Lee, & Jamieson, 2016) have demonstrated that a similar conceptual knowledge approach to 
SEL can be effective with students of high school age. Jamieson and colleagues (2010) made 
use of it with college students; Kemeny et al., (2012) with teachers; Berking and Schwarz 
(2014) and Mennin and Fresco (2014) with adults from a clinical population; and in my 
studies I have successfully worked with people aged 18 and up. Below, I provide details of 
two such experiments, which tested the effects of teaching a core HES model to two different 
target groups. The first of these was a pilot study, in which I worked with graduate students at 
Columbia Teachers College. The second was a larger, follow-up study, in which I conducted 
an online experiment with US high school graduates aged 18 to 25. 
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PART II: PILOT STUDY 
 
Given above theory and findings, I designed and ran a pilot study to test the hypothesis that 
learning a core model of the HES would transfer to a novel context and influence aspects of 
emotional awareness, specifically other awareness and empathy. A small sample (ages 22-53, 
n=20) of graduate students at Columbia Teachers College was randomly assigned to a model 
learning group or a control group. The model learning group was taught a simple, appraisal-
based model of emotion generation. Compared to the control group, which read literary 
fiction, the model learning group rated “socially inappropriate” emotional responses of 
characters in fictional scenarios as significantly less blameworthy, indicating altered 
attributions of responsibility and greater cognitive empathy. The findings support the 
hypothesis that conceptual knowledge about the emotion system can enhance SEC, 
specifically other awareness, and that these improvements would transfer to novel problems 
in a new context.  
 
Other Awareness, Empathy, and Blame 
As previously mentioned, other awareness is one of the foundational SEL skills and is closely 
linked to empathy (Weissberg et al., 2015). Research suggests that empathy depends on 
several distinct processes including aspects of other awareness such as perspective-taking and 
comprehending the other’s emotional state, also known as cognitive empathy (Decety and 
Jackson, 2004). Such comprehension is affected by one’s conceptual emotion knowledge 
(Barrett, 2006; Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007; Wranik et al., 2007). Increasing such 
knowledge would thus be expected to support empathy, specifically cognitive empathy, and 
thus other awareness more generally.  
In the present study, participants in the model learning group were provided 
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conceptual emotion knowledge in the form of a core model of the HES focused on the 
appraisal process (see Presentation 1 in Appendix B). Appraisal is a key concept in the 
emotion literature (Frijda, 1986, 2007; Gross & Barrett, 2011; Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 
2001), and Wranik et al. (2007) have suggested that a better understanding of emotional 
appraisal may support SEC. The model created for the present study emphasized the 
automatic nature of appraisal and its central role in emotion generation (Scherer, Schorr, 
Johnstone, 2001). Acquiring such knowledge would be expected to influence participants’ 
attributions of responsibility when considering people’s emotional reactions (Weiner, 1995; 
Cushman & Young, 2010). Understanding that much of the emotion generation process 
happens outside a person’s control would be expected to reduce attributions of control and 
responsibility when evaluating an emotional reaction (Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015), and 
consequently attributions of blame (Knobe, 2006). Attributions of blame are thought to be 
instrumental in the generation of anger (Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 2001) and subsequent 
aggression (Crick & Dodge, 1995; Weiner, 1995), while aggressive behavior has been an 
ongoing target of interventions in schools and other contexts (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Durlak, 
1997; Yeager et al., 2013). Altered attributions of responsibility and reductions in blame 
(Gasser, Malti & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2012; Graham, 1997; Yeager et al., 2013) as well 
as greater empathy (Batson, 1991; Decety & Hodges, 2004; Zahn-Waxler, Cole, Welsh, & 
Fox, 1995) have been previously linked to reductions in aggressive tendencies. Thus, if the 
present intervention were to lead to reductions in blame with respect to others’ emotions, it 
would be demonstrating that increased understanding of the emotion system, specifically of 
the automaticity of the appraisal process and its integral role in emotion generation, has the 
potential to reduce anger and consequently aggression (i.e. improve regulation), by increasing 
other awareness. Specifically, the acquired emotion knowledge would be impacting an aspect 
of other awareness known as cognitive empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004), i.e. the ability to 
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better understand someone’s emotional state and its causes.  
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the intervention’s hypothesized pathway of change. 
Importantly, the taught material did not directly address the issue of blame: altered 
attributions of blame were expected to occur as a result of the transfer and application of HES 
knowledge to a novel context. 
 
Figure 2.1. Hypothesized pathway of change. Learning about appraisal is expected to influence perceptions of 
control and responsibility and consequently blame. Dashed lines represent effects not evaluated in the study. 
 
Types of Deep Structure Learned and Their Expected Level of Integration 
It may be worth noting here that deep learning is not defined by the length of time spent on 
learning but by what is learned and how well it is learned. One may spend hours studying 
without achieving what might be called deep learning, and conversely in some cases it may 
be achieved in as little as a few minutes. For instance, in their studies on transfer, Gick and 
Holyoak (1983) showed that given particular instruction methods people were able to abstract 
the solution of a sample problem and apply it to solve a subsequent, analogously structured 
but superficially different problem, in procedures that lasted well under an hour. The key was 
grasping the solution’s deep structure, also known as a mental model (or schema) in the 
learning literature (Johnson-Laird, 1995). Doing so was thought to enable transfer by 
allowing learners to map that structure onto new problems while getting past their surface 
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attributes, and using it to reason about the problem (Gick and Holyoak, 1983). Similarly, in 
the present study, my focus was on the deep structures participants would be assimilating, 
and the methods used to communicate them, with the expectation that this could be achieved 
in a relatively short amount of time.  
The HES model taught as part of the intervention encompassed at least two types of 
deep structure: a causal mental model of the core emotion system, and principles that factor 
into that model. Central aspects of the causal model included a stimulus that sets off the 
emotion generation process, the appraisal process which interprets the stimulus and gives rise 
to the emotion, and the resulting emotional response. Additionally, it included the 
individual’s goals and needs which factor into the appraisal, with either a positive or negative 
appraisal arising due to the congruence or incongruence of the stimulus or event with the 
individual’s goals and needs (see Presentation 1 in Appendix B). The HES principles 
included the automaticity and speed of the appraisal process, such that it is largely outside of 
conscious control.  
It is important to note that not all of the information provided would likely be novel to 
the participants. Study subjects were graduate students at Columbia Teachers College, who 
would be expected to have fairly well developed and sophisticated models and theories of 
people’s emotional functioning. Consequently, the causal relationship between an event, 
one’s goals, and resulting emotions, while it may not have been previously articulated to 
them so explicitly, would likely not be surprising or new but would fit in with participants’ 
naturally developed emotion models (Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Flavell, 2004; 
Goldman, 2006; Gordon, 1986). The most novel piece of the model was likely to be the 
appraisal process, which most participants would not be expected to know about. Thus it is 
primarily the principles of the appraisal process (i.e. its speed, automaticity, and lack of 
conscious control) and its role in emotion generation that would be expected to produce 
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changes in participants’ conceptual emotion knowledge. To be precise, learning about the 
appraisal process would be expected to affect participants’ conceptual emotion knowledge in 
at least two critical ways: first, it would introduce the concept of appraisal into the naturalistic 
or “naive” mental model of emotion generation depicted in Figure 2.2A (i.e. stimulus-
>response), so that it becomes more like the appraisal-based model in Figure 2.2B (i.e. 
stimulus->appraisal->response); second, it would introduce the principle of appraisal 
automaticity, so that participants can come to appreciate one’s lack of control of this process.  
 
Figure 2.2A. Naturalistic or “naive” model of emotion generation.  
 
Figure 2.2B. Appraisal-based model of emotion generation.  
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I expected the new emotion knowledge to be relatively readily assimilated because it 
too would build on participants’ existing understanding of emotions and brain functioning. 
For instance, people already tend to believe emotions may not be entirely controllable 
(Barrett, 2006; Barrett, Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Frijda, 1986; Roseman & Smith, 2001), and 
they are also likely be aware that the brain is responsible for interpreting one’s environment 
and producing emotions. Even if participants did not fully master all aspects of the model due 
to the brevity of the intervention (e.g. the involvement of goals and needs in the appraisal), I 
expected sufficient knowledge transfer to occur on the post-test tasks as part of the “knowing 
with” that participants bring with them to the activity, as outlined by Bransford and Schwartz 
(1999). The notion of “knowing with” refers to the fact that the way a person approaches an 
activity is influenced and informed by pre-existing knowledge, even if there is not a perfect 
one-to-one, whole-cloth match of a previously learned solution to the present problem, such 
as with the more ‘sequestered’ analogical problems used by Gick and Holyoak (1983). This is 
similar to the “transfer-in-pieces” process described by Wagner (2006), whereby transfer 
occurs by means of a gradual collection of smaller chunks of knowledge rather than by the 
wholesale formation of a schema. 
 Similarly, I did not expect the new emotion information to be fully integrated into 
participants’ store of conceptual emotion knowledge at a level where it would impact the 
automatic appraisal of an event (Barrett, 2006; Barrett et al., 2014). Rather, I expected that 
the new knowledge would figure into the secondary appraisal (Lambie & Marcel, 2002) that 
occurs in the context of regulation (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2007) and 
empathy (Decety & Jackson, 2004). Such a follow-up appraisal can make use of additional 
information as part of a more deliberate cognitive analysis of the original stimulus (Gross & 
Thompson, 2007; Lambie & Marcel, 2002). In a real world context, second order appraisal 
should ideally arise from a habit of reflection (Teasdale, 1999) which would lead an 
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individual to become aware of an emotional reaction and to evaluate it for its nature, causes 
and consequences, as well as possible response strategies (Stegge & Meerum Terwogt, 2007). 
In the case of the present intervention, by asking participants to consciously consider the 
blameworthiness of a character’s conduct I effectively induced them to carry out a second 
order appraisal by making them reflect on the situation (Crick & Dodge, 1994). I expected 
this secondary appraisal to be influenced by the emotion knowledge they had been taught.  
The control group read a literary fiction selection, as it has previously been shown 
that reading literary fiction produces short-term improvements in theory of mind (ToM, Kidd 
& Castano, 2013). Thus this group might have been expected to show some short-term 
increases in ToM skills like empathy, making it a more meaningful comparison group than 
one that got no social emotional training at all. This group got no explicit emotion knowledge 
instruction. Effects were measured immediately following the intervention.  
 
Hypotheses 
My hypotheses were that the model learning intervention would: 
1. result in the transfer of the learned emotion knowledge to a novel context; 
2. reduce the perceived blameworthiness of others’ emotional reactions, thus signaling a 
(short-term) positive change in social awareness and empathy, and the potential for 




Recruitment. Participants were recruited from several classes (all graduate level) at Columbia 
Teachers College. The study was announced by the researcher in class, and study information 
 50 
was made available through the school website. The study was announced as offering one 
hour of course credit for participating in the study. Separately, the study was posted on the 
Teachers College bulletin board as offering $20 compensation for participating.  
 
Participants. The study sample was drawn from the student body of Columbia Teachers 
College. The population of interest was preservice and younger working teachers, and many 
TC students are either actively teaching, have taught in the past, or are working toward 
graduate degrees that will enable them to teach, making TC a suitable recruitment 
environment. The reason for focusing on teachers was that teachers’ SEC has been correlated 
with the quality of implementation of SEL programs (Jones, Bouffard, & Weissbourd, 2013; 
Reyes et al., 2011) as well as teachers’ psychological wellbeing (Goddard, Hoy, & Woolfolk 
Hoy, 2004) and burnout rate (Provasnik & Dorfman, 2005), the general quality of the 
classroom climate (Marzano, Marzano, & Pickering, 2003), and ultimately students’ social 
emotional and academic outcomes (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). Meanwhile, teachers often 
get little to no direct instruction aimed at enhancing social emotional competence as part of 
regular professional training (Zins et al., 2004), and only a few standalone SEC enhancement 
programs aimed at teachers have been implemented or evaluated (Jennings & Greenberg, 
2009; Jones et al., 2013).  
Twenty male and female participants, aged 22 to 53 (M=27.2) took part in the study. 
Of these, 6 (30%) were male and 14 (70%) were female. After random assignment, 5 males 
and 5 females were in the control group and 1 male and 9 females in the experimental group. 
(Note that I examined the means of the males in the control group compared to the females, 
to see if males had harsher blameworthiness ratings and thus skewed the outcome toward the 
desired result, but in fact the opposite was true, and males had lower average 
blameworthiness ratings than females: 6.47 vs 7.73). For the majority of participants (12), 
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English was not their native language. Native and non-native english speakers were evenly 
split between groups. Of the non-native speakers, six (50%) were native speakers of Chinese, 
Cantonese or Mandarin, 2 (16.7%) were Japanese speakers, as well as 1 (8.3%) of each of the 
following: Ukrainian, Hindi, Turkish, Spanish. The participants represented a diverse set of 
areas of study, with 3 (15%) in Clinical Psychology, 3 (15%) in Philosophy and Education, 2 
(10%) in Cognitive Studies, 2 (10%) in Developmental Psychology, and 1 (5%) of each of 
the following: Economics, Science Education, Social-Organizational Psychology, School 
Psychology, Autism, Arts Administration, Teaching Social Studies, Instructional Technology 
and Media, and Applied Linguistics. Of the participants, 9 participated in the study for 
monetary compensation and these participants were evenly distributed across conditions, with 
5 in the experimental condition.  
In all, these individuals were considered sufficiently comparable to the broader 
teacher population to justify their use in an exploratory study. Two participants were 
excluded from the final analysis, both from the experimental group. One was excluded 
because she correctly surmised the true nature of the study, and the other because she had 
gotten 4 out of 9 questions wrong on the model learning quiz. These exclusions did not 




Overview. The study followed a randomized, 1x2 between-subject, post-test only design (see 
Table 2.1). Participants were randomly assigned to either the experimental or control group. 
The experimental group was taught the emotion model (see Presentation 1 in Appendix B), 
whereas the control group read literary fiction. Both groups then completed an outcome 
measure in which they rated the blameworthiness of reactions of characters in fictional 
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scenarios. The experimental and control groups were given two different cover stories to 
create the impression that the outcome measure is unrelated to the preceding activities in 
order to test for spontaneous transfer of the model and reduce the possible impact of social 
desirability. All activities for both groups, with the exception of the outcome measure, were 
conducted on a computer. For the outcome measure, participants were moved to a desk 
without a computer, and asked to complete a scenario-based post-test. Both groups filled out 
a computer-based exit questionnaire, which included demographic information and a 






















Control Reading Fiction + Comprehension Questions Post-test 
Table 2.1. 1x2 between-subject, post-test only study design.  
 
Content of Model Learning Intervention 
PFL Activity. Bransford and colleagues (1989) offered evidence that before instruction 
occurs, students need to experience the problems that render told knowledge useful. Building 
on this, Schwartz and colleagues (1998, 2011) have shown that specific activities, such as 
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optimal “time for telling” and lead to deeper learning and better transfer of knowledge. Such 
activities readied students to more fully appreciate the expert solutions and deep structures 
(i.e. the concepts’ underlying schema or model) when they were explained (Schwartz et al., 
2011). Thus, given the goal of teaching a model of the emotion system, PFL activities were 
thought to represent a fruitful instructional strategy. Having learners grapple with questions 
about how their emotions work may make them more receptive to the subsequently offered 
expert ‘solutions’--in this case, research-based depictions of aspects of emotional 
functioning--and more likely to internalize them. That is, the information may be more likely 
to be integrated into learners’ belief structures and become part of their theory of emotion.  
Previous studies have shown “explanation” PFL activities to produce better learning 
outcomes compared to thinking aloud or simply describing the given cases (Williams & 
Lombrozo, 2010). Thus a PFL activity was designed in which participants were asked to 
come up with a generalized explanation for how emotions arise based on a set of contrasting 
cases of comics-like scenarios. The scenarios depicted three characters, each of whom 
experienced two different emotional reactions, one negative and one positive (see Activity 1 
in Appendix B). The model learning group began by engaging in this PFL activity. They 
were given ten minutes to complete the explanation, but were free to take less time.   
 
HES Model Learning. One of the most effective ways to ensure that learners grasp a 
concept’s deep structure or schema is to explicitly highlight it (Chen and Klahr, 1999; Klahr 
and Chen, 2011). This helps ensure that the underlying principles and key interrelations of the 
system are indeed known to the learners, and are not lost or overlooked in the process of 
instruction. Thus, participants were taught the HES model directly (see Presentation 1 in 
Appendix B), following the PFL activity.  
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Three components, which are commonly featured in the scientific literature in the 
context of emotion generation, were identified as a kind of core of the emotion system, and 
formed the basic instructional model of the HES used in the study. These components 
included: 1) the stimulus that triggers the emotion generation process  (Frijda, 1988; Scherer, 
2000; Gross & Barrett, 2011) 2) the top-down cognitive appraisal process that gives rise to an 
emotion  (Gross & Barrett, 2011; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 2001) 
and 3) the resulting emotional response (Frijda, 1988; Gross & Thompson, 2007).  
The HES model was presented by means of a powerpoint. Participants were told to go 
through a powerpoint at their own pace. The model was presented using diagrams. Diagrams, 
also known as conceptual models, have been shown to help students build more accurate 
mental models of a system, and subsequently perform better on transfer problems (Mayer, 
1987, 1989). The key concepts that were meant to be communicated by the model were 
appraisal’s causal role in emotion generation, and the automatic nature of the appraisal (i.e. 
the fact that it happens extremely quickly and without one’s conscious control) as it evaluates 
stimuli with respect to a person’s goals, needs and desires. Because the HES model, like all 
social emotional knowledge, only has utility in relation to actual instances of human emotions 
and interactions, the diagrams included simple narrative illustrations of how aspects of the 
model map to concrete human experiences.  
 
Practice Exercises. As previously discussed, social emotional knowledge is meant to be used 
on the fly, in a real world context, rather than to be merely recited back in a classroom or lab 
(Durlak et al., 2011; Berking and Schwarz, 2014). Achieving this requires practice. While it 
is too much to hope that a true automatization of using the more accurate HES model for 
interpreting emotion information could be accomplished in a single short experimental 
session, having the opportunity to practice is still expected to increase the likelihood of the 
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assimilation of the new emotion knowledge and hence at least partial transfer (Bransford & 
Schwartz, 1999; Marton, 2006; Perkins & Salomon, 1992; Salomon & Perkins, 1989; 
Wagner, 2006). Consequently, the intervention included a number of computer-based 
practice exercises.  
SEL content must be grounded in concrete human behavior (Brackett et al., 2015; 
Durlak et al, 2011), and such grounding often takes the form of narrative (Brackett, Rivers, 
Reyes & Salovey, 2012; Maurer & Brackett, 2004; Greenberg, Kusché, & Mihalic, 1998). 
Engaging with narrative activates the simulation of others’ mental states, representing a 
training exercise of the mentalizing system in its own right (Barrett, 2006; Hutcherson et al., 
2005; Keen, 2007; Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997; Niedenthal, 2007). It also allows for the 
abstract principles of the HES to be connected to specific examples of human emotions, 
actions, problems and conflicts, without which HES model learning would be a purely 
academic (i.e. not readily transferrable) endeavor. The practice exercises, therefore, took the 
form of narrative scenarios. These scenarios were based on scenarios my colleagues and I 
developed for previous pilot studies (see Practice Exercises 1 in Appendix B).  
It has been shown that making correct inferences is associated with building accurate 
mental models, because it reinforces the understanding of the causal interrelations of the 
system’s elements (Mayer, 1989). Thus the narrative-based exercises emphasized inference-
making on the basis of the core HES model, focusing in particular on the causal role appraisal 
plays in emotion generation. For instance, a learner would be given the following scenario: 
“You go to move your brand new car.” They were then asked the question, “Given the above, 
suggest an event that is likely to produce a *negative* appraisal.” Such inference-based 
exercises were also expected to support constructive learning (Chi, 2009) by ensuring that 
participants were not passively absorbing information, but were both active and producing 
responses that went beyond the information that is given. Chi (2009) has provided evidence 
 56 
that constructive learning is more conducive to deep cognitive processing as compared to 
merely active or passive learning.   
It has also been convincingly argued that varied practice is essential to deep structure 
acquisition and successful transfer (e.g. Marton, 2006; Salomon & Perkins, 1989). Such 
practice reinforces the abstraction of shared underlying problem structures, while exposing 
learners to numerous problem variants with differing surface characteristics (Marton, 2006). 
In the case of the present intervention, the goal was to alter learners’ mental models of 
emotion generation by helping them understand the role of appraisal in that process. 
Consequently, the practice exercises were varied in their surface features, i.e. the details of 
the scenario, as well as the scenario’s situational meaning (i.e. whether it was seen as motive 
congruent or incongruent), but invariant in that in each case the appraisal was identified as 
central to the meaning-making process. They were also varied in the type of inference 
participants were asked to make: either predicting an event that would give rise to a particular 
type of appraisal in a given situation, or inferring a situational antecedent that would produce 
a certain appraisal given an event. There were ten exercises in all, each featuring a different 
scenario. The exercises had two parts: the first part focusing on the appraisal and the second 
part on the resulting emotion, tying the two together. Thus there were twenty practice 
questions in all.  
 Finally, participants were prompted to reflect on the experience of answering the 
questions. Research suggests that reflection facilitates deep learning that enables transfer 
(Bransford & Schwartz, 1999; Kuhn & Pease, 2009; Perkins & Salomon, 1992). Reflection is 
also a critical part of developing self and other awareness (Teasdale, 1999). To encourage 
reflection, participants were asked to notice how given a hypothetical scenario they were able 
to effortlessly assess the valence of their emotional response (positive or negative), 
highlighting the automatic nature of appraisal (see Practice Exercises 1 in Appendix B).  
 57 
 
Self-quiz. Following the practice exercises, participants completed a computer-based self-quiz 
based on the HES model they learned earlier (see Quiz 1 in Appendix B). The quiz was 
meant to assess their grasp of the main ideas--that is the key causal relations and principles of 
the HES--that the model was meant to communicate. They then received feedback on their 
answers. Education research has produced strong evidence that feedback is crucial to learning 
success (Hattie & Timperley, 2007). Feedback can draw students' attention to potential gaps 
in knowledge, and provide guidance on how to improve performance (Hattie & Timperley, 
2007). Since the success of the experiment depended on participants developing a sufficiently 
accurate understanding of the provided HES model, aside from being a way to establish the 
level of model learning that occurred, the quiz provided an opportunity to correct 
misperceptions. The feedback focused on those questions where the participants’ answers 
differed from suggested answers. In such cases the study administrator discussed the question 
with the participant and explained why the suggested answer had been chosen. The quiz 
included 9 questions. In most cases, participants responded at rate of 7 correct (78%) or more, 
but in one case a participant got 4 responses incorrect. This participant was excluded from the 
analysis, on the assumption that they had not learned the model sufficiently well. Overall, the 
results of the self-quiz tended to show ceiling effects, as subjects were able to reason about 
the model principles presented in the experiment with relative ease. This represents the risk 
that the taught content was too easy or too familiar. However, exit questionnaires from 
previous pilots have consistently shown that key aspects of the model, i.e. appraisal and its 
role in emotion generation, were new to most participants, and thus would still be expected to 




The control group’s main activity was reading a literary fiction selection and answering 
reading comprehension questions. The fiction selection was a short story called “The Big 
Cat” by Louise Erdrich, originally published in The New Yorker, and selected from the Best 
American Short Stories 2015.  This material was chosen because Kidd and Castano (2013) 
demonstrated that reading high quality literary fiction such as that published in the Best 
American Short Stories anthologies led to short-term theory of mind improvements, as 
compared to reading “popular” or “pulp” fiction. The story was also selected because its 
length was expected to require control group participants to spend about as much time 
reading and answering questions as the model group participants spent on the model learning 
activities. The reading comprehension questions that accompanied the fiction selection did 
not focus on the emotional aspects of the story but on basic story content, and were meant to 
be a way to ensure participants were paying attention to the narrative rather than to increase 
their conceptual emotional knowledge or understanding. The control group was not be taught 




Post-test. The primary outcome measure was based on participants’ responses to social 
scenarios presented to the groups under a deception-based cover story (see Outcome Measure 
1 and Researcher Script 1 in Appendix B). Participants were asked to rate the actions of 
individuals in fictional scenarios with regard to how “blameworthy” they appeared to be. This 
was considered a transfer task, though it was necessarily operationalized somewhat 
differently from approaches often taken in experiments focused on academic learning. In 
education research, transfer assessments usually take the form of teaching some concept that 
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can be used in problem solving, e.g. the ratio structure in density, then seeing if students can 
utilize that concept on novel problems, e.g. using the spring constant in a trampoline problem 
(Schwartz et al., 2011). In the present study, I was interested in seeing how HES model 
learning affected socio-emotional functioning. The material being taught was the appraisal-
focused, core HES model, and the question was whether this conceptual knowledge could be 
used in a novel context. The prototypical “problem” in this case is an emotion-eliciting (and 
often social) situation, which one needs to evaluate and manage. Unlike academic problem-
solving, such socio-emotional problem solving needs to occur more or less in real time, so I 
was less interested in having participants use the HES model to solve elaborate social puzzles 
offline, than to see if the knowledge could be utilized in the sort of heuristic manner that 
resembled its real world use. At the same time, I needed to deal with the issue of social 
desirability (Reynolds, 1982) which would likely come up if I simply asked participants 
transparently model-based questions (such as those used on the self-quiz). That is, I needed 
an activity where participants wouldn’t be likely to realize what I wanted to hear and give the 
answers they thought they were supposed to give. Asking participants to rate the 
blameworthiness of characters’ emotional responses was a transfer task that fit these criteria. 
It was distinct from the activities involved in learning and practice in a number of respects. 
When learning, participants were asked to complete partial scenarios based on the logic of the 
emotion model, and to suggest the emotional reactions that would arise in the given 
scenarios. On the post-test, participants were asked to evaluate complete, novel scenarios on 
the basis of an 11-point Likert scale of blameworthiness. This represents a difference in task 
content (Barnett & Ceci, 2002; Klahr & Chen, 2011). Furthermore, the purpose of the 
activities as explained to the participants, i.e. the task’s functional context (Barnett & Ceci, 
2002) or how it was framed (Nokes & Belenky, 2011), was different for practice and post-test 
(model learning and scenario database creation, respectively). Moreover, during learning and 
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practice, scenarios were all presented in the second person, i.e. they all focused on the 
reactions “you” (the participant) would have in a given situation. By contrast, the outcome 
measure scenarios all focused on the emotions of others: the characters described in the 
scenarios. Because the HES model underpins the emotional functioning of both self and 
other, I expected that learning it with a focus on the self would still allow for the model to 
transfer when reasoning about others. Additionally, the scenarios in the post-test included 
more superficial details, such as descriptions of the environment and the characters, to 
introduce some extraneous factors a person might attend to. Finally, for the post-test I 
deliberately changed the activity context by moving the participant to a different location 
with no computer, and having them fill out the questionnaire using pen and paper rather than 
digitally, i.e. a modality change (Barnett & Ceci, 2002). The general structure of the approach 
was analogous to that of a study by Shariff, Greene, Karremans, et al., (2014), in which 
participants were taught about the lack of free will, and then asked to decide on a punishment 
for a convicted criminal.  
The post-test target scenarios were broken up into two distinct categories: socially 
inappropriate emotional reactions, and socially appropriate emotional reactions. A scenario 
was categorized as showing an inappropriate emotional reaction if the person might be 
expected to be criticized for exhibiting it, given the prevailing social and cultural norms. The 
following is a scenario that would be considered socially inappropriate: “An instructor is 
teaching a large class during fall semester. One day, a student sitting in the back row asks a 
great deal of questions in class, raising his hand every few minutes. After a while, the 
instructor starts to feel impatient with the student.” This scenario is deemed inappropriate 
because an instructor would generally be expected to keep his or her cool even in the face of 
a difficult student. I expected participants to rate such inappropriate reactions more 
negatively even though they only depicted emotions and not outward behaviors. Conversely, 
 61 
the following sample scenario would be considered more socially appropriate: “Having risen 
extra early so as not to miss an important appointment, for which he will have to drive across 
town, a man misplaces his keys just as he is about to leave. He is very annoyed and ready to 
turn his apartment upside down to find the keys.” The rationale for the socially 
appropriate/inappropriate dimension comes from research on moral judgment, which suggests 
people’s judgments of responsibility (and blameworthiness) are influenced by whether 
behavior is seen as morally reprehensible (Cushman & Young, 2010; Knobe, 2006). Thus in 
the more inappropriate scenarios, characters would likely be seen as more responsible and 
more blameworthy. However, I expected HES model training to alter participants’ 
attributions of responsibility by increasing their understanding of how emotions occur, and 
lead them to assign less blame for the characters’ reactions. I expected the effect to be more 
pronounced than for appropriate scenarios, where attributions of responsibility and blame 
would be low to begin with, and thus would be less susceptible to influence. In sum, I 
expected the experimental group to assign significantly lower blameworthy ratings than the 
control group to characters’ reactions in inappropriate scenarios. For appropriate scenarios, I 
expected lower blameworthy ratings in the experimental group, but did not expect the 
difference across groups to be significant. 
The post-test consisted of three “inappropriate” scenarios, three appropriate 
“scenarios,” and six filler scenarios that were designed to have no strongly salient emotional 
dimension. The following is an example of a filler scenario: “A woman sits alone in an office. 
It is after 10pm. She is concentrating on her work. She gets a phone call, glances to see who it 
is, but does not pick up.”  The rationale for including the filler scenarios was to bolster the 
credibility of the cover story (that the researchers are creating a scenario database) and to 
decrease the likelihood that participants discover the true purpose of the activity (measuring 
the effects of the model learning intervention). Two counterbalanced versions of the post-test 
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were used. Participants were randomly assigned one or the other version of the post-test, with 
an equal number of participants using each version.  
 
Exit Questionnaire. Participants also responded to an exit questionnaire that included a 
suspicion probe (see Exit Questionnaire 1 in Appendix B). The suspicion probe asked 
participants to describe what they understood the purpose of the experiment to be. 
Participants were excluded if they described the actual nature of experiment as opposed to the 
what was given to them in the cover story. Only one person was excluded on this basis. In 
addition, I asked participants directly whether they suspected the different parts of the 
experiment were connected, and how, as part of the final debrief. No additional participants 
were excluded on the basis of this direct questioning. The exit questionnaire also asked for 
participants’ demographic data including age, gender, ethnicity, native/primary language, and 
subject specialization (e.g. math,  language arts, etc.).  
 
Data Analysis 
Data was analyzed using ANOVA to compare outcomes across groups. The primary goal was 
to compare the experimental group’s DV scores with the control group to establish the effects 
of the manipulation, i.e. whether learning the core HES model has a short-term positive 
impact on blameworthiness. I ran several individual one-way ANOVAs to compare: overall 
blameworthiness scores by condition, as well as blameworthiness for the two types of 
scenarios, appropriate and inappropriate, by condition. I also ran a 2x2 mixed ANOVA to 
confirm the difference between appropriate and inappropriate scenarios based on 





I ran several planned one-way ANOVAs, with condition as the fixed factor, to test the effects 
of the intervention. There was a significant difference across conditions for scenarios with 
inappropriate emotional responses, with higher blameworthiness ratings observed in the 
control group, as predicted (Control M=7.1, SD=1.58, Experimental M=5.1, SD=1.57, 
F(1,18)=6.97, p=.018, η2=.3). The effect size of .3 is large according to Cohen (1988). There 
was no significant difference across conditions for scenarios with appropriate emotional 
responses (F(1,18)=.432, p=.52). However, the mean was higher for the control condition, as 
expected (Control M=3.75, SD=2.14, Experimental M=3.1, SD=2.29). The difference in the 
overall means for the blameworthiness rating across conditions  approached significance 
(F(1,18)=3.39, p=.08, η2=.175), with the mean for the control condition higher than the 
experimental, as would be expected (Control M=5.43, SD=1.68, Experimental M=4.09, 




Figure 2.3A. The contrast between means for inappropriate emotional reactions. The difference was significant 









Figure 2.3C. The overall mean difference, which approached significance (p=.08, η2=.175). 
 
I also ran a 2x2 mixed ANOVA looking at appropriate and inappropriate scenarios 
across conditions, which showed that there was a main effect for appropriateness, i.e. a 
significant difference in blameworthiness ratings of appropriate and inappropriate scenarios 
(Appropriate M=3.44, SD=2.17, Inappropriate M=6.22, SD=1.83, F(1,16)=24.06, p<.001, 
η2=.6). Because there was no significant interaction between appropriateness and condition 
(F(1,16)=1.36, p=.26, see Figure 2.4), I could conclude without further analysis that 
appropriate and inappropriate scenarios were indeed depicting reactions that elicited 





Figure 2.4. The graph above demonstrates the main effect of appropriateness for the two conditions 
(F(1,16)=24.06, p<.001, η2=.6). There is no significant interaction between appropriateness and condition 
(F(1,16)=1.36, p=.26).  
 
Additionally, I ran a one way MANOVA with condition as the fixed factor and appropriate 
and inappropriate scenarios scores as the two DVs. Box’s test of equality of covariance 
matrices was non-significant (p=.332).  Levene’s test of equality of error variances was non-
significant for both DVs across groups (F(1,18)=.234, p=.634 and F(1,18), p=.384). These 
results suggest that the MANOVA assumptions are not violated and the MANOVA can be 
run. The results of the MANOVA between-subject effect tests showed significance for the 
inappropriate scenario ratings across conditions (F(1,19)=7.931, p=0.011), and insignificant 
effects for appropriate scenario ratings across conditions (F(1,19)=.03, p=.865), matching the 




In the past several decades evidence has emerged that enhanced SEC can have a significant 
positive impact on performance in the classroom and beyond (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009; 
Zins et al., 2004). Teachers in particular stand to benefit from SEC improvements. Teachers 
are constantly dealing with students’ emotions and behavior which may create challenges in 
regulation (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009). At the same time, teachers are expected to manage 
their emotions and the classroom, and build positive relationships with their students 
(Hargreaves, 1998). Consequently, higher levels of SEC, including better regulatory 
capabilities, would be expected to enable teachers to more effectively achieve their teaching 
goals. However, research on ways to accomplish improvements in teacher SEC is lacking. 
The present study was intended to begin to close this gap in knowledge. 
In the present study, I asked whether knowledge acquired in learning a core HES 
model will affect aspects of emotional awareness, and thus SEC, and spontaneously transfer 
to a novel situation. That is indeed what I observed (see Figure 2). In learning the HES 
model, participants in the experimental group learned about the role of appraisal in emotion 
generation, and the largely automatic nature of that process. This knowledge was expected to 
influence participants’ perceptions of the level of control one has over emotional reactions, 
and consequently how blameworthy one is for exhibiting such reactions. I thus expected to 
see reduced blameworthiness scores for the experimental group compared to the control 
group. More specifically, inappropriate emotional reactions, which would generally be seen 
as more blameworthy compared to appropriate reactions, would be rated as significantly less 
blameworthy by the model learning group than the control group. That is, the experimental 
group would be more tolerant and empathic when they perceived someone having what might 
be seen as an inappropriate emotional reaction. The model group did indeed rate characters’ 
“inappropriate” emotional reactions as significantly less blameworthy than the control group, 
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indicating a transfer of some or all of the emotion model by the experimental group, and thus 
a change in the experimental group’s conceptual emotion knowledge, other awareness, and 
empathy. It is noteworthy that this occurred after an intervention lasting merely an hour, of 
which only about half an hour was devoted to the manipulation itself. Furthermore, the 
training had been entirely “you”-focused, i.e. the model was taught with the participant as the 
primary actor. Whereas the post-test was entirely other-focused, highlighting the universal 
nature of the emotion system, which allows it to be utilized in reasoning about one’s own or 
others’ emotions. Moreover, the control group read literary fiction, which was shown to 
produce short-term theory of mind improvements like perspective-taking (Kidd & Castano, 
2013), and thus might have been expected to positively influence social awareness, thereby 
blunting the contrast with the experimental group. Nevertheless, the effect of the 
manipulation remained significant, pointing to the efficacy of the transfer-focused, emotion 
system model approach to SEL as compared to less deliberately structured approaches like 
simply exposing learners to fiction.  
As anticipated, responses to appropriate emotional reactions were not significantly 
affected by the manipulation, though the rating trends were in the expected direction, i.e. with 
the control group showing higher average blameworthiness ratings.  
The results of the intervention provide some direct empirical support for the 
hypothesis that teaching the emotion system model may be a viable approach to SEL and to 
facilitating transfer in this context, specifically as part of teacher training. They also offer 
evidence of the instructional value of specific aspects of the HES model, namely the 
appraisal-based, core system model. This has wider implications for the way social emotional 




The present study includes several limitations. One limitation is the study’s small sample 
size. For example with the final sample size of 18 and observed effect size f of .31, I only had 
power of .24. Additionally, the sample was too small for a meaningful analysis of the 
influence of factors like gender, ethnicity, and area of study. Furthermore, the sample of TC 
masters students suffers from selection bias. It is arguably not representative of the 
population of teachers more broadly. These issues might be addressed by a future study with 
a larger and more representative sample.  
 Another limitation is the absence of a baseline SEC measure, which would allow an 
analysis of covariance using the baseline and the examination of effects for low SEC vs high 
SEC subgroups. In future studies, a baseline SEC measure should be obtained prior to 
conducting the intervention, with the the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS, Lane 
et al., 1990) being one possible instrument which could be used for this purpose. 
A further limitation is that the outcome measure used in the study is based on scenario 
ratings, so that it only captures judgements of emotional reactions depicted in narrative, 
rather than changes in behavioral responses to ‘real world’ (that is, not narrative-based) 
events. This might arguably render the results less compelling than a behavioral measure such 
as allocating hot sauce to a peer following a social exclusion manipulation (Yeager et al., 
2013). At the same time, this form of assessment can be said to focus more closely on actual 
impact on SEC, such as other awareness, which I am interested in capturing, rather than on 
the behavioral outcomes that are expected to result from changes in SEC.  
Additionally, only the short-term effects of the intervention were measured, and thus 
the findings cannot tell us anything about the long-term effects of teaching the emotion model 
on awareness, empathy or SEC.  
 I intend to address a number of the above limitations in the proposed follow-up study 
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PART III: DISSERTATION STUDY 
 
The dissertation study closely followed the design of the pilot study described above, with 
some alterations. To begin with, participants were US high school graduates aged 18 to 25, 
rather than graduate students at Teachers College. This population was chosen for several 
reasons. First, this is a somewhat understudied population when it comes to SEL (Durlak et 
al., 2015), and one that has often proven resistant to social emotional interventions (Yeager, 
2017a; Yeager et al., 2013). At the same time, this is an age at which significant and often 
stressful life transitions occur, such as leaving home, starting college or a job, making social 
emotional competence and the protective factors that it provides especially important 
(Yeager, 2017a). Additionally, teaching an HES model such as the one used in the present 
study, which focuses on internal cognitive processes like appraisal, was expected to be most 
readily accomplished with older learners who already had a fairly sophisticated theory of 
emotions and capacity for self-reflection, such as those of high school age and up (Harris, 
Olthof, Terwogt, 1981).  
Participants were recruited via Amazon MTurk, and the intervention was 
administered entirely online and remotely rather than in person in the lab. This is significant 
because while educational technology is increasingly pervasive, most SEL interventions have 
so far remained “low-tech” (Osher et al., 2016). Though several studies examining the use of 
technology for SEL purposes have been conducted (Stern, Harding, Holzer, & Elbertson, 
2015), additional research is called for to investigate technology’s potential in the space 
(Osher et al., 2016; Weissberg et al., 2015). This is especially true given the negative 
associations that have arisen between modern technologies, such as smartphones and social 
media, and psychological adjustment and wellbeing (e.g. Shakya & Christakis, 2017). In light 
of such concerns, there are grounds to further examine these technologies’ capacities to 
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support social and emotional growth.  
Participants were randomly assigned to 3 groups: a model learning (ML) group, a 
model & preparation for future learning (M+PFL) group, or a control group. The two model 
learning groups were taught an appraisal-based model of emotion generation that was very 
similar to the one used in the pilot study. The M+PFL group was exposed to the same 
material as the ML group, but it also took part in the PFL activity used in the pilot study prior 
to the model learning. The ML group did not engage in the PFL activity. PFL activities have 
previously been shown to lead to deeper learning and better transfer (Schwartz & Bransford, 
1998; Schwartz, Chase, Oppezzo, & Chin, 2011), and my goal was to see if this might apply 
in the SEL context, i.e. whether the PFL activity significantly influences emotion knowledge 
transfer.  
Furthermore, I considered the effects of the intervention on self-awareness as well as 
other awareness. Thus, in addition to considering how blameworthy other people’s emotional 
reactions may be, participants were also asked to rate how much blame they would assign to 
their own emotions in hypothetical scenarios. Lower levels of blame would reflect higher 
levels of acceptance of one’s emotions. Acceptance of one’s emotions, which involves non-
judgment of the emotional experience, is an important form of regulation associated with 
psychological wellbeing (Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Greater emotional acceptance in 
the experimental groups would signal the intervention’s positive impact on self-awareness. 
Because of the universal nature of the emotion system discussed above, such that other 
awareness is facilitated by self-awareness (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Lane & Schwartz, 1987; 
Smith, Killgore & Lane, 2017; Wondra & Ellsworth, 2015), I was expecting self and other 
awareness changes to occur in tandem, and indeed for the effect on self-awareness to be 
greater. In both cases, participants were evaluating blameworthiness, as mentioned above. As 
in the pilot, blame level was chosen as the preferred outcome measure because attributions of 
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blame are thought to be instrumental in the generation of anger (Scherer, Schorr, Johnstone, 
2001) and subsequent aggression (Crick & Dodge, 1995; Weiner, 1995). At the same time, 
altered attributions of responsibility and reductions in blame have been previously linked to 
reductions in aggressive tendencies (Gasser, Malti & Gutzwiller-Helfenfinger, 2012; Graham, 
1997; Yeager et al., 2013). Thus, reductions in blame have a meaningful association with 
other positive emotional and social outcomes. At the same time, blame has been used as an 
outcome variable in past studies evaluating judgments of moral responsibility (Nadelhoffer, 
2006; Woolfolk, Doris & Darley, 2006), and I was able to successfully use it in this manner 
in the pilot described above. 
As in the pilot, the rating of blameworthiness was considered a transfer task. As 
previously discussed, this way of operationalizing transfer is somewhat different from how it 
is often done in experiments focused on academic learning. In education research, transfer 
assessments usually take the form of teaching some concept that can be used in problem 
solving, such as the ratio structure of density, then seeing if students can use that concept on 
novel problems (Schwartz et al., 2011). In the present study, I was interested in seeing how 
HES model learning affected socio-emotional functioning. The prototypical “problem” in this 
case is an emotion-eliciting, usually social situation, which one needs to evaluate and 
manage. Unlike academic problem-solving, such socio-emotional problem solving needs to 
occur more or less in real time, so I was less interested in having participants use the HES 
model to solve complex social ‘problems’ offline, than to see if the knowledge could be 
utilized in the sort of heuristic, on-line manner that resembled its real world use. Even if 
participants did not fully master all aspects of the model, I expected sufficient knowledge 
transfer to occur on the post-test task as part of the “knowing with” that participants bring 
with them to an activity (Bransford & Schwartz, 1999). That is, given that the way a person 
approaches an activity is influenced and informed by pre-existing knowledge (Bransford & 
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Schwartz, 1999), I expected critical aspects of the knowledge acquired as part of the 
intervention (e.g. the idea of appraisal automaticity) to influence participants’ reasoning on 
(i.e. to transfer to) the post-test tasks. Wagner (2006) referred to this process as “transfer-in-
pieces,” whereby transfer occurs by means of a gradual collection and carry-over of 
incremental chunks of knowledge. This perspective aligns with research on ‘mindset’ SEL 
interventions, where learners’ mental models of certain aspects of social functioning (e.g. the 
nature of personality) are altered, providing a new way of viewing social situations, which 
can be carried over across contexts (Yeager, 2017a). 
As in the pilot, the control group read a literary fiction selection, and effects were 
measured immediately following the intervention.  
 
Hypotheses 
In addition to the two hypotheses from the pilot study, I have introduced three additional 
hypotheses for the follow-up study (in bold below).  
My hypotheses are that the model learning intervention would: 
1. Result in the transfer of the learned emotion knowledge to a novel context. 
2. Reduce attributions of the blameworthiness of others’ hypothetical emotional 
reactions, thus signaling a positive short-term change in social awareness, empathy, 
and the potential for more regulated functioning. 
3. Reduce blame ratings of one’s own hypothetical emotional  reactions, thus 
signaling a positive short-term change in self-awareness, emotional acceptance, 
and the potential for more regulated functioning. 
4. Show more pronounced effects when coupled with a PFL activity. 





Recruitment. Participants were recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk). 
MTurk is an online platform that allows people to perform small online tasks for 
compensation. Participants are able to select tasks on the basis of the amount of 
compensation offered, the anticipated length of the task, and the nature of the task. The 
platform has been used to recruit subjects for numerous studies in recent years, and MTurk 
workers have been found to be “relatively representative of the population of U.S. Internet 
users” (Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010). As there has been as a surge of interest in using 
technology for SEL, yet scant research on its effectiveness (Osher et al., 2016), this method 
of recruitment and content delivery offered a chance to expand our knowledge in this area.  
Participants were paid $3.25 for participating, with the expectation--based on an 
earlier MTurk pilot study--that the study activities would take roughly half an hour. 
Participants were provided detailed information about the nature of the study, as well as their 
study participant rights, prior to engaging in the study activities (See Online Consent in 
Appendix A). 
 
Participants. The participants were young adults aged 18-25 (M=22.36), all of whom were 
US high school graduates. A power analysis based on an observed effect size  f of .31 in a 
previously run pilot study indicated that a total of 263 participants would have been required 
to achieve a power of .95 for 3 groups and an ANCOVA analysis. However, previous MTurk 
pilot studies suggested that a large proportion of participants would need to be excluded 
based on non-completion, previous exposure to the content, time spent on the study, and 
other factors. Given this, a total of 556 participants were recruited, or roughly twice the 
number required.  
 77 
 A number of participants were then excluded on the basis of: failure to complete the 
study, previous exposure to some of the study materials, quiz scores, study participation 
duration, and suspicion probe responses. A total of 144 participants were excluded for failing 
to complete the study. Of this group, 65 participants completed 0% of the study, while the 
rest completed varying percentages from 52% to 96%. Following this exclusion, the totals for 
the three groups were Control=140, Model Learning (ML)=145, and Model+PFL 
(M+PFL)=127. A Chi-Square analysis of the completion rate for the three groups was not 
significant (N=556, Chi-Sqr=4.55, p=.1), indicating that the resulting groups were not 
statistically imbalanced. However, when conducting the analysis only with participants with 
non-zero completion percentages, i.e. those who had spent enough time to get to the learning 
content, the Chi-Square analysis was significant (N=491, Chi-Sqr=7.06, p=.029), suggesting 
that the resulting groups may in fact suffer from some selection bias (e.g. more people not 
finishing in the M+PFL condition because it may have been perceived as more difficult).  
Of the 412 participants who completed the study, an additional 94 indicated that they 
had previously been exposed to some of the content (through several preceding pilot studies), 
and were also excluded. No Chi-Square analysis was performed at this stage because 
previous exposure to study content would be random in relation to group placement, and 
considering an underlying selection bias would not be meaningful.  
The remaining 318 participants were further culled based on the time they spent 
completing the study and on their performance on a quiz assessing their understanding of the 
HES model (in the two experimental conditions). As in the pilot study, the rationale for doing 
so was that HES model knowledge transfer would only be expected to occur if that 
knowledge was acquired in the first place.  
With regard to quiz scores, the criterion for exclusion was similar to the one used in 
the pilot study: participants could be considered for exclusion if they answered 5 or less 
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questions correctly out of 9 (i.e. <= 56% correct). However, in the present study an additional 
criterion had to be met if the participant scored exactly 5 points: that at least one of the 
incorrect answers dealt with the automaticity of appraisal (questions 4 and 9), which was the 
central idea participants would need to learn for their perception of control of emotion to be 
affected. Thus both these criteria had to be met for exclusion to occur if the participant had 5 
correct answers. All participants scoring below 5 were excluded. A total of 13 (5%) 
participants were excluded (from the two experimental groups) on the basis of the above 
criteria, 8 from the ML group and 5 from the M+PFL group. A Chi-Square test with the two 
affected groups was not significant (N=200, Chi-Sqr=.32, p=.57), indicating that this 
exclusion was likely not marked by selection bias.  
Unlike in the pilot study, participants in the present study were participating online, 
with no experimenter to oversee their progress. Furthermore, pilot study participants were all 
Teachers College students, while the participants in the present study were “average” internet 
users 18 to 25 years of age, who might be expected to be somewhat less conscientious with 
regard to the quality of their responses. This was reflected in the average duration of their 
engagement with the study, which was approximately 22.5 minutes, compared to 
approximately one hour in a laboratory setting. It should be noted, however, that in the 
laboratory, participants were given a certain amount of time to complete the various parts of 
the study and they would often wait for the experimenter to check on them rather than 
immediately alerting the experimenter upon finishing the section. Thus the longer average 
time for the laboratory setting is not simply a function of greater care and fastidiousness on 
the part of the pilot participants. Nevertheless, some of the online participants managed to 
complete the study in a very short amount of time, in some cases as little as 2.5 minutes. It 
would be unreasonable to expect that meaningful learning could take place in so short a time, 
especially given the number of different parts of the study (there were seven sections all 
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together in the M+PFL condition) and thus that any subsequent transfer would occur. 
Similarly, participants in the control condition would not be expected to be substantially 
impacted by the fiction they read if they merely skimmed or speed-read it. By the same token, 
participants who rushed through the study activities would be much less likely to give 
thoughtful responses on the post-test. Therefore the participants with the lowest study 
duration times in all three groups were excluded from the final analysis. The cutoff duration 
was set at 10 minutes, which was just over one standard deviation (720 seconds) below the 
mean of 22.5 minutes (note that a single extreme outlier with a duration of 299142 seconds 
was excluded when calculating the mean and standard deviation). Based on this cutoff, 16 
participants (5%) were excluded: 14 from Control, 1 from ML, and 1 from M+PFL. A Chi-
Square analysis indicated that this exclusion was not statistically balanced (N=303, Chi-
Sqr=17.3, p<.001), with significantly more participants excluded from the control group 
compared to the experimental groups. This may have had to do with the fact that reading 
fiction was a more passive activity, with comprehension questions occurring only halfway 
through the narrative and at its end, encouraging more participants to move through it quickly 
with only superficial engagement. Additionally, several participants in the experimental 
conditions with very short duration times had already been excluded on the basis of their low 
quiz scores, adding to the imbalance. (Note that an analysis was also conducted including the 
low-duration participants, and it did not significantly alter the results.) 
Exclusion was also considered on the basis of the suspicion probe, which sought to 
determine if participants correctly guessed the purpose of the study and thus might be 
influenced in their responses by social desirability (Reynolds, 1982). While a number of 
participants (14) did speculate that the study sought to examine whether learning about 
emotions or reading a story influenced judgments of blame, only 2 accurately guessed the 
purpose of the manipulation in relation to the blame scenarios (i.e. that blame scores would 
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be expected to decrease), and thus only those 2 participants were excluded on this basis. The 
final sample size was 287. Of these, 91 (32%) were males and 196 (68%) were females.  
Procedure 
Overview. A randomized, 1x3 study design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to 
either the two experimental (ML, M+PFL) groups or a control group (see Table 3.1). The 
final group sizes following exclusion were: Control=102, ML=99, M+PFL=86. Males and 
females were evenly distributed among the groups (control group was 28% male, ML group 
34%, and M+PFL group 32%).  
All activities were done online using the Qualtrics survey platform. The procedure 
largely followed that of the pilot study, with the following difference: all groups completed 
the Empathic Concern and Perspective-Taking subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI; Davis & Oathout, 1987) prior to undertaking any other study activities. 








































Table 3.1. 1x3 study design. Every group completed two subscales of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
prior to all other study activities. All groups also completed a scenario-based post-test. 
 
Content of Model Learning (ML) Intervention 
HES Model Learning. The HES model learning content was largely identical to that of the 
pilot study (minus the PFL activity). Slight changes were made to the diagrams and text used 
in the model learning activity to avoid giving the false impression that appraisals and 
emotions are merely binary (positive/negative). See Presentation 1 in Appendix A. 
 
Practice Exercises. The practices exercises in the M+PFL group were virtually identical to 
those used in the pilot study. However, for the ML group, the number of exercises was 
increased to sixteen (as compared to ten in the pilot study and the M+PFL group), to account 
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for the time the M+PFL group spent on the PFL activity. Additionally, some language was 
updated to better highlight some of the HES model concepts. See Practice Exercises 1 and 2 
in Appendix A. 
 
Self-quiz. The self-quiz was largely identical to the one used in the pilot study. Slight changes 
in the phrasing of some of the questions and answers were made to better emphasize the key 
concepts from the taught emotion model. Additionally, participants were shown whether their 
responses to the quiz questions matched the suggested answers, and in some cases provided 
explanations of why the suggested answer was chosen. See Quiz 1 in Appendix A. 
 
Model Learning Plus PFL (M+PFL)  
The M+PFL group followed the same procedure as the ML group, with two exceptions: the 
group began by doing a PFL activity, and the number of practice exercises following the 
model learning was smaller (ten rather than sixteen) to account for the time spent on the PFL 
activity.  
 
PFL Activity. The PFL activity in the present study was identical to the one used in the pilot 
study. I had previously attempted to use an alternative version in a separate MTurk pilot, but 
the results were not encouraging--the PFL group did not show lower blame scores than 
control--and I returned to the version from the pilot. The main difference in the alternative 
version had been that instead of depicting six different events, to which the three characters 
had different emotional reactions, all three characters reacted to the same two events. This 
was meant to reduce the amount of the variation in the contrasting cases, and draw 
participants’ attention to the fact that the same event can give rise to different emotional 
reactions in different people based on their individual desires, a key idea in appraisal theory 
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(Roseman & Smith, 2001). See PFL Activity 1 in Appendix C. However, I suspect that this 
also made the contrasting cases too trivial, in part because participants already had quite 
sophisticated theories of emotion (as compared to younger students asked to do a PFL dealing 
with novel concepts like density), resulting in weaker learning. 
 
Fiction Content 
As in the pilot study, the control group’s main activity was reading a literary fiction selection 
and answering reading comprehension questions. The fiction selection was the same as that 
used in the pilot.  
 
Measures 
Pre-test. All participants completed the Empathic Concern and Perspective-Taking subscales 
of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis & Oathout, 1987; see Pre-Test 1 in Appendix A). 
These subscales are often used to measure empathic disposition (McCullough, Emmons, 
Tsang, 2002). They have adequate internal reliability (.73 and .71, respectively, Davis & 
Oathout, 1987). The two subscales consist of seven (7) items each, for a total of fourteen (14) 
items. Respondents use a 5 point Likert scale to indicate to what extent the statements in the 
subscales describe them. The subscale scores were used to approximate respondents baseline, 
trait empathic tendencies. I expected that these scores would covary with participants’ 
responses to other-blame scenarios on the post-test. Since empathy and perspective-taking, 
and similar theory of mind capacities, are thought to be closely related to emotional self-
awareness (Lane & Schwartz, 1987; Ochsner et al., 2004), I also expected the scores to 
covary with participants’ responses on the self-blame scenarios.  
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Post-test. The post-test was based on the outcome measure used in the pilot study, i.e. a set of 
fictional scenarios which are rated with regard to how “blameworthy” characters’ reactions 
appear to be. Blameworthiness has been used in a past studies evaluating judgments of moral 
responsibility (Nadelhoffer, 2006; Woolfolk, Doris & Darley, 2006), and I was able to use it 
successfully in my pre-dissertation pilot described above. The scenarios were designed to 
depict “socially undesirable” emotional responses. The notion of social desirability (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1964) has been widely used by researchers to establish if participants are 
susceptible to the so-called approval motive, which would push them to provide responses 
which they believed were desired by the questioner. The Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1964) relies on items which offer opportunities to provide socially desirable but 
highly improbable responses (e.g. that one is always courteous even with people who are 
disagreeable). Based on a similar, but reverse logic, the scenarios in the present study were 
designed to depict emotional responses which would be seen as socially undesirable yet 
which are fairly plausible, such as an instructor getting impatient with a student asking a lot 
of questions. The expectation was that the scenarios’ social undesirability would push 
participants to rate them as having relatively high blameworthiness. To improve reliability, 
one of the original pilot scenarios was replaced, and an extra scenario added, for a total of 
four scenarios rather than three as in the pilot. (See Outcome Measure 1 in Appendix A). The 
resulting internal consistency of the other-blame scenarios was acceptable at .74.  
The other-blame scenarios were accompanied by an additional section in which 
participants were asked to rate how blameworthy they would find emotional reactions they 
themselves may experience in hypothetical self-focused scenarios. This section of the post-
test was intended to measure the intervention’s effects on self-awareness. The section had the 
same number of scenarios as the other-blame section (4), and the scenarios were similarly 
designed to depict “socially undesirable” emotional reactions. The following is an example of 
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one of the self-blame scenarios: “One evening you hear on the news that a person of about 
the same age as you, and with the same background, has recently achieved considerable 
success and fame. You feel a surge of envy on hearing the story.”  (See Outcome Measure 1 
in Appendix A). The internal consistency of the self-blame scenarios was good at .82. 
Additionally, as in the pilot, there was an equal number of “filler” scenarios, which 
were designed to have no explicit or salient reference to emotional reactions. These scenarios 
were primarily meant to help maintain the plausibility of the cover story. They also provide a 
comparison group for the self-blame and other-blame scenarios: I expected that because there 
was no overtly emotion-referencing content in these scenarios the intervention would have no 
significant impact on people’s responses to the fillers (note that this does not mean the fillers 
were completely devoid of emotion, just that emotional reactions were not a overt component 
of the scenarios). The following is an example of one of the filler scenarios: “A woman sits 
alone in an office. It is after 10pm. She is concentrating on her work. She gets a phone call, 
glances to see who it is, but does not pick up.” (See Outcome Measure 1 in Appendix A.) The 
internal consistency of the filler scenarios was excellent at .92.  
Blameworthiness for all scenarios was rated on an 11-point Likert scale. The other-
focused scenarios were written to ensure gender balance, such that there was approximately 
the same number of male and female protagonists, with some characters’ gender being left 
deliberately ambiguous. Similarly, self-focused scenarios were written to allow universal 
gender identification. The order of the scenarios was randomized to ensure the sequence did 
not affect the outcome.  
 
Exit Questionnaire. Participants responded to the same exit questionnaire as in the pilot 
study, which included questions about demographic information such as age and gender. In 
addition, they were asked their highest achieved level of education. As in the pilot, 
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participants were also asked to describe their understanding of the purpose of the study 







Between Group Differences 
Demographic Variables, Empathy, Participation Duration. Groups did not differ 
significantly based on age, education level, empathy scores, or participation duration (all ps > 
.05). Descriptive statistics for the three groups can be found in Table 3.2. 
 
 Control ML M+PFL 
Age 22.29 +/- 1.82 22.37 +/- 1.88 22.46 +/- 2.32 
Education 1.3 +/- .84 1.44 +/- .8 1.6 +/- 1.09 
Empathy 37.97 +/- 9.54 39.18 +/- 7.79 38.59 +/- 9.15 
Duration 1498 +/- 650 1381 +/- 648 1421 +/- 856 
Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics for Age, Education, Empathy and Duration for each condition. The groups did 
not significantly differ from each other on any of the measures. 
 
Blame Scores. A one-way multiple analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was run with Group 
as a factor, three dependent variables (Self-blame scores, Other-blame scores, and Non-
emotional blame scores), and two covariates (Empathy and Duration). Covariates were 
included based on the fact that Empathy had a significant positive correlation with Other-
blame (Spearman’s rho=.144, p=.01) and a marginally significant positive correlation with 
Self-blame (Spearman’s rho=.1, p=.08), and Duration had a marginally significant negative 
correlation with Other-blame (Pearson r=-.1, p=.1) and Self-blame (Pearson r=-.1, p=.09). 
Neither of the other potential covariates--age and education--were correlated with any of the 
blame scores (ps > .05) and were not included in the analysis. Similarly, preliminary tests 
showed no multivariate significance for Gender as a factor or for the interaction of Gender 
and Condition (ps > .05), and consequently Gender was not included in the analysis.  
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Multivariate tests for Group were significant (Wilks’ Lambda=.92, F(6, 560)=3.8, 
p=.001), as were the overall between-subject models for Other-blame (F(4,282)=4.99, 
p=.001), Self-blame (F(4,282)=3.57, p=.007), and Non-emotional scenario blame 
(F(4,282)=3.28, p=.012). Group was a significant between-subject predictor of blame scores 
for both Other-blame (F(2, 282)=6.33, p=.002, hp2=.043) and Self-blame (F(2,282)=3.97, 
p=.02, hp2=.027) but not Non-emotional scenario blame (F(2,282)=1.4, p=.25, hp2=.01).   
Pairwise comparisons revealed that for Other-blame, both experimental groups 
produced significantly lower blame scores than the control (MControl=6.47 vs MML=5.49, 
p=.001; MControl=6.47 vs MM+PFL=5.69; p=.01), as predicted. These results essentially 
reproduced those of the pilot. However, the M+PFL blame scores were somewhat higher than 
the ML scores (MML=5.49 vs MM+PFL=5.69; see Figure 3.1), counter to expectations, though 
this difference was not significant (p=.51).  
For Self-blame, the scores in the ML condition were significantly lower than control 
(MControl=5.28 vs MML=4.5, p=.008), but those in the M+PFL condition were not 
(MControl=5.28 vs MM+PFL=5.13, p=.62). Indeed, the M+PFL group scores were only slightly 
lower than control, such that they were still significantly higher than the ML group 
(MM+PFL=5.13 vs MML=4.5; p=.039). See Figure 3.2 for Self-blame score comparisons and 
Table 3.3 for estimated marginal means.  
Counter to expectations, the effect on Other-blame scores were greater than the effect 
on Self-blame scores. The overall effect size for Other-blame was hp2=.043, while for Self-
blame it was hp2=.027. Looking at the simple contrast effects, the M+PFL group’s Self-blame 
scores weren’t different from control, whereas the group’s Other-blame scores were 
significantly lower than control, offering an obvious disparity in effects. On the other hand, 
the ML group’s scores were significantly different from control for both Self-blame and 
Other-blame. The effect sizes for these contrasts again showed a stronger effect for Other-
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blame (hp2=.053) than for Self-blame (hp2=.033). However, there was a significant difference 
between the control group’s Self-blame and Other-blame scores (Mother-blame=6.43 vs Mself-
blame=5.24, F(1,101)=53.98, p<.001), which introduces a confound in comparing effect sizes 
in this case because lower ‘baseline’ scores for Self-blame may have provided less 
opportunity for blame reduction. Nevertheless, the fact that the Self-blame scores in the 
M+PFL condition were no different from control, whereas they were significantly lower than 
control for Other-blame, points to the likelihood that the intervention’s effect on Self-blame 
may indeed be weaker than on Other-blame. 
See Table 3.4 for a summary of outcomes broken down by hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Comparisons of the estimated marginal means of Other-blame scores for the 3 conditions. 




Figure 3.2. Comparisons of the estimated marginal means of Self-blame scores for the 3 conditions.  
The Model Only (ML) group scored significantly lower than control. The M+PFL group scores were  
not significantly lower than control. 
 
 Figure 3.3. Comparisons of the estimated marginal means of Non-emotional scenario blame scores for  




 Control ML M+PFL 
Other-blame 6.47 +/- .2 (ML, 
M+PFL) 
5.49 +/- .21 (Control) 5.69 +/- .22 (Control) 
Self-blame 5.28 +/- .21(ML) 4.5 +/- .21 (Control, 
M+PFL) 
5.13 +/- .22 (ML) 
Non-emotional 
scenario blame 
5.35 +/- .27 5.5 +/- .27 5.99 +/- .29 
Table 3.3. Estimated marginal means for the three groups with Duration and Empathy as covariates. For the 





Expectation Outcome Outcome 
Supports 
Hypothesis? 
1 Conceptual emotion knowledge 
will transfer to a novel context 
Experimental and control 
conditions differed 
significantly on blame 
scores 
Yes 
2 Ratings of the blameworthiness 
of others’ hypothetical emotional 
reactions will be significantly 
reduced  
Blameworthiness scores in 
the ML and M+PFL 
conditions significantly 
lower than control 
Yes 
3 Ratings of the blameworthiness 
of one’s own hypothetical 
emotional reactions will be 
significantly reduced  
Blameworthiness scores in 
ML condition significantly 
lower than control, not 
significantly lower in 
M+PFL condition 
Partially 
4 M+PFL condition will show 
greatest reductions in blame 
ML group showed 
equivalent (other-blame) or 
greater (self-blame) 
reductions in blame than 
M+PFL group  
No 
5 Effects will be greater for self 
blame than for other blame 
Effects were greater for 
other-blame than for self-
blame 
No 
Table 3.4. Summary of study outcomes as they relate to the hypotheses.  
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Exploratory Analyses  
PFL Effects. Counter to expectations, the PFL group did not exhibit significantly better 
results (i.e. lower blame scores) than the the model only group, despite engaging in a 
preparation for future learning activity. In the case of Other-blame, the M+PFL group scores 
were slightly higher than the ML group scores, though there was no significant difference 
between the two. For Self-blame the M+PFL group scores were significantly higher than the 
ML group. One possibility was that something about the PFL activity had ended up 
interfering with learning rather than aiding it. For instance, asking participants to explain how 
emotions arise might have activated their existing emotion theories. Such theories can be 
highly personal, and their activation may conceivably make participants less rather than more 
receptive to an alternative ‘expert’ explanation provided by the intervention. This is in 
contrast to PFL activities carried out with material which is both new to the learners and 
superficially different from the content being taught, as for example in the case of middle 
school students learning about density having to come up with a ‘clown car crowdedness 
index’ as part of an invention PFL activity (Schwartz, Chase et al., 2011). In a similar vein, 
the activity might have distracted participants from--or at least failed to enhance the 
absorption of--the key idea of appraisal automaticity, since it would have focused their 
attention instead on the process of interpreting a situation in relation to one’s goals and needs.  
To try to test these possibilities, a correlation analysis was carried out between the 
length of time spent on the PFL activity, as well as the quality of the explanation produced, 
and blame scores, along with other measures (Table 3.6). The PFL explanations were made in 
response to the following prompt:  
Below, three characters are shown having emotional reactions to different events. 
Using the  
scenes below as a starting point, your task is to come up with a GENERAL  
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EXPLANATION for how different emotions arise. Your explanation should be 
generally  
predictive, that is, you should be able to use it to predict what type of emotion will 
arise  
given a specific situation. The type of emotion does not need to be totally exact, like  
frustration or contempt. A broad emotional category would be sufficient. Your 
explanation  
should work for all the scenarios below, and ANY OTHER hypothetical situation. 
The quality of explanation was determined by two independent raters and given a score of 0 
to 3 (see Table 3.5 for rubric and sample responses). Inter-rater consistency of .75 was 
achieved, and any discrepancies were resolved through discussion. The distribution of the 
scores is shown in Figure 3.4. 
 
0: No serious 
attempt made to 
answer the question 
1: Explanation is 
attempted but it's not 













the emotions arose 
are like excited are 
apprehensive  
Mrs. Sellers is happy 
because she received 
a gift from her 
friends on 
Christmas. 
Jenny is happy 
because she got an A 
on her math tests 
which equates to 
being good at math 
for her. 
Jack is happy about 
his promotion 
because it can help 
him move ahead in 
life.  
Emotions arise as a 
result of a tendency 
or attitude being 
activated by a 
specific stimuli. 
People have certain 
traits and categories 
inside of them, 
which predispose 
them to respond with 
specific emotions 
when presented with 
specific stimuli. 
When they are 
accurately presented 
with that specific 
A positive emotional 
reaction will arise 
from someone when 
something they 
support, like, or find 
important is 
supported by another 
or an event/outcome. 
A negative 
emotional reaction 
will arise from 
someone when 
something they like 
is negated by 
someone else or an 





something they don't 




Table 3.5. PFL score rubric and sample PFL explanation responses. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Distribution of PFL scores. 
 
 PFL Score PFL Time Gender Quiz Other-blame Self-blame 
PFL Score 1      
PFL Time .18, p=.09 1     
Gender -.03, p=.78 .09, p=.44 1    
Quiz .27*, p=.01 .2, p=.06 -.17, p=.12 1   
Other-blame -.09, p=.42 -.01, p=.95 .23*, p=.035 -.19, p=.08 1  
Self-blame -.04, p=.75 -.13, p=.22 .21, p=.06 -.17, p=.12 .8**, p<.001 1 
Table 3.6. Correlations between PFL score, PFL time and blame scores and other measures for the M+PFL 
Group. *Significance at the .05 level. **Significance at the .01 level. 
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As can be seen from Table 3.6, PFL time and PFL score were not significantly 
correlated with blame scores (ps > .05). Instead, PFL scores were significantly and positively 
correlated with quiz scores (r=.27, p=.01), and PFL time was positively correlated with quiz 
scores at a marginally significant level (r=.2, p=.06) indicating that spending more time on 
and producing a better explanation on the PFL activity was generally associated with better 
learning of the emotion material presented in the study. At the same time, gender was 
significantly positively correlated with other-blame scores (r=.23, p=.035), suggesting that 
males tended to rate others’ emotional reactions as more blameworthy than did females. 
Similarly, gender had a marginally significant positive correlation with self-blame (r=.21, 
p=.06), indicating that males also tended to rate their own undesirable emotional reactions as 
more blameworthy.  
Given these gender correlations, a two-way MANCOVA was run with Gender and 
Group as factors and Duration and Empathy as covariates, to explore Gender by Group 
interactions for Other-blame and Self-blame only (i.e. excluding Non-emotional scenario 
blame). The multivariate test of the Gender by Group interaction was marginally significant 
(Wilks’ Lambda=.97, F(4,556)=2.16, p=.07), and the tests of between-subject effects for the 
interaction were significant for both Other-blame (F(2, 279)=3.22, p=.041) and Self-blame 
(F(2,279)=3.36, p=.036). Two-way ANCOVAs (with Group and Gender as factors) for 
Other-blame and Self-blame confirmed the significance of the interactions, which are 
depicted in Figures 3.5 and 3.6.  
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Figure 3.5. Group x Gender interaction for Other-blame. The interaction was significant (p=.036). 
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Figure 3.6. Group x Gender interaction for Self-blame. The interaction was significant (p=.04). 
 
Comparing estimated marginal means of Other-blame for Gender conditional on 
Group revealed no significant differences in scores for the Control group (F(1, 98)=.56, 
p=.46) or the ML group (F(1,95)=1.21, p=.27). However, for the M+PFL group males 
produced significantly higher blame scores than females (6.48 vs 5.34, F(1,82)=4.73, p=.03) 
with the overall model marginally significant (F(3,82)=2.19, p=.095). See Table 3.7 for the 




Estimated Marginal Means for Other-blame by Gender 
 Female Male 
Control 6.34 +/- .23 6.65 +/- .35 
ML 5.69 +/- .24 5.23 +/- .34 
M+PFL* 5.34 +/- .29 6.48 +/- .43 
Table 3.7. Estimated marginal means of Other-blame scores with Duration and Empathy as covariates. 
*Significant difference across genders (p < .05). 
 
Comparing estimated marginal means of Self-blame for Gender conditional on Group 
revealed no significant differences in scores for the Control group (F(1, 98)=.4, p=.53) or the 
ML group (F(1, 95)=1.62, p=.2), whereas in the M+PFL group the males scored significantly 
higher than females (5.82 vs 4.8, F(1, 82)=4.61, p=.04) with a significant overall model (F(3, 
82)=2.65, p=.05). See Table 3.8 for the estimated marginal means. 
 
Estimated Marginal Means for Self-blame by Gender 
 Female Male 
Control 5.39 +/- .25 5.07 +/- .35 
ML 4.68 +/- .26 4.18 +/- .33 
M+PFL* 4.8 +/- .28 5.82 +/- .37 
Table 3.8. Estimated marginal means of Self-blame scores with Duration and Empathy as covariates. 
*Significant difference across genders (p < .05). 
 
At the same time, there was no significant difference in PFL score means by gender 
(Female: 2.24, Male: 2.18, t(85)=.32, p=.75), nor PFL time by gender (F: 232.1, Male: 252.3, 
t(85)=-.66, p=.51), suggesting that gender did not play a role in the quality of PFL 
explanations produced or the time spent on them. The above data could mean that doing the 
given PFL activity interacted with gender to impede the integration of the new emotion 
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knowledge, especially among males, possibly by activating their existing emotion models, or 
by distracting from the key idea of appraisal automaticity, or both.  
Another possibility is that there were practice effects whereby the ML group 
performed better due to the larger number of practice exercises they completed (in order to 
compensate for the absence of the PFL activity). However, ascertaining practice effects posed 
a challenge for several reasons. First off, the extra exercises completed by the ML group were 
not simply tacked on to the end of the set of exercises performed by the M+PFL group. This 
was because there were two distinct subsets of exercises, with the first subset dealing with 
inferences about future events, while the second subset dealt with inferences about situational 
antecedents. Furthermore, each subset consisted of multiple choice as well as open response 
questions. Therefore, when new exercises were added in the ML condition, they were 
integrated into the set such that an equal number of exercises was added to both subsets, and 
new questions were grouped with existing ones by type, i.e. multiple choice with multiple 
choice and open response with open response. In other words, in seeking to analyze the 
results it wasn’t possible simply to split the ML exercise set and compare the means of the 
equivalent of the M+PFL set and the new add-on set, because the questions in each were 
interleaved. Had it been possible to do such a split, improved performance on the add-on set 
compared to the preceding M+PFL set equivalent might have arguably pointed to the 
presence of practice effects.  
However, there was a further factor that would have undermined the usefulness of 
such a comparison. Namely, that there was effectively no way for participants to provide a 
wrong answer on the practice exercises with respect to the HES model taught. This was 
because the purpose of the exercises was to give participants repeated exposure to the concept 
of appraisal as it fits into the emotion generation process in the real world, rather than to 
present them with problems that they might have failed on. Thus the exercises were simple 
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vignettes dealing with everyday occurrences, which asked participants to either select or 
imagine events that would produce positive or negative appraisals and emotional responses. 
For example, given the following scenario, “You go to move your brand new car,” 
participants were asked, “Given the above, suggest an event that is likely to produce a 
*negative* appraisal.” As cognitively unimpaired English-speaking adults who have been 
taught the concept of appraisal, all participants were able to provide appropriate responses to 
this and similar exercises. The only times their answers could be said to be ‘incorrect’ was 
when they either did not answer at all, or misread or misunderstood a question, e.g. when 
asked to offer a preceding situation that might lead to a particular appraisal, they instead 
offered a future situation. However, such responses would not necessarily have reflected a 
faulty understanding of the material (i.e. the emotion model) -- since the responses were 
correct with regard to the valence of the appraisal -- and thus score differences based on such 
errors would not be useful in determining practice effects in relation to the mastery of the 
emotion model. Rather, they might be indicative of other factors such as level of attention, 
motivation, or cognitive ability.  
Practice exercise scores did not differ by condition overall (MML=.94 +/- .05 vs 
MM+PFL=.93 +/- .1), nor by gender within condition, nor by condition within gender (all ps > 
.05). However, the correlation patterns of practice scores for the two genders in the M+PFL 












Duration 1       
Other-blame -.129, 
p=.29 
1      
Self-blame -.21, 
p=.29 
.77*, p<.001 1     
PFL Time .74**, 
p<.001 
-.07, p=.74 -.2, p=.33 1    



















Female Duration 1       
Other-blame -.13, 
p=.33 
1      
Self-blame -.11, 
p=.39 
.8**, p<.001 1     
PFL Time .43**, 
p=.001 
-.01, p=.94 -.14, p=.29 1    
PFL Score -.02, 
p=.86 
-.03, p=.84 .004, p=.98 .19, 
p=.14 



















Table 3.9. Practice score correlations for Males and Females in the M+PFL group. *Significance at the .05 level. 
**Significance at the .01 level. 
 
As can be seen from table 3.9, for females, practice scores were strongly correlated to 
PFL scores (r=.52, p<.001) and moderately correlated with quiz scores (r=.27, p=.04), but not 
with blame scores (ps > .05 for both Other-blame and Self-blame). On the other hand, quiz 
scores were marginally negatively correlated with Other-blame scores (r=-.23, p=.08) and 
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Self-blame scores (r=-.22, p=.09). This is consistent with the idea that practice scores might 
be reflective of some mix of cognitive ability and motivation, while quiz scores would reflect 
the quality of learning of the emotion model, and would consequently have a correlation to 
blame scores.  
On the other hand, for males, the pattern was quite different. Practice scores were 
significantly and negatively correlated to overall duration (r=-.46, p=.016) and PFL time (-
.53, p=.004), and at the same time strongly and positively correlated to Self-blame scores 
(p=.49, p=.01). That is, higher practice scores were associated with less time spent on task 
and higher self-blame scores. Meanwhile, practice scores were not correlated to either quiz 
scores or PFL scores, and quiz scores were not correlated to blame scores (all ps > .05).  This 
hints at a particular kind of participation profile of some male participants: ones who were 
relatively high on some aspects of cognitive ability, such as attention and decision-making, 
but also motivated to complete the study quickly (evidenced by high practice scores, which 
required quick evaluations, coupled with high speed of completion), and who also were 
relatively resistant to the effects of model learning (no quiz-blame correlations), especially 
when it came to self-blame (high self-blame scores). The latter may well have been related to 
these male participants’ rapid study completion and their capacity for and emphasis on rapid 
decision-making (rather than e.g. absorbing new material, as evidenced by no practice-quiz 
correlation). In sum, it may be that some of the males in the M+PFL group were able and 
motivated to complete the study activities quickly and accurately, but also somewhat 
superficially, and as such they were less susceptible to the emotional model learning. 
This does not negate the possibility that practice effects were at play, such that fewer 
practice exercises coupled with a PFL activity, which allowed for an open response and thus 
could be completed very quickly, diminished these participants’ absorption of the material 
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and subsequent blame score effects. Nevertheless, such practice effects, if any, would still 
appear to have been more pronounced for males than females. 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, I asked whether knowledge acquired in learning the HES core model 
would spontaneously transfer to a novel set of problems and affect aspects of emotional 
awareness. As in the pilot study, participants in the experimental groups learned about the 
role of appraisal in emotion generation, and the largely automatic nature of that process. This 
knowledge was expected to influence participants’ perceptions of the level of control one has 
over emotional reactions. This, in turn, was expected affect how blameworthy one judges 
others and oneself to be for exhibiting such reactions. 
 With respect to other-blame, I expected to reproduce the results of the pilot, such that 
there were reduced blameworthiness scores in the experimental groups compared to the 
control group. More specifically, I expected socially undesirable emotional reactions to be 
rated as significantly less blameworthy by the model learning groups than the control group. 
That is, the experimental groups could be said to be more tolerant and empathic when they 
perceived someone “reacting badly.” The results were largely in line with expectations. Both 
experimental groups rated others’ socially undesirable emotional reactions as significantly 
less blameworthy than did the control group. The ML group’s blame scores were more than 
15% lower than the control group’s, and the M+PFL group’s scores were more than 12% 
lower. These results supported the hypothesis that conceptual emotion knowledge would 
transfer to novel problems and impact social awareness. However, they went counter to the 
expectation that the M+PFL group would show the lowest blameworthiness scores, as this 
group’s scores were not significantly different from the ML group, and were in fact slightly 
higher.  
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 Similar results were observed for self-blame. The ML group’s self-blame scores were 
significantly lower than the control’s, with a reduction of nearly 15%, providing an indication 
that learning the emotion model also had an impact on self-awareness, as expected. On the 
other hand, the M+PFL group’s scores, while somewhat lower than the control’s, were not 
significantly different. They were, however, significantly higher than the ML group’s.  
Overall, these results bolstered the proposition that learning a core, appraisal-based 
model of the emotion system would transfer to a novel set of problems and influence aspects 
of self and other awareness in a positive way. Moreover, this was accomplished with a 
sample of 18 to 25 year olds, an age range which includes late adolescence, which has proven 
itself to be a difficult target for SEL interventions (Yeager, 2017a). The results are arguably 
made more compelling by the fact that the intervention was quite short, and that the control 
group read literary fiction, which would be expected to have a short-term positive impact on 
aspects of theory of mind (Kidd & Castano, 2013).  Additionally, given that the intervention 
was run online, the results are an indication that this SEL methodology can be delivered using 
modern technologies, increasing its potential scalability and accessibility.   
Furthermore, the findings highlight the importance of a more nuanced and 
comprehensive approach to teaching students about emotions than, for example, simply 
communicating the idea that personality or emotions can change, as has been done in 
interventions focusing on incremental theories (e.g. Yeager et al., 2013). Instead, the study 
results indicate that, as suggested by Stegge and Meerum Terwogt (2007), there is value in 
developing a two-level theory of emotions, recognizing that some aspects of the emotion 
system cannot be controlled (Flavell and Green, 1999), while also learning that some emotion 
regulation is both possible and desirable.  
At the same time, the results largely failed to back the hypothesis that engaging in a 
PFL activity as part of the learning process would produce better outcomes. The M+PFL 
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condition performed essentially the same as the ML condition in the case of Other-blame, 
while producing significantly higher Self-blame scores than the ML condition. An 
exploratory analysis revealed that unlike in the other two conditions, the males in the M+PFL 
group tended to produce higher other-blame scores and self-blame score than females, while 
exhibiting no difference in performance on the PFL activity. This suggests that males may 
have been more likely than females to fail to assimilate the new information about emotions, 
and that the PFL activity may have factored in this disparity. One possibility is that the PFL 
activity primed participants with respect to their existing theory of emotions, bringing it to 
the fore. This in turn may have made them resistant to the ‘expert’ explanation of emotion 
generation provided as part of the intervention. Alternatively, the problem may have been 
that the PFL activity targeted an aspect of appraisal (evaluation of events in relation to one’s 
concerns) that wasn’t central to producing the effect of blame reduction, i.e. understanding 
appraisal’s automaticity. In either case, males and females seemed to be affected to a 
different degree, which is in keeping with findings suggesting differences in the way the two 
genders process emotion information (Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). 
Another possibility was that the ML group benefited from practice effects, having had 
the opportunity to complete more practice exercises compared to the M+PFL group. While 
there was no easy way to determine definitively if this was so, correlation patterns of the 
genders’ performance on the practice exercises suggest that some males in the M+PFL 
condition had a particular participation profile--tending to have fast completion rates and 
good performance on the practice exercises, but higher self-blame scores--reflective of 
characteristics and/or a mode of engagement that may have made them less susceptible to the 
intervention, e.g. being motivated to complete the study quickly, and focusing on speed and 
accuracy of performance over learning, especially when it came to their own self-concept.  
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It is worth noting that the study was conducted entirely online, with MTurk recruits 
rather than TC students. This sample and this mode of content delivery may have resulted in 
the presence of participants who were more eager to finish quickly (since they were getting 
paid the same amount regardless of participation duration) and less motivated to engage in 
the arguably more challenging and open-ended PFL activity (there is evidence of the latter in 
the higher rate of M+PFL participants who did not complete the study). Because such 
participants were prone to speed through the PFL activity, which allowed them to take as 
much time as they wished (up to 10 minutes), they might have benefited less from it than 
from additional practice exercises such as were provided to the ML group. 
Follow-up studies would be needed to determine whether the observed gender 
differences in model learning effects with a PFL are robust, as well as the relative impact of 
the PFL activity and practice on learning and blame scores. Nevertheless, the results do point 
to a potentially important consideration in the way PFL activities might be used for SEL. 
Namely, that because even relatively young people already possess sophisticated (albeit 
usually implicit) theories and models of emotion--whereas they may not have such models of 
specialized concepts like density--PFL activities might cause the activation of these extant 
models, which may result in some detrimental interference or resistance effects. One possible 
way to mitigate this problem would be to design the activity in such a way as to avoid 
touching on emotions explicitly, and instead dealing with something structurally analogous 
but superficially different. A similar approach was taken by Schwartz, Chase et al. (2011) 
when they asked students to come up with a “crowdedness index” for clown cars in 
preparation for learning about density. At the same time, there may be situations in which the 
PFL activity should directly engage with existing emotion theories, e.g. in order to address 
misconceptions. Additional studies will be needed to determine which circumstances call for 
which approach. 
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Furthermore, any PFL activities used in SEL (or elsewhere) should be designed to 
precisely target the deep structures that will be taught following the activity and that the 
learners are expected to assimilate. Those designing such activities will likely want to take 
both these considerations--deliberate obfuscation of PFL focus through superficial 
differences in task depiction, and precise targeting of underlying deep structure--into account. 
It should also be noted that the present intervention was quite brief, and only its short-term 
effects were measured. It’s possible that the given PFL activity would produce different 
results as part of a longer intervention. 
I had also predicted that the effects of the intervention would be more pronounced on 
self-awareness than on other-awareness, in part because of the you-focused nature of the 
training (i.e. the practice exercises asked the participant to imagine that they themselves 
found themselves in particular hypothetical scenarios), as well as the human tendency to self-
exonerate (Bandura, 2002) and the so-called self-serving bias (Myers, 2015), which would 
presumably cause people to seek to use their knowledge of automaticity of appraisal to justify 
and excuse socially inappropriate emotions. However, the study results did not support this 
hypothesis, and the effects were greater for other-blame than for self-blame. These results 
must be viewed with caution however, because the control group’s blame ratings for the self-
blame scenarios were lower than other-blame. That is, these scenarios were seen as less 
blameworthy to begin with, and thus there was less room for blame reduction. A follow-up 
study might attempt a comparison of effects on self- and other-blame scenarios whose scores 
are equivalent. At the same time, the strong disparity in effects for the M+PFL group 
compared to control (no effect for Self-blame and significant effect for Other-blame) does 
suggest that the intervention was indeed more effective for Other-blame than for Self-blame. 
If this was the case, it might be explained by the fact that people found it easier to apply the 
principles of the HES they had learned to (fictional) others than to themselves. This would fit 
 108 
in with the finding that most people believe themselves to be above average (Taylor & 
Brown, 1988), i.e. different from and superior to the majority of other people, and thus may 
be somewhat resistant to the notion that the universal principles of the HES apply to them no 
less than to others. As there is evidence that men tend to overestimate their abilities more 
than women (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003), i.e. are less objective and aware of themselves, 
this hypothesis seems consistent with the study results, given that it was men (in the M+PFL 
group) who were most resistant to changes in self-blame. 
Another unexpected finding of the present study was the relationship between 
participants’ trait empathy scores and their blame scores. As expected, empathy scores were 
correlated with blame scores, however, that correlation was the opposite of the one that had 
been assumed: instead of being associated with lower blame scores, higher empathy was 
correlated with higher blame. While this seems counterintuitive, evidence from recent studies 
on empathy provide a plausible explanation for such results, namely that when people feel 
empathy for someone they are likely to also feel greater animosity toward the person’s 
perceived antagonist (Buffone & Poulin, 2014), and thus empathizing for a victim may 
increase the anger (and blame) directed at the aggressor. Bloom (2016) cited this 
phenomenon as evidence that empathy may sometimes lead to undesirable outcomes. In this 
case, nearly all of the blame scenarios (3 of the 4 other-blame and 3 of the 4 self-blame) 
contained what could be perceived as ‘victims’ of those experiencing the undesirable 
emotional responses, and thus the latter might be more strongly blamed by participants with 
greater empathy. This result, while unexpected in the context of the present study, provides 
an illustration of the value of developing a more nuanced model of emotion. According to 
Bloom (2016) excessive anger at an aggressor due to strong empathy for the victim can lead 
to overly harsh punishment and retribution aimed at the perpetrator. While it is certainly 
desirable to be empathetic toward victims, that does not justify being cruel or inhumane 
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toward others, even if those others have themselves acted cruelly. Having a more elaborate 
model of emotions can moderate the anger one feels toward a perpetrator, whether actual or 
alleged, by providing a more flexible framework through which to evaluate social situations, 
and consequently help behave more equitably toward all parties (Yeager et al., 2013).  
 
Limitations 
One limitation of the present study is that the participants were aged 18-25, and thus the 
study results do not necessarily generalize to younger or older groups. Additionally, there 
were considerably fewer males than females in all conditions (approximately a 2:1 ratio), so 
that, for example, in the M+PFL group there was a relatively small total number of males 
(28). Furthemore, a large number of participants was eliminated from the final analysis due to 
various causes (non-completion, previous exposure to the material, etc). In some cases, this 
elimination was statistically unbalanced across groups, suggesting the presence of selection 
bias. Moreover, the elimination of participants who scored poorly on the quiz means that the 
observed results can only be generalized to those who successfully learn the model, with the 
possibility that some groups or individuals may not benefit from the present instructional 
approach. 
An additional limitation is that the outcome measures are based on scenario ratings, so 
that they only captured judgements of emotional reactions depicted in narrative, rather than 
changes in behavioral responses to ‘real world’ (that is, not narrative-based) events. This 
might arguably render the results less compelling than a behavioral measure such as 
allocating hot sauce to a peer (Yeager et al., 2013). At the same time, this form of assessment 
can be said to more directly reflect actual impact on SEC, such as self and other awareness, 
which I was interested in capturing, rather than on the behavioral outcomes that are expected 
to result from changes in SEC.  
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Another limitation related to the outcome measure used is that blame scores were the 
only outcome considered as a consequence of the intervention. It is possible that the 
intervention produced other effects that were not captured in the post-test. For instance, 
participants might have become better at inferring causes of their own and others’ emotional 
reactions.  
A limitation related to the self-blame outcome measure is that the model learning 
section of the intervention was also self-focused, thus reducing the transfer distance, so to 
speak, from learning to post-test. Nevertheless, other factors, such as the different nature of 
the task and task framing should be sufficient to justify categorizing self-blame rating as an 
instance of transfer.  
Another limitation pertaining to self- vs other-blame scenarios is that the average 
blame scores for the two sets of scenarios were significantly different in the control condition 
(self-blame scenarios had lower blame scores), which represents a confound with regard to 
comparing effect sizes for the two dependent variables (self-blame vs other-blame), since 
lower baseline blame scores might offer less opportunity for blame reduction.  
There is also a potential limitation connected to the fact that the ML group had more 
practice exercises than the M+PFL group. While this was done to account for the fact that the 
M+PFL group was asked to engage the PFL activity, and to equalize time spent on the study, 
it arguably created an imbalance between the conditions in that one group had additional 
practice that was not equivalent in nature to the additional work done by the other group (i.e. 
the PFL activity vs additional regular practice exercises). A better approach may have been to 
have the ML group undertake additional exercises based on the PFL activity content (but with 
a different task objective).  
Finally, only short-term effects of the intervention were measured, and thus the 
findings cannot tell us anything about the long-term effects of teaching the emotion model on 
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awareness, empathy or other aspects of SEC, nor about the use of PFL activities as part of 
such instruction. Similarly, the intervention itself was quite short (under an hour), whereas 
many SEL interventions last weeks if not months. Therefore, the results can’t speak to the 
effects of a longer intervention based on teaching a model of the HES.  
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PART IV: GENERAL DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
In my dissertation, I have proposed a novel approach to facilitating transfer in the context of 
SEL: the direct teaching of the emotion system model, developed on the basis of well-
established research findings pertaining to the neurological and physiological functioning of 
the system. This approach is based on an emphasis on deep learning, where the principles and 
processes of the emotion system represent deep structures of SEL content, understanding 
which can help learners develop an accurate mental model of emotional functioning, and 
enable them to transfer their social emotional knowledge across contexts and situations.  
The pilot and follow-up studies described above provide some initial empirical 
backing for the viability of the proposed instructional methodology. The pilot study results 
demonstrate that teaching a core model of emotion generation results in the transfer of 
conceptual emotion knowledge to new problems, and leads to a more tolerant view of others’ 
emotional reactions. The dissertation study reproduces these results (using a different 
population), and also provides evidence that the method can lead to a greater acceptance of 
one’s own emotions. Unlike past interventions that made use of some aspect(s) or versions of 
a model of the emotion system as part of a multifaceted approach to enhancing SEC (e.g. 
Berking & Schwartz, 2014; Broderick & Metz, 2014; Kemeny et al., 2011), the present 
studies focused exclusively on the effects of teaching a core model of the HES, and expressly 
evaluated the transfer of the taught emotion knowledge. At the same time, the instructional 
methodology employed in the studies, designed to facilitate mental model formation and 
featuring emotion system model diagrams, as well as narrative-grounded, varied, and 
constructive practice, was shown to be successful at enabling learners to acquire the 
presented content (particularly in the ML condition) and can serve as a prototype for future 
HES model instruction efforts.  
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Furthermore, the results were achieved in both an in-person, lab-based experiment 
(pilot study) as well as in a purely online study (dissertation study). In the first case, the 
participants were drawn from among graduate students at Columbia Teachers College, who 
were judged to be a fairly representative sample of the broader US educator population (e.g. 
teachers, school psychologists, administrators, and policymakers), which suggests that the 
methodology could be generalized to other educators in the United States. Educator SEC has 
been shown to be related to student academic and emotional outcomes (Jennings & 
Greenberg, 2009; Durlak et al., 2015), yet there is a shortage of research on effective methods 
to develop educators’ social and emotional competencies (Osher et al., 2016). The present 
research adds to our knowledge in this regard.   
In the dissertation study, participants were 18-25 year-old US high school graduates, 
which offers evidence of the viability of the present SEL methodology with US adolescents 
and young adults, a population that has often proved resistant to SEL (Yeager, 2017a). 
Furthermore, the study was carried out as an online intervention, providing additional 
evidence for the feasibility of technology-based SEL programming, which is a topic of 
ongoing research and debate (Osher et al., 2016).  
The results also shed some new light on the potential for using preparation for future 
learning activities in the SEL context. Specifically, they suggest that the nature of SEL calls 
for careful consideration of PFL activity design, such that, for example, the PFL activity does 
not interfere with learning by activating existing theories of emotion (though it’s important to 
note that there may be situations in which such activation is desirable, e.g. when seeking to 
address misconceptions), and that the activity precisely target the concepts being taught. 
Moreover, they provide preliminary evidence that gender may play a role in the success of 
HES-based SEL instruction, suggesting that some males may be more resistant to 
assimilating ‘expert’ models of emotion under some conditions. Further research will be 
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needed to ascertain the validity of these findings. The results also intimate that teaching the 
HES model -- on its own and in the short term -- may be more effective at influencing the 
perception of others’ emotions than of one’s own emotions. It is likely that influencing 
people’s perceptions of their own emotions more profoundly may require additional time and 
other forms of practice applying the model to personal emotional experiences, such as 
journaling.  Overall, though exploratory, these findings provide valuable hints to curriculum 
designers and point to a number of avenues for future research. 
 Several aspects of the outlined SEL methodology have implications for the field of 
SEL and SEL research. To begin with, the results point to the shortcomings of interventions 
that present emotions as a monolithic construct that one is fully capable of changing and 
controlling. Instead, the present research highlights the value of teaching a more nuanced and 
comprehensive model of emotion, which acknowledges that there are parts of the emotion 
system that are largely outside our conscious control, such as appraisal. Such knowledge can 
have a beneficial effect on social competence, including greater tolerance for others’ 
emotions and greater acceptance of one’s own, as the results of the present studies illustrate.  
A similar implication can be drawn from the finding that higher trait empathy scores 
were correlated with higher (rather than lower) blame scores, which reproduces past research 
showing that greater empathy for a victim can lead to excessively harsh retribution aimed at 
the perceived perpetrator (Bloom, 2016). The results of the present studies suggest that a 
more elaborate and nuanced understanding of emotion could serve to moderate overly 
aggressive responses toward e.g. bullies while simultaneously enabling healthier coping on 
the part of the victims, as was previously demonstrated by Yeager et al. (2013). Put another 
way, empathy alone is not enough: it works best when informed by an understanding of our 
emotional functioning. 
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On the basis of this early evidence, I am hopeful that the proposed instructional 
approach may offer a blueprint for developing SEL content and interventions that are 
potentially more effective in that they would be expected to lead to more robust learning and 
greater capacity and motivation for applying social emotional skills to new contexts and 
situations, particularly among adolescent learners. These benefits would be expected to arise 
as the result of a focus on deep learning, whereby students would acquire the deep structures 
that underpin SEL content in the form of a mental model of the emotion system. The 
acquisition of the model would allow learners to understand the interconnections between the 
elements of the emotion system, such as events, desires and goals, beliefs, appraisals, 
emotions and expressions of emotion, and behavior. Such understanding should bolster 
learners’ ability to apply socio-emotional knowledge across situations as well as their 
motivation to do so (Chi & VanLehn, 2012). More generally, the theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence presented here provide additional grounds for including the goal of 
designing for transfer in the SEL program development guidelines produced by organizations 
like CASEL.  
Importantly, HES model learning would be compatible with existing SEL programs, 
and is not proposed as a replacement for such programs. Rather, because the emotion system 
represents the universal basis of emotional functioning, the HES model is envisioned as 
providing common foundational knowledge that would support the efficacy of any SEL 
curriculum. For example, having a better understanding of the appraisal process may support 
learners in acquiring self-regulation techniques like reappraisal (Gross, 2015; Wranik et al., 
2014). Kemeny et al. (2011) had made a similar argument when incorporating information 
about aspects of the emotion system together with mindfulness practice. Thus, an 
instructional HES model such as the one proposed here could provide a set of well-defined, 
foundational concepts and principles derived from established research that would bolster the 
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effectiveness of virtually any program aiming to enhance SEC. Furthermore, it can equip 
learners with a common lexicon, beyond mere emotion vocabulary, for articulating and 
labeling key aspects of the emotional experience, both when considering private feelings and 
when dealing with interpersonal relations. Labeling aspects of one’s experience is an 
important part of self-reflection (Bosoevski & Zelazo, 2008) and regulation (Marcovitch, 
Jacques, Boseovski, & Zelazo, 2008), but perhaps just as importantly, a shared language of 
emotion can help improve communication around emotional experiences and associated 
conflict situations.  
At the same time, an empirically-validated HES model would potentially be useful in 
helping program creators, educators and policy-makers standardize baseline SEL program 
content and evaluation. The development of content standards for SEL, beyond high level 
program requirements (such as being developmentally and culturally appropriate), may 
facilitate broader adoption of SEL curricula in schools as well as the inclusion of SEL 
coursework in standard teacher training. By the same token, a deep understanding of the 
principles that underpin SEL could help teachers in modeling these skills, improving the 
classroom environment, and implementing SEL programs, which would be expected to lead 
to better student outcomes (Jennings & Greenberg, 2009; Osher et al., 2016; Yeager, 2017a).  
 
Future Directions  
Building on the present research, several follow-up studies could help answer lingering 
questions with regard to PFL activity effects on SEL, and self vs other awareness changes. 
This would involve designing a more precisely targeted and less overtly emotion-related PFL 
activity, altering the practice exercises in a way that would allow for tests of practice effects, 
and employing self-blame and other-blame scenarios that have equal baseline (i.e. control 
group) blameworthiness ratings. Additionally, follow-up studies might consider outcome 
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measures beyond blame scores, such as evaluating changes in participants’ skills at inferring 
causes of people’s emotional reactions.  
Looking further, it is notable that with a few exception (e.g. Jamieson et al., 2010; 
Yeager et al., 2013, 2015; Lyashevsky, Cesarano & Black, 2017), it is still largely unknown 
which aspects of the human emotion system are, when learned, particularly impactful with 
regard to building social emotional competencies. Thus, a future research goal would be to 
identify these system principles and components through additional experimental studies, 
such as the ones described here. For instance, one might look at the usefulness of 
distinguishing between top-down and bottom-up appraisal processes, or at identifying the 
ways by which individuals acquire their beliefs, values, and goals, which factor into 
appraisals. This would help researchers who wish to develop future HES models, as well as 
interactive HES model simulations for educational purposes.  
 Once a comprehensive instructional HES model is developed and validated, full scale, 
longer-term interventions should be evaluated to gather evidence in support of the hypothesis 
that SEL programs that feature an HES model will lead to stronger results--in terms of social 
emotional skill acquisition and their transfer as well as more distal outcomes such as 
academic and behavioral improvements--than those that don’t. Success in these efforts would 
bolster the argument for updating the SEL program development guidelines to emphasize 
generalizability and transfer, and provide a springboard for further research efforts. To begin 
with, it would be valuable to investigate the effectiveness of this approach to SEL with 
different populations, for instance, groups that regularly face high stress situations and may 
benefit from greater SEC, such as doctors and police officers. It would also be useful to 
examine how well such interventions may work with the general adult population, college 
students, and K-12 students. For all these groups, and for younger students in particular, the 
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HES model and the accompanying instructional materials and exercises would need to be 
adapted to suit the group’s developmental and contextual characteristics.  
 Another exciting future challenge would be the development of an interactive HES 
simulation, as interactive simulations have been shown to be useful in the formation of 
accurate mental models of systems (Schwartz, Pilner, Biswas, Leelawong, & Davis, 2007; 
Kuhn, Black, Kesselman, & Kaplan, 2000; Chan & Black, 2006). Similarly, the HES model 
could provide a foundation for developing and assessing software-based SEC training 
programs, which may offer easily accessible and cost-effective ways of improving social 
emotional skills. 
Furthermore, the assessment of procedural HES model mastery may in itself prove to 
be a useful measure of SEC.  One of the challenges of SEL research and program 
implementation and evaluation is the shortage of highly reliable and easily implemented 
measures of social emotional skills (Durlak et al., 2011; Osher et al., 2016; Weissberg et al., 
2015; Zins et al., 2004). Without adequate measurement tools, social emotional skills can 
seem nebulous and thus difficult to teach or evaluate in a consistent manner (Salovey, Mayer, 
Caruso, & Lopes, 2003). Meanwhile, the HES model provides a clear, research-based set of 
knowledge as well as of associated abilities (i.e. the fluent use of the knowledge beyond the 
level of declarative recall) that would be measurable with a relatively high level of 
objectivity. For instance, inference-focused practice exercises based on the HES model would 
be fairly easy to score and could be used for evaluation purposes. As a person has more 
practice and grows more comfortable with reasoning on the basis of the model, they would be 
expected to produce more correct responses more quickly, a metric which could be tracked 
over time, providing a potentially powerful formative assessment method, if the scores have a 
meaningful correlation with SEC.  The development and validation of such a measure, and its 
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comparison to existing alternatives for evaluating SEC, represents a potentially fruitful future 
research direction.  
Finally, an exciting future line of research could include the use of ‘objective' 
neurological and autonomic biotechnology such as fMRI and EEG to examine the neural and 
physiological (Heart rate variability, HR, GSR) changes that may occur as a result of HES 
model-based training and the associated changes in awareness and regulation ability.  
 
Conclusion 
The last two decades have seen an explosion in SEL research, yet numerous questions remain 
with regard to the optimal way to develop and deliver SEL programming, particularly among 
adolescents and young adults. These questions include how best to ensure social emotional 
knowledge transfer, which specific SEL content and activities produce which outcomes, and 
to what extent can technology be leveraged for SEL instruction. This dissertation expands our 
knowledge in relation to these questions. First, it articulates a novel approach to facilitating 
the transfer of social emotional skills: the direct teaching of a model of the human emotion 
system, which I have argued represents the deep structures of social emotional knowledge. It 
also offers evidence that teaching a core, appraisal-based model of the emotion system can 1) 
lead to emotional knowledge transfer 2) produce short-term improvements in self and other 
awareness, and 3) that this can be achieved via an online platform with young adults and 4) 
by means of in-person instruction with professional educators. The findings have implications 
for social emotional learning theory and practice. They bolster the argument that teaching the 
emotion system can become a useful addition to the repertoire of SEL instruction 
methodologies. More specifically, they suggest that there is value to teaching a more nuanced 
model of emotions than one that simply highlights emotions’ ability to be changed and 
controlled, and suggest that a focus on teaching the underlying principles of the emotion 
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system may indeed represent a way to develop deep social emotional knowledge, making it 
more likely to be utilized in novel situations and ultimately to produce greater positive 
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PLEASE NOTE: IF YOU HAVE PREVIOUSLY DONE AN HIT WITH THE SAME 
NAME, WE ASK YOU NOT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS SURVEY. THANK YOU. 
 
By clicking Next you agree to participate in the studies based on the Informed Consent 







You will be invited to participate in three short online emotion-related studies. You qualify to 
take part in these studies because you are between 18 and 25 years of age. Approximately 
100 people will take part in these studies. The studies will take approximately 30 minutes to 
complete. 
 
Why Are These Studies Being Done? 
 
The studies are being done to help us better understand the nature of human emotions. 
 
What Will I Be Asked to Do? 
 
Study 1: You will be invited to answer a questionnaire pertaining to your perception of 
yourself in relation to other people. 
Study 2: You will be provided emotion-related material and asked to respond to questions 
pertaining to this material. 
Study 3: You will be asked to make judgments about fictional scenarios. 
Finally, you will be asked to fill out a basic information questionnaire. 
 
What Possible Risks or Discomforts Should I Expect? 
 
Participating in the study involves minimal risk, such as encountering hypothetical scenarios 
that involve characters exhibiting emotional reactions. 
 
What Possible Benefits Should I Expect? 
 
Participating in this study is not likely to provide any substantive benefits to you, aside from 
monetary compensation. 
 
Will I Be Paid For Participating? 
 




When Are the Studies Over? Can I Stop Early? 
 
The studies are over when you have completed all the online activities. However, you can 
stop at any time even if you haven’t finished. Note, however, that due to the nature of the 
Amazon Turk platform, you can only be paid if you submit your work. 
 
Protection of Your Confidentiality 
 
Your participation is anonymous. No personally identifiable data will be shared with anyone 
outside the study team. All data will be password protected and only accessible by the 
research team. 
 
How Will the Results Be Used? 
 
The results of these studies may be published in journals and presented at academic 
conferences. Your name or any identifying information about you will not be published. 
These studies are being conducted as part of the dissertation of the principal investigator. 
 
Who Can Answer My Questions About The Studies? 
 
If you have any questions or concerns you can communicate with the Principal Investigator, 
Ilya Lyashevsky, at ial2112@tc.columbia.edu. 
 
If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, you should contact 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) (the human research ethics committee) at 212-678-4105 
or email IRB@tc.edu. Or you can write to the IRB at Teachers College, Columbia University, 
525 W. 120th Street, New York, NY 1002.  The IRB is the committee that oversees human 
research protection for Teachers College, Columbia University. 
 





* I have read the above information regarding the studies. 
* I understand that my participation is voluntary. I may refuse to participate or withdraw 
participation at any time without penalty. 
* Any information derived from the research studies that personally identifies me will not be 
voluntarily released or disclosed without my separate consent, except as specifically required 
by law. 
 







Pre-Test 1: Perspective-taking and Empathic Concern Scales of the Interpersonal Reactivity 




In this study, we are interested in learning about people's perceptions of themselves in relation to 
other people.  
 
Please answer the questions below. There are no right or wrong answers. We are simply 
interested in your perceptions. 
 
 
● Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other people's 
arguments. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their 
perspective. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" (or girl's) point of view. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his or her shoes" for a while. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
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(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
● I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
(0=does not describe me well, 4=describes me very well) 
0 1 2 3 4 
 








This study is designed to investigate the effectiveness of specific instruction methodologies 
for conveying psychological material. Two groups will be compared to see how different 
instructional methodologies compare when learning about emotions. 
 
For this study, you will be asked to do the following activities: an emotion exercise, a 
learning activity followed by practice exercises, and a short quiz. 
 
 
Activity I: Emotion Explanation Exercise 
 
Below, three characters are shown having emotional reactions to various events. Using the 
scenes below as a starting point, your task is to come up with a general explanation for how 
different emotions arise.  
 
Your explanation should be generally predictive, that is, you should be able to use it to 
predict what type of emotion will arise given a specific situation. The type of emotion does 
not need to be totally exact, like frustration or contempt. A broad emotional category would 
be sufficient. Your explanation should work for all the scenarios below, and any other 
hypothetical situation.  
 
This can be a challenging task,  so do not worry if you don't come up with a perfect 











Write your explanation here (make sure to read the instructions above). Take about 10 
minutes to think about and complete your answer. 
 






SCREEN 1:  
 
Activity II: Emotion Info 
 
On the following screen(s) you will be presented with information about emotion based on 














In fact, research indicates that the process is more complicated.There is a crucial step that 
occurs between event perception and emotion generation.The following diagram provides a 














To recap: when an event occurs, multiple brain regions work very quickly and without your 
conscious control to evaluate the nature of the event (good or bad for me, what should I do 
about it). The evaluation, or appraisal, then gives rise to a corresponding emotion. Thus, full-
fledged emotions are products of appraisal. Yet we have no conscious control of much of 
the appraisal process. Consequently, our initial emotional reactions are also largely 




Great! You've reached the end of this activity. Next, you'll be asked to do some practice 





Practice Exercises 1 - PFL+Model Group 
 
Activity III: Practice Exercises 
 
In the following 5 questions, you will be asked to select or suggest an event that would be 
most likely to produce a positive or negative appraisal, given an initial situation. 
 
1.i. You come home after work/school, wanting to relax and expecting to be alone. Given the 
above, select an event that is most likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
❍ a) You find that the apartment is empty and quiet. 
❍ b) You find that your roommate has brought back a group of loud friends. 
❍ c) You find that you got no mail. ❍ d) You find that your neighbor got a package delivered. 
❍ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: b) 
 
1.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
2.i. You have put a lot of effort into an essay. Given the above, select an event that is most 
likely to produce a *positive* appraisal. 
❍ a) You computer crashes and the essay is lost. 
❍ b) You get the essay back a week after you turn it in. 
❍ c) You learn that your instructor won't count the essay toward the final grade. ❍ d) Your professor praises you for the essay's quality. 
❍ e) None of the above. 
 
Suggested response: d) 
 
2.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
3.i. You are at a cafe and looking forward to having a particular pastry. Given the above, 
select an event that is most likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
❍ a) You see that you have plenty of cash in your wallet. 
❍ b) You note that the cafe is full of people. 
❍ c) The customer in line in front of you asks for the last of the pastries. ❍ d) The pastries look particularly fresh. 
❍ e) a and b only 
 
Suggested response: c) 
 
3.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
4.i. You are taking an important final exam. Given the above, suggest an event that is likely 
to produce a *positive* appraisal. 
 
4.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
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5.i. You go to move your brand new car. Given the above, suggest an event that is likely to 
produce a *negative* appraisal. 
 




In the 5 questions below you will be asked to select or suggest a situation, in which the given 
event is most likely to produce a positive or negative appraisal. 
 
1.i. Your boss tells you that your company will implement a particular idea. Which situation, 
if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a *positive* appraisal of the above event.  
❍ a) The idea is one you had openly opposed in the past. 
❍ b) The idea is one that you had proposed to your boss as something the company should 
do. 
❍ c) Your boss is dressed casually when he gives you the news. 
❍ d) The idea was originally proposed by a coworker whom you dislike. 
❍ e) None of the above. 
 
Suggested response: b) 
 
1.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
2.i. You are talking with friends in the school parking lot, when you hear the second bell, 
announcing that class has just started. Which situation, if true, would be most likely to cause 
you to have a *negative* appraisal of the above event. 
❍ a) This is your lunch period, and you don't have to be in class. ❍ b) You are an alum, visiting the school for the day. 
❍ c) You and your buddies are planning to skip class and go to the mall. 
❍ d) You care about doing well in school and are supposed to be in class. 
❍ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: d) 
 
2.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
3.i. Your mother, who is very good with money, calls and begins to ask you questions about 
your finances. Which situation, if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a 
*negative* appraisal of the above event. 
❑ a) You have been worrying about your credit card debt. ❑ b) You have a high paying job. 
❑ c) You have high confidence in your money management abilities. 
❑ d) Your apartment is very clean. 
❑ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: a) 
 
3.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
4.i. You happen on an affordable apartment listing in your neighborhood. Suggest a 
*preceding* situation which, if true, would be likely to cause you to have a *positive* 
appraisal of the above event.  
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4.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 
you have suggested. 
 
5.i For this question, use the same event as in question 9. Suggest a *preceding*  situation 
which, if true, would be likely to cause you to have a *negative* appraisal of the event. 
 
5.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 




Take a moment to reflect on how you were able to answer the questions above.  
 
Notice that you did not have to do calculations, as with a math problem. Nor was your answer 
merely a guess, as when trying to make a prediction about something like a sports match. Given a 
scenario, you were able to know with a high degree of certainty how you would feel, and this just 
"happened." That is appraisal at work. Given an event or situation, even a hypothetical one, the 
appraisal is performed by the mind automatically. One cannot prevent this from happening, and 
the appraisal will generate an emotional response, even if only a mild one (as when considering a 
fictional situation).  
 
 





Practice Exercises 2 - Model Only Group 
 
Activity III: Practice Exercises 
 
In the following 8 questions, you will be asked to select or suggest an event that would be 
most likely to produce a positive or negative appraisal, given an initial situation. 
 
1.i. You come home after work/school, wanting to relax and expecting to be alone. Given the 
above, select an event that is most likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
❍ a) You find that the apartment is empty and quiet. 
❍ b) You find that your roommate has brought back a group of loud friends. 
❍ c) You find that you got no mail. ❍ d) You find that your neighbor got a package delivered. 
❍ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: b) 
 
1.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
2.i. You have put a lot of effort into an essay. Given the above, select an event that is most 
likely to produce a *positive* appraisal. 
❍ a) You computer crashes and the essay is lost. 
❍ b) You get the essay back a week after you turn it in. 
❍ c) You learn that your instructor won't count the essay toward the final grade. ❍ d) Your professor praises you for the essay's quality. 
❍ e) None of the above. 
 
Suggested response: d) 
 
2.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
3.i. You are at a cafe and looking forward to having a particular pastry. Given the above, 
select an event that is most likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
❍ a) You see that you have plenty of cash in your wallet. 
❍ b) You note that the cafe is full of people. 
❍ c) The customer in line in front of you asks for the last of the pastries. ❍ d) The pastries look particularly fresh. 
❍ e) a and b only 
 
Suggested response: c) 
 
3.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
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4.i. You are single, and while at a party you spot an attractive person with whom you might 
want to talk. Given the above, select an event that is most likely to produce a *positive* 
appraisal. 
 
❍ a) You notice that the person is wearing a wedding ring. ❍ b) Someone else comes up to the person and starts flirting with them. 
❍ c) The person looks your way but does not seem to show any interest. 
❍ d) The person is of average height. 
❍ e) The person catches your eye and gives you a friendly smile. 
 
Suggested response: e) 
 
4.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
5.i. You call one of your parents on the phone. Given the above, select an event that is most 
likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
 
❍ a) Your parent tells you they are having trouble paying the mortgage. 
❍ b) Your parent is interested in the stories you share with them. 
❍ c) Your parent tells you they are proud of you. ❍ d) The phone connection is of high quality. 
❍ e) Your parent tells you they have been in good health. 
 
Suggested response: a) 
 
5.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
6.i. You are taking an important final exam. Given the above, suggest an event that is likely 
to produce a *positive* appraisal. 
 
6.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
7.i. You go to move your brand new car. Given the above, suggest an event that is likely to 
produce a *negative* appraisal. 
 
7.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
8.i. You are having a conversation with someone you just met. Given the above, suggest an 
event that is likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
 
8.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
 
In the 8 questions below you will be asked to select or suggest a situation, in which the given 
event is most likely to produce a positive or negative appraisal. 
 
 159 
1.i. Your boss tells you that your company will implement a particular idea.Which situation, 
if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a *positive* appraisal of the above event.  
❍ a) The idea is one you had openly opposed in the past. ❍ b) The idea is one that you had proposed to your boss as something the company should 
do. 
❍ c) Your boss is dressed casually when he gives you the news. ❍ d) The idea was originally proposed by a coworker whom you dislike. 
❍ e) None of the above. 
 
Suggested response: b) 
 
1.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
2.i. You are talking with friends in the school parking lot, when you hear the second bell, 
announcing that class has just started.Which situation, if true, would be most likely to cause 
you to have a *negative* appraisal of the above event. 
❍ a) This is your lunch period, and you don't have to be in class. 
❍ b) You are an alum, visiting the school for the day. 
❍ c) You and your buddies are planning to skip class and go to the mall. ❍ d) You care about doing well in school and are supposed to be in class. 
❍ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: d) 
 
2.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
3.i. Your mother, who is very good with money, calls and begins to ask you questions about 
your finances.Which situation, if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a *negative* 
appraisal of the above event. 
❑ a) You have been worrying about your credit card debt. 
❑ b) You have a high paying job. 
❑ c) You have high confidence in your money management abilities. ❑ d) Your apartment is very clean. 
❑ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: a) 
 
3.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
4.i. You get on a scale and see that you have gained weight. Which situation, if true, would 
be most likely to cause you to have a *positive* appraisal of the above event. 
❑ a) You have recently been eating a lot of junk food. 
❑ b) You have been exercising and eating healthy in order to slim down. ❑ c) You have been exercising and eating a diet heavy in protein in order to bulk up. 
❑ d) You have been having problems at work. 
❑ e) None of the above. 
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Suggested response: c) 
 
4.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
5.i. You see that you have received an email from an ex-girlfriend or boyfriend. Which 
situation, if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a *positive* appraisal of the 
above event. 
❑ a) Your relationship ended with a lot of bitterness on both sides. ❑ b) Every time you and the ex reconnected in the past, it resulted in unpleasant drama. 
❑ c) The ex is someone whom it is always fun to be around. 
❑ d) All of the above. 
❑ e) a & b only 
 
Suggested response: e) 
 
5.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
6.i You run into a neighbor in the hallway. Suggest a *preceding*  situation which, if true, 
would be likely to cause you to have a *negative* appraisal of the event. 
 
6.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 
you have suggested. 
 
7.i. You happen on an affordable apartment listing in your neighborhood. Suggest a 
*preceding* situation which, if true, would be likely to cause you to have a *positive* 
appraisal of the above event.  
 
7.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 
you have suggested. 
 
8.i For this question, use the same event as in question 7. Suggest a *preceding*  situation 
which, if true, would be likely to cause you to have a *negative* appraisal of the event. 
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8.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 





Take a moment to reflect on how you were able to answer the questions above when faced with a 
particular scenario.  
 
Notice that you did not have to do calculations, as with a math problem. Nor was your answer 
merely a guess, as when trying to make a prediction about something like a sports match. Given a 
scenario, you were able to know with a high degree of certainty how you would feel, and this just 
"happened." That is appraisal at work. Given an event or situation, even a hypothetical one, the 
appraisal is performed by the mind automatically. One cannot prevent this from happening, and 
the appraisal will generate an emotional response, even if only a mild one (as when considering a 
fictional situation).  
 
 









1. If a person is exhibiting signs of anger, e.g. in their voice or facial expression, which of the 
following is likely: 
❍ a) something occurred that the person has interpreted as threatening to their desires ❍ b) the person is mean 
❍ c) the person is probably blowing things out of proportion 
❍ d) the situation they are in is their fault 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If a] -> Correct! The suggested response was a) something occurred that the person has 
interpreted as threatening to their desires. 
[If not a] -> Sorry, the suggested response was a) something occurred that the person has 
interpreted as threatening to their desires. 
 
2. If a person perceives an event, for example someone speaking to them 
❍ a) they’ll remember the event ONLY if it’s important 
❍ b) their mind will automatically evaluate the event to determine if it is harmful or 
beneficial to them 
❍ c) they may be expected to have an emotional response to the event, even if only a mild 
one 
❍ d) b and c only 
❍ e) a, b and c 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If d] -> Correct! The suggested response was d) b and c only.  
[If b or c] -> That's partially correct. The suggested answer was d) b and c only. That is, b) their 
mind will automatically evaluate the event to determine if it is harmful or beneficial to them, and 
c) they may be expected to have an emotional response to the event, even if only a mild one. 
[If a or e] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is d) b and c only. That is, b) their mind will 
automatically evaluate the event to determine if it is harmful or beneficial to them, and c) they 
may be expected to have an emotional response to the event, even if only a mild one. 
People often think that a) they’ll remember the event ONLY if it’s important, is also a 
valid answer. But note the ONLY in the text of option a). While important details are more likely 
to be remembered, it is certainly also possible to remember details of an event that might not be 
considered particularly important, which is why this option was not included as part of the 
suggested answer.  
 
3. Based on the emotion model you have been provided with, if two similar individuals have 
different goals or desires within the same domain (for example, supporting different political 
candidates), they may be expected to 
❍ a) dislike each other ❍ b) behave the same way regardless of the difference 
❍ c) have different emotional reactions to the same event 
❍ d) pursue those goals or desires with different intensities 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If c] -> Correct! The suggested answer is c) have different emotional reactions to the same event. 
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[If not c] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is c) have different emotional reactions to the same 
event.  Different goals or desires will produce different appraisals of the event, causing different 
emotions in response to the same event.  
 
4. A person can learn to control their initial appraisals 
❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If b] -> Correct! The suggested answer is b) False. Initial appraisals generally aren't believed to 
be consciously controllable. 
[If a] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is b) False. Initial appraisals generally aren't believed to be 
consciously controllable. 
 
5. Before an emotion is experienced 
❍ a) a person has to become sensitive 
❍ b) a person must learn what emotions are ❍ c) an event must be evaluated in the mind to determine if it’s good or bad for the person 
❍ d) a person should begin leading a dramatic life 
❍ e) a person must consciously decide what emotion they want to feel 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If c] -> Correct! The suggested answer is c) an event must be evaluated in the mind to determine 
if it’s good or bad for the person. 
[If not c] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is c) an event must be evaluated in the mind to 
determine if it’s good or bad for the person. 
 
6. An emotion can arise from both an external event, like someone saying something, and an 
internal one, for example a memory or a thought. 
❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If a] -> Correct! The suggested answer is a) True. 
[If b] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is a) True. An emotion can indeed arise from both an 
external event, like someone saying something, and an internal one, for example a memory or a 
thought. 
 
7. The more intense an emotion is the more you can expect 
❍ a) that a person is going to suppress it ❍ b) that it will be a positive emotion 
❍ c) that the event that triggered it was interpreted as being highly important to the person 
❍ d) none of the above 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If c] -> Correct! The suggested answer is c) that the event that triggered it was interpreted as 
being highly important to the person. 
[If not c] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is c) that the event that triggered it was interpreted as 
being highly important to the person. If an event is interpreted as being very significant (by the 
appraisal process), then it is likely to trigger an more intense emotional response. 
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8. Each event a person perceives, whether it’s as minor as someone’s passing comment or as 
significant as their country going to war, is automatically evaluated in the mind as being 
either positive or negative with regard to the person’s goals, needs and desires. 
❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If a] -> Correct! The suggested answer is a) True.  
[If b] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is a) True. Each event a person perceives is evaluated in the 
mind to determine if it has significance for the person and if it is good or bad for them in relation 
to their goals and needs.  
 
9. The initial appraisal process, and resulting emotion impulse, occur without conscious control 
or awareness. 
 ❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 
Response Feedback: 
[If a] -> Correct! The suggested answer is a) True. The initial appraisal of an event is a rapid 
process that is believed to occur in the mind largely without conscious awareness, resulting in an 
initial emotional response that is essentially involuntary. 
[If b] -> Sorry, the suggested answer is a) True. The initial appraisal of an event is a rapid process 
that is believed to occur in the mind largely without conscious awareness, resulting in an initial 
emotional response that is essentially involuntary. 
 
Great! You've finished this section of the study 
 
There will be a another, delayed assessment (quiz) later in the survey, so do your best to 
remember the information you've been presented. 
 
For now you will go on to the next study. The delayed assessment will take place after you are 




Outcome Measure 1 
 
Study III. In this study, you will be helping build a scenario database. These scenarios will be 
used for conducting future experiments. 
 
In the following fictional scenarios, people are depicted reacting to various hypothetical 
situations. In some cases, you are are asked to imagine yourself in the hypothetical situation. 
For each scenario, please provide a rating of how blameworthy you think the person is for 
their reaction. 
 
When we say how blameworthy a person is, we mean to what extent does the person 
deserve blame for their reaction. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. We are just interested in your perceptions.  
 
[Other-blame scenarios -- this text was not present in the version see by study 
participants] 
 
● At a company meeting, a young office worker presents a report to their team. One of 
their colleagues points out an error in the report calculations. The presenter starts to 
get angry at the colleague for highlighting the mistake. 
 
How blameworthy is the presenter for their reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● An instructor is teaching a large class during fall semester. One day, a student sitting 
in the back row asks a great deal of questions in class, raising his hand every few 
minutes. After a while, the instructor starts to feel impatient with the student.  
 
How blameworthy is the instructor for their reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● Late in the semester, a student gets a bad grade on an assignment she hadn’t put a lot 
of time into. Walking home after school, and remembering the grade, the student feels 
angry about how hard the instructor has been grading. 
 
How blameworthy is the student for his reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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● On a fall afternoon, a woman overhears some people at a restaurant expressing 
political views very different from her own. The woman feels a growing disgust. 
 
How blameworthy is the woman for her action? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
[Self-blame scenarios -- this text was not present in the version see by study 
participants] 
 
● You and a friend are working on two similar important projects. One night, both of 
you stay late at the office. The friend, with whom you have a somewhat competitive 
relationship, tells you that he’d had a setback and that he’s worried about completing 
his project on time. To an extent, you are pleased to hear about your friend’s troubles 
and concerns.  
 
How blameworthy are you for your reaction?  
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● One evening you hear on the news that a person of about the same age as you, and 
with the same background, has recently achieved considerable success and fame. You 
feel a surge of envy on hearing the story. 
 
How blameworthy are you for your reaction?  
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● You and your boyfriend/girlfriend are discussing where you want to go on vacation. 
You suggest one destination, but your partner prefers another. You agree to go to the 
place they like, but you feel some resentment toward them. 
 
How blameworthy are you for your reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● One Spring afternoon, a friend asks for your help on an assignment. You have helped 
the friend before, and know they are counting on you, but you have work to do, and 
you feel exasperated by their request. 
 
How blameworthy are you for your reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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[Filler scenarios -- this text was not present in the version see by study participants] 
 
● A woman sits alone in an office. It is after 10pm. She is concentrating on her work. 
She gets a phone call, glances to see who it is, but does not pick up.  
 
How blameworthy is the woman for her reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● Sitting on a park bench in early spring, a woman is reading the paper. Small birds skip 
around nearby, looking for crumbs. The woman realizes that she is cold, but does not 
put on her jacket.  
 
How blameworthy is the woman for her reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● A jogger is making his way through a park at an easy pace. It is dusk. Families are 
gathering at the picnic areas with food and music. The jogger notices that the 
shoelaces on his left sneaker are untied, but does not stop to tie them. 
 
How blameworthy is the jogger for his reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● On a brisk, sunny morning a man gets out of his car and heads toward an office 
building. He is in a hurry to get to the tenth floor. But though the elevator is working, 
he takes the stairs instead.  
 
How blameworthy is the man for his action? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
● On a Sunday afternoon, a woman strolls down the street of his urban neighborhood. 
She begins to feel hungry, checks her watch, and steps into an inexpensive restaurant 
for a bite to eat. 
 
How blameworthy is the woman for her action?  
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 














● Have you previously participated in MTurk studies that are very similar to any of the 
studies you just completed? 







 Short Answer 
 
● What is your highest level of education? 
 High School 
Some College 
College Graduate 
Some Graduate School 
Graduate Degree (such as Masters) 
Doctoral Degree (PhD, EdD, JD, MD, etc) 
 
● Please briefly describe the research question of interest (in other words, the main 
purpose) for each of the studies you have participated in today, as you understand 
them. 
 Short Answer 
 
● Please provide any other thoughts or comments you may have. 
 Short Answer 
 
● MTurkCode 







Now we can explain the true purpose of the preceding studies. In fact, all preceding activities 
were part of a single study. There is also NO delayed final assessment :). We were interested 
in seeing whether providing information about emotions may influence the way people rated 
the emotional reactions in the hypothetical scenarios provided near the study’s end. We 
theorized that getting information about emotions would cause people to rate the emotional 





Pilot Study Materials 




Today you’ll be participating in two short studies. Altogether they should take about an hour. 
 
Part 1: Model Learning 
 In this study we’re investigating the effectiveness of specific instruction 
methodologies for conveying psychological material. We will be comparing two groups to 
see how different instructional methodologies compare when learning about emotions. 
[Describe study activities.] A week from today we will send you a link to a short online 
assessment to evaluate your retention and understanding of the material you see today. Then 
we’ll compare the results to see which approach was more effective.  
 
Part 2: Post-test 
In this study, you will be helping us build a scenario database. Such databases exist 
for images, and we’re working to develop one for text narratives. The idea is to use the 
scenarios for conducting future experiments: it’s useful to know ahead of time how people 
tend to respond to them.  
So in this last study you will be presented with a number of scenarios and asked to 
rate the reactions of the people in those scenarios. There are no right or wrong answers. We 
are just interested in your perceptions. You don’t need to spend too long thinking about your 
response, just go with what seems right to you. 




Today you’ll be participating in two short studies. Altogether they should take about an hour. 
 
Part 1: Fiction Reading 
This study’s purpose is to investigate how reading emotionally affecting content such 
as literary fiction is influenced by the reading medium. In this case, whether reading on the 
computer affects the recall of emotional content. [Describe study activities.]  A week from 
today we will send you a link to a short online assessment to evaluate your retention of the 
material you see today. Then we’ll compare the results to the other group, which is reading 
on paper, to see how they compare. 
 
Part 2: Post-test 
In this study, you will be helping us build a scenario database. Such databases exist 
for images, and we’re working to develop one for text narratives. The idea is to use the 
scenarios for conducting future experiments: it’s useful to know ahead of time how people 
tend to respond to them.  
So in this last study you will be presented with a number of scenarios and asked to 
rate the reactions of the people in those scenarios. There are no right or wrong answers. We 
are just interested in your perceptions. You don’t need to spend too long thinking about your 
response, just go with what seems right to you. 
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PFL Activity 1 
 
Below, three characters are shown having emotional reactions to various events. Using the 
scenes below as a starting point, your task is to come up with a general explanation for how 
different emotions arise. This may involve a principle or set of principles. Your explanation 
should be generally predictive, that is, you should be able to use it to predict what type of 
emotion will arise given a specific situation. The type of emotion does not need to be totally 
exact, e.g. frustration or contempt. A broad emotional category would be sufficient. Your 
explanation should work for all the scenarios below, and any other hypothetical situation.  
 
This can be a challenging task,  so do not worry if you don't come up with a perfect 




















































On the following screen(s) you will 
be presented with information about 
emotion based on research findings 




Please review the information on the 
following screens. You will have 5-
10 minutes to do so.  
 
You can let the study administrator 
know if you feel you are ready 
before the time is up. 
 
SCREEN 3: 
The following diagram provides a 






In fact, research indicates that the 
process is more complicated. 
 
There is a crucial step that occurs 




The following diagram provides a 





To recap: when an event occurs, multiple 
brain regions work very quickly and without 
your conscious control to evaluate the nature 
of the event (good or bad for me). This 
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appraisal then gives rise to a corresponding 
emotion. Without the appraisal process, full-
fledged emotions could not occur. Yet we 
have neither conscious awareness nor control 








Practice Exercises 1 
 
In the following 5 questions, you will be asked to select or suggest an event that would be 
most likely to produce a positive or negative appraisal, given an initial situation. 
 
1.i. You come home after work/school, wanting to relax and expecting to be alone. Given the 
above, select an event that is most likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
❍ a) You find that the apartment is empty and quiet. ❍ b) You find that your roommate has brought back a group of loud friends. 
❍ c) You find that you got no mail. 
❍ d) You find that your neighbor got a package delivered. 
❍ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: b) 
 
1.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
2.i. You have put a lot of effort into an essay. Given the above, select an event that is most 
likely to produce a *positive* appraisal. 
❍ a) You computer crashes and the essay is lost. ❍ b) You get the essay back a week after you turn it in. 
❍ c) You learn that your instructor won't count the essay toward the final grade. 
❍ d) Your professor praises you for the essay's quality. 
❍ e) None of the above. 
 
Suggested response: d) 
 
2.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
3.i. You are at a cafe and looking forward to having a particular pastry. Given the above, 
select an event that is most likely to produce a *negative* appraisal. 
❍ a) You see that you have plenty of cash in your wallet. ❍ b) You note that the cafe is full of people. 
❍ c) The customer in line in front of you asks for the last of the pastries. 
❍ d) The pastries look particularly fresh. 
❍ e) a and b only 
 
Suggested response: c) 
 
3.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
4.i. You are taking an important final exam. Given the above, suggest an event that is likely 
to produce a *positive* appraisal. 
 
4.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction you might have to the event above. 
 
5.i. You go to move your brand new car. Given the above, suggest an event that is likely to 
produce a *negative* appraisal. 
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In the 5 questions below you will be asked to select or suggest a situation, in which the given 
event is most likely to produce a positive or negative appraisal. 
 
1.i. Your boss tells you that your company will implement a particular idea. Which situation, 
if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a *positive* appraisal of the above event.  
❍ a) The idea is one you had openly opposed in the past. 
❍ b) The idea is one that you had proposed to your boss as something the company should 
do. 
❍ c) Your boss is dressed casually when he gives you the news. 
❍ d) The idea was originally proposed by a coworker whom you dislike. 
❍ e) None of the above. 
 
Suggested response: b) 
 
1.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
2.i. You are talking with friends in the school parking lot, when you hear the second bell, 
announcing that class has just started. Which situation, if true, would be most likely to cause 
you to have a *negative* appraisal of the above event. 
❍ a) This is your lunch period, and you don't have to be in class. ❍ b) You are an alum, visiting the school for the day. 
❍ c) You and your buddies are planning to skip class and go to the mall. 
❍ d) You care about doing well in school and are supposed to be in class. 
❍ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: d) 
 
2.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
3.i. Your mother, who is very good with money, calls and begins to ask you questions about 
your finances. Which situation, if true, would be most likely to cause you to have a 
*negative* appraisal of the above event. 
❑ a) You have been worrying about your credit card debt. ❑ b) You have a high paying job. 
❑ c) You have high confidence in your money management abilities. 
❑ d) Your apartment is very clean. 
❑ e) All of the above. 
 
Suggested response: a) 
 
3.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the response 
you have selected. 
 
4.i. You happen on an affordable apartment listing in your neighborhood. Suggest a 
*preceding* situation which, if true, would be likely to cause you to have a *positive* 
appraisal of the above event.  
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4.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 
you have suggested. 
 
5.i For this question, use the same event as in question 9. Suggest a *preceding*  situation 
which, if true, would be likely to cause you to have a *negative* appraisal of the event. 
 
5.ii. In a word or two, describe the emotional reaction to the event above, given the situation 




Take a moment to reflect on how you were able to identify the answers to the questions above. 
Notice you did not have to do calculations, as with a math problem. Nor was your answer merely 
a guess, as when trying to make a prediction about something like a sports match or an election. 
Given a scenario, you were able to know with a high degree of certainty how you would feel, and 
this happened "automatically." That is appraisal at work. It is performed by the mind so quickly, 
that one can neither prevent appraisal from happening, nor have conscious awareness of it, except 








1. If a person is exhibiting signs of anger, e.g. in their voice or facial expression, which of the 
following is likely: 
❍ a) something occurred that the person has interpreted as threatening to their desires 
❍ b) the person is mean 
❍ c) the person is probably blowing things out of proportion ❍ d) the situation they are in is their fault 
 
Suggested Response: a) 
 
2. If a person perceives an event, for example someone speaking to them 
❍ a) they’ll remember the event ONLY if it’s important 
❍ b) their mind will automatically evaluate the event to determine if it is harmful or 
beneficial to them 
❍ c) they may be expected to have an emotional response to the event, even if only a mild 
one 
❍ d) b and c only 
❍ e) a, b and c 
 
Suggested Response: d) 
 
3. Based on the emotion model you have been provided with, if two similar individuals have 
different goals or desires within the same domain (for example, supporting different political 
candidates), they may be expected to 
❍ a) dislike each other 
❍ b) behave the same way regardless of the difference 
❍ c) have different emotional reactions to the same event 
❍ d) pursue those goals or desires with different intensities 
 
Suggested Response: c) 
 
4. A person can learn to control their initial appraisals 
❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 
Suggested Response: b) 
 
5. Before an emotion is experienced 
❍ a) a person has to become sensitive ❍ b) a person must learn what emotions are 
❍ c) an event must be evaluated in the mind to determine if it’s good or bad for the person 
❍ d) a person should begin leading a dramatic life 
❍ e) a person must consciously decide what emotion they want to feel 
 
Suggested Response: c) 
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6. An emotion can arise from both an external event, like someone saying something, and an 
internal one, for example a memory or a thought. 
❍ a) True ❍ b) False 
 
Suggested Response: a) 
 
7. The more intense an emotion is the more you can expect 
❍ a) that a person is going to suppress it 
❍ b) that it will be a positive emotion 
❍ c) that the event that triggered it was interpreted as being highly important to the person ❍ d) none of the above 
 
Suggested Response: c) 
 
8. Each event a person perceives, whether it’s as minor as someone’s passing comment or as 
significant as their country going to war, is automatically evaluated in the mind as being 
either positive or negative with regard to the person’s goals, needs and desires. 
❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 
Suggested Response: a) 
 
9. The initial appraisal process, and resulting emotion impulse, occur without conscious control 
or awareness. 
 ❍ a) True 
❍ b) False 
 





Outcome Measure 1 
ID_______          V1 - ____ 
 
Below, you will be presented with scenarios, and asked to rate the reactions of the people in 
the scenarios based on how blameworthy you think the people are for their reactions.  
 
When we say how blameworthy a person is, we mean to what extent does the person 
deserve blame for their reaction. 
 
 
1. An elderly woman lives in a large old house in the suburbs. Her eyesight is 
deteriorating. Her daughter, visiting on a warm fall afternoon, suggests that she go to 
a doctor to get an eye exam. But the woman refuses. 
   
 How blameworthy do you think is the woman for her reaction? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
2. A woman sits alone in an office. It is after 10pm. She is concentrating on her work. 
She gets a phone call, glances to see who it is, but does not pick up.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the woman for her reaction? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. On a brisk, sunny morning a man gets out of his car and heads toward an office 
building. He is in a hurry to get to the tenth floor. But though the elevator is working, 
he takes the stairs instead.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the man for his action? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4. Coming to the DMV on a cloudless summer day, a young man fails at his second 
attempt to get a driver’s license. Going back home with his father, he feels ashamed 
and frustrated.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the young man for his reaction? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
5. At a summer dinner thrown by a wealthy friend, a poet gets praised by the host for a 
poem most of which was written by someone else. Relaxed by the wine, a number of 
guests add their own compliments. The poet is pleased with the attention. 
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 How blameworthy do you think is the poet for their reaction? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
6. An instructor is teaching a large class during fall semester. One day, a student sitting 
in the back row asks a great deal of questions in class, raising his hand every few 
minutes. After a while, the instructor starts to feel impatient with the student.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the instructor for their reaction? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
7. Coming in for his annual checkup, a man is told by his doctor that he should quit 
smoking cigarettes.  Afterward, on the walk home through the twilit neighborhood, he 
stops by the bodega to buy one last pack.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the man for his action? 
 (0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
8. Having risen extra early so as not to miss an important appointment, for which he will 
have to drive across town, a man misplaces his keys just as he is about to leave. He is 
very annoyed and ready to turn his apartment upside down to find the keys. 
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the man for his reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
9. Sitting on a park bench in early spring, a woman is reading the paper. Small birds skip 
around nearby, looking for crumbs. The woman realizes that she is cold, but does not 
put on her jacket.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the woman for her reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  
10. A jogger is making his way through a park at an easy pace. It is dusk. Families are 
gathering at the picnic areas with food and music. The jogger notices that the 
shoelaces on his left sneaker are untied, but does not stop to tie them.  
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the jogger for his reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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11. Late in the semester, a student gets a bad grade on an assignment she hadn’t put a lot 
of time into. Walking home after school, and remembering the grade, the student feels 
angry about how hard the instructor has been grading. 
 
 How blameworthy do you think is the student for her reaction? 
(0 = not at all blameworthy, 10 = completely blameworthy) 
 








SECTION 1:  

















 Short Answer 
 
● Previous degree(s)/area(s) of study 
 Short Answer 
 
● Occupation (if other than or in addition to Student) 
 Short Answer 
 







● For which class will you be getting credit for participating in this experiment? (If you 
are participating for monetary compensation, enter "Compensation") 
 Short Answer 
 
● Please briefly describe the research question of interest for each of the studies you 
have participated in today, as you understand them. 
 Short Answer 
 
● To what extent would you agree with the following statement: "As I performed the 
tasks in these studies, I came to believe that they were part of a single study." 
(1=completely disagree, 5=completely agree) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
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● Please provide any other thoughts or comments you may have. 





APPENDIX C  
 
2nd Pre-Dissertation Pilot Select Materials (remaining materials identical to 1st pilot) 
 
PFL Activity 1. 
 
Activity I: Emotion Exercise 
 
Below, three characters are shown having emotional reactions to different events. Using the 
scenes below as a starting point, your task is to come up with a general explanation for how 
different emotions arise. This may involve a principle or set of principles.  
 
Your explanation should be generally predictive, that is, you should be able to use it to 
predict what type of emotion will arise given a specific situation. The type of emotion does 
not need to be totally exact, e.g. frustration or contempt. A broad emotional category would 
be sufficient. Your explanation should work for all the scenarios below, and any other 
hypothetical situation.  
 
This can be a challenging task,  so do not worry if you don't come up with a perfect 
explanation. Just do your best!  
 









Write your explanation here. Take about 10 minutes to think about and complete your 
answer.  
